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ABSTRACT 
Across today’s spectrum of contemporary warfare, the human terrain is routinely 
recognized as the center of gravity, but disconnects exists between how states or power 
holders seek to influence target audiences and how insurgents, terrorist groups, and 
similar nonstate actors fight to seize the population’s cognitive terrain. Insurgents and 
nonstate actor threats increasingly seek the influence advantage through grassroots 
processes to subvert populations and establish asymmetric advantages against the United 
States and other state actors. U.S. policy recognizes the need to influence the behavior, 
perceptions, and attitudes of foreign audiences through an indirect approach, but its 
influence methods, in reality, remain tied to Cold War constructs unable to generate the 
desired effects needed for current/future threats. This thesis examines case studies of 
insurgent and nonstate actor influence operations to analyze their effects on the 
perceptions and attitudes of various disparate audiences at a grassroots level. The analysis 
then identifies methodology, vulnerabilities, and opportunities to engage these 
asymmetric threats within their own influence safe havens. 
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 1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Perceptions are as important as any physical reality of the battlefield. 
Adept adversaries plan their actions around sophisticated influence 
strategies enabled by the globalization of information and technology. In 
this age of instant communication, actors have become proficient at 
crafting their accounts of events into a compelling story or narrative. The 
intent of this narrative is to influence not only the local population but the 
global community as well. The battle of the narrative, as this struggle for 
influence has been called, is waged primarily through critical elements of 
the population who have formal or informal power or standing to sway the 
sentiments or induce the compliance of the general population.1
Across today’s spectrum of contemporary warfare, the human terrain is routinely 
recognized as the center of gravity for achieving success. While the United States 
recognizes this center of gravity and the importance for an indirect approach to affect it, 
the United States continues to treat influence warfare methods as supporting efforts to 
other lines of operations within traditional warfare constructs. In 2006, the Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, recognized this flaw when he stated; “if I were grading, I 
would say we probably deserve a D or D-plus as a country on how well we’re doing in 
the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today.”
 
2 This shortfall was recognized 
again in 2010 when the House Armed Services Committee admonished the Department 
of Defense for its execution of influence warfare activities.3
U.S. military influence efforts are traditionally secondary operations, often seen 
as a support mechanism for a conventional approach to war.
  
4
                                               
1 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating 
Concept Ver. 2.0, 2010, 13, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc2_0.pdf. 
 Within unconventional 
operations, the use of influence warfare and influence operations is more prominent. U.S. 
2 Robert J. Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs 
Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 227, 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0722/2007028974.html. 
3 United States, Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, The FY 2010 Defense Appropriations 
Act, 2009. 
4 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, 
Vietnam and Beyond, 227. 
 2 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) doctrine recognizes the need to influence the behavior, 
perceptions, and attitudes of foreign populations as a cornerstone for successful 
unconventional warfare, but the application of influence warfare and psychological 
warfare actions is executed with the same methodology as it is in the conventional 
approach. It remains top down and reactionary. 
U.S. influence efforts typically target a general populace for supporting the 
shaping of the operational environment or used to support counterinsurgency operations, 
but they are traditionally directive in nature, and maintain a readily apparent U.S. and/or 
authoritarian attribution and stigma modeled from conventional forms of warfare. These 
efforts are often predicated on formulaic, standardized, and inflexible methods with a 
preoccupation for reorganizing structures and technologies instead of focusing on 
conducting influence centric operations.5
A. BACKGROUND  
 This methodology is inadequate for current and 
future threats because insurgents and nonstate actors prioritize, design and resource their 
influence warfare operations to affect the perceptions and attitudes of various disparate 
populations. These groups operate at a local, or grassroots, level with the intent of 
mobilizing multiple audiences toward a set of desired effects.  
Since 2003, regional and global insurgent and terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, 
Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hezbollah, have increased their means and methods of 
influencing targeted audiences. In September 2010, Ronald Noble, the Head of 
INTERPOL, warned that extremist websites were skyrocketing, and their growth was 
making recruitment easier.6 The number of these websites in English alone has grown so 
fast that the total number is now unknown.7
Despite the investment of millions of dollars by the United States and allies, the 
enemy’s influence effectiveness appears undiminished, unless the enemy commits 
 
                                               
5 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, 
Vietnam and Beyond, 227. 




tactical and operational mistakes that countermand its own efforts, which occurred in the 
case of Al Qaeda—Iraq (AQI) in 2008. U.S. and state actors often neglect to capitalize on 
such mistakes using sustained and deliberate influence operations. Adversaries’ influence 
operations are routinely anchored in interpersonal interactions exemplified by relevant 
physical examples. These operations typically focus on affecting social networks and are 
reinforced through, but not exclusive to, the use of social media interaction, text 
messaging, blogs, Internet chat rooms, traditional audio-visual and visual media, Mosque 
and Madrassa indoctrination, and electronic social networks (eSocial networks). 
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda continue to exemplify these methods.  
From Indonesia to Sub-Saharan Africa, “Jihadist” influence paraphernalia like 
DVD’s, magazines, and posters can be found with street vendors and within affiliated 
terrorist or insurgent camps. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah actively maintain, or are affiliated 
with, personal and eSocial networks, blogs, chat rooms, and other social media outlets to 
connect their influence actors and actions with individual and group participants, which 
encompass local and international audiences,8 who are active in nearly every first power 
nation, to include China and Russia.9 Their influence efforts are portrayed and translated 
into a myriad of languages other than Arabic to include English, French, Spanish, 
Indonesian, and Farsi.10 Although these trends show a global outreach, their influence 
efforts intuitively tap into principles of social movement theory that enable them to 
exploit grassroots channels, methods, and messages for mobilization and propagation,11
U.S. Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP), and comparable foreign agencies, traditionally rely on employing a top-down 
 
which is in stark contrast to U.S. methodology. 
                                               
8 D. E. Denning, “Information Operations and Terrorism,” Journal of Information Warfare (Draft), 
http://www.Infowar.Com (2004): 1–2. 




11 Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, “Hezbollah As a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence, Heritage and Commemoration Center 
(IICC), June 2007, http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e_0607.pdf, 3. 
 4 
methodology to affect the beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes of various population groups 
and audiences. States and expeditionary forces are predominantly reactionary, with their 
influence endeavors aimed at validating the action instead of the action validating the 
message.  
A disconnect exists between how a state, or power holder, strives to influence 
target audiences and how the insurgent, terrorist groups, and similar nonstate actor fights 
for the support or control of the population.12
In her thesis on Hezbollah’s psychological war against Israel, Lisa Brennan 
succinctly exemplified Hezbollah’s effective psychological and influence warfare 
campaign targeting Lebanese and Israeli audiences. Hezbollah’s grassroots methodology 
portrays a stark contrast to that of the U.S. and its allies.  
 The advantage and momentum resides with 
the insurgent or other irregular group until either they succeed or self-destruct based on 
their ability or inability to achieve their influence objectives favorably. A wealth of 
articles and research exist on how nation states, specifically the United States, should 
conduct psychological operations, strategic communications, and public diplomacy to 
deny popular support to the insurgent and terrorist group. Most research does not address 
or analyze the enemy’s means and methodology in conducting influence campaigns 
within the context of assessing how it is able to impact audiences within and outside of its 
operational environments. The existing research lacks analysis of the adversary’s 
influence warfare activities for the purpose of developing and employing an effective 
methodology to prevent and defeat the growing trend of insurgent activity to mobilize 
social groups against the United States and its allies. Meaningful advancements in 
changing U.S. methodology and policy for waging a war of influence cannot be instituted 
until the manner in which adversaries wage influence warfare against the United States is 
deconstructed or understood.  
Hezbollah’s military strategy was unique because of the way it combined 
conventional and psychological warfare. Specifically, the group subjected 
almost all of its military operations to its media requirements. Al-Manar [a 
Hezbollah owned TV station] was a central part of this strategy. Every 
                                               
12 Gordon McCormick, “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
January 2010. 
 5 
Hezbollah unit deployed with a cameraman who recorded their operations. 
After making appropriate edits—such as deleting scenes or adding music 
and narration—the clips would then be broadcasted on Al-Manar. The 
footage was selective in that it only showed scenes that favored Hezbollah, 
even if the fighters eventually were defeated by the IDF in that particular 
operation. Consequently, Al-Manar helped give the perception that 
Hezbollah was doing better on the battlefield than it actually was.13
Although this example displays a top-down approach from Hezbollah to the local 
level to influence several types of audiences, it illustrates how Hezbollah uses combat 
actions to reinforce and validate the messages and narratives generated by its propaganda 
division. Examples also exist of how similar efforts reinforce the influence operations 
occurring within local Lebanese communities, as well as electronic social media 
interaction with Israeli communities. Hezbollah’s approach to influence warfare is but 
one example of a systematic approach to waging a war of influence and psychological 
warfare as a means to disrupt and defeat a superior state sponsored adversary. To 
understand Hezbollah’s use of influence methodology, a clear and concise definition of 
influence operations and influence warfare is essential although “no agreed-upon Joint 
force or Army definition of influence operations exists.”
 
14
B. WHAT ARE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, influence operations are defined as deliberately 
planned and synergized actions designed to produce desired effects using coordinated and 
multidimensional methods.15
                                               
13 Lisa M. Brennan, Hezbollah: Psychological Warfare Against Israel (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2009), 23, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA496916. 
 Focused at the local and community levels, they shape 
14 Eric V. Larson et al., “Foundations for Effective Influence Operations,” A Framework for 
Enhancing Army Capabilities (RAND, 2009), 2, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.pdf. RAND and the U.S. 
Air Force definitions of influence operations remain focused and grounded on a strategic messaging 
methodology. Their definitions gloss over the importance of physical and nonphysical methods of 
persuasion that validate the influence message. These definitions neglect the actions of actors and entities 
embedded with the local populace and their immediate social audience, and the importance of affecting 
audiences within their interpersonal social networks.  
15 Thomas Scanzillo. Influence: Maximizing Effects to Create Long-Term Stability (Master’s thesis, 
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2010), 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA538741&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 6 
operational conditions by fostering changes in the behavior, attitudes, civil disposition, 
and operating environment across targeted social groups, populations, and political-
military organizations.16 They are continuously refined to address evolving conditions 
within a community or at an interpersonal level from within the social structure of the 
targeted audience(s). These operations use both physical and nonphysical methods of 
persuasion to affect vulnerabilities across diverse and complex social networks to 
generate advantageous behavior, perception, and attitude changes.17
C.  INFLUENCE ACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
 Ultimately, these 
methods affect the wider social and political environment and facilitate the 
accomplishment of desired effects.  
According to the RAND Corporation and Arizona State’s Consortium on 
Strategic Communications, the United States and other states traditionally rely on 
elements of national power to action influence efforts to affect various audiences, with 
subordinate organizations echoing the strategic messages.18 In contrast, insurgents and 
similar actors employ ideological or vanguard elements who embed with local 
communities to conduct comprehensive actions using propaganda and coercive actions to 
isolate existing political structures, establish shadow administrative functions, conduct re-
education program, conduct psychological operations, collect social intelligence, identify 
individuals for exploitation or replacement, and establish support mechanisms.19
Successful influence operations are based on whether or not the influence 
purveyor achieves its short-term and long-term objectives. Influence operations comprise 
a carrot and stick approach to affecting targeted and wider audiences. They can serve to 
fulfill expectations, needs, and requirements of the audience to achieve favorable effects. 
Simultaneously, these operations can be coercive, repressive, violent, and threatening to 
divest their adversary of support, or prevent resistance to the influencing of an actor’s end 
 
                                               
16 U.S. Department of the Army, “Field Manual 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces 
Unconventional Warfare,” September 2008, 2–11, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf.  
17 Scanzillo, Influence: Maximizing Effects to Create Long-Term Stability, 3. 
18 Larson et al., “Foundations for Effective Influence Operations,” 5. 
19 Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah As a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 3. 
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state objectives. Their influence efforts and objectives are inexplicably linked to 
everything they do. They are subject to the successful leveraging of channels, mediums, 
messages, and deeds pertinent to each target audience. 
D.  PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE 
This research examines nonstate and state sponsored insurgent and terrorist 
influence operations to recruit, subvert, coerce, and/or repress various target audiences. 
Insurgents and terrorist groups intuitively or purposely utilize aspects of prevailing social 
movement theories (SMT) when conducting influence warfare against target audiences, 
states, and the United States. This thesis assesses how insurgent and terrorist influencing 
actors apply combined influence activities to gain operational or strategic advantages 
over adversaries and population groups. The analysis presents methods and means to 
combat insurgent lines of influence more efficiently and effectively in volume, parity, 
sophistication, impact, and reach through attributable and non attributable U.S. sponsored 
special influence operations. 
E.  RESEARCH QUESTION AND SCOPE 
How are insurgent and terrorist influence operations effective and how can these 
be exploited or subverted to U.S. advantage? Insurgent and terrorist influence operations 
can be exploited or subverted to U.S. advantage by analyzing their methodology, 
vulnerabilities, mediums and influence conduits. Case studies from the late 20th century 
to the present demonstrate successful and unsuccessful methods of influence, as well as 
the actions of intended and unintended audiences. Although this research uses SMT to 
derive conditions for successful influence operation and social network analysis (SNA) to 
assess the impact and causal relationships of insurgent influence warfare initiatives, it is 
not an attempt to add to the body of SMT and SNA. Rather, they serve as a lens for 
understanding the role of new and emerging methodologies in influence operations.  
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F.  INFLUENCE FRAMEWORKS 
Two prevailing conceptual frameworks exemplify influence factors at a macro, 
meso, and micro level, prevailing influence methodology (PIM) and social movement 
theory (SMT). PIM encompasses U.S. and western doctrine and policy governing 
communications used for influencing and informing various audiences that can be 
described as top-down and reactive methodology to achieve influence,20 which is 
predicated on strictly controlled information messaging to justify the actions and policies 
of the state.21 SMT is a broad field of theory, with nuanced and interrelated theories 
including collective, relative deprivation, resource mobilization and frame alignment 
approaches to understanding the emergence and growth of a social movement. Apparent 
causal relationships exist between insurgent and terrorist influence warfare methodology 
and facets of SMT. Insurgents employ a network construct that invariably leverages 
factors identified by SMT that mobilize people in desired ways.22
G.  PREVAILING U.S. INFLUENCE METHODOLOGY (PIM) 
 SMT also demonstrates 
a need for influence operations to be more proactive and personally relative in nature.  
PIM is inherently reactionary and predicated on a defensive rather than a 
proactive posture. U.S. expeditionary influence efforts are not anchored in a synchronized 
approach to affect a disparate foreign audience below a state or national level. 
Historically, U.S. military influence efforts are intended to operate at tactical and 
operational levels to inform and influence the local population, but current methods and 
practices are directed toward the population and maintain a U.S. attributable and 
authoritarian stigma.23
                                               
20 Steven R. Corman and Kevin J. Dooley. “Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape,” 
(2008), 
 Exceptions exist, but they typically manifest themselves through a 
few adept culturally and operationally leaders attuned in understanding how to influence 
http://comops.org/article/121.pdf, 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 “The term “netwar” denotes an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at a societal levels... in 
which protagonists use—indeed, depend on using—network forms of organization, doctrine, and strategy, 




and affect their immediate operating environments. Additionally, U.S. activities attempt 
to inform, not influence, the population using a centrally controlled message from 
information managers far removed from the tactical and local population environments.24
Despite some examples of past success in influence operations, PIM does not 
display a pattern of successful influence efforts (Figure 4). When PIM approaches have 
been successful, it is typically because they are in conjunction with or tied to facets of 
SMT. In cases where PIM was the exclusive influence methodology, insurgent and state 
operations were predisposed to failure. U.S. doctrine and policy, and their inherent tie to 
PIM, appear to lack efficacy. Due to PIM’s apparent shortcomings, the case studies 
examined in this thesis are analyzed based on SMT concepts, and the insurgents’ and 
nonstate actors’ intuitive application of SMT principles. 
  
H.  INSURGENTS, NONSTATE ACTORS, AND SMT 
For purposes of this thesis, social movement theory is identified as a bottom-up, 
proactive, and interactive methodology used intuitively by insurgents and comparable 
nonstate actors to affect an audience’s social and daily environments. Effective influence 
operations are assessed based on their achievement of active or passive support by the 
population, and increase or decrease of active or passive support to the state or power 
holders. One of the traditional advantages insurgent and terrorist groups possess is their 
ability to operate and exist within and among the population. Sufficiently garnering 
support to grow, operate, and achieve their objectives are inherently tied to their ability to 
influence the population both physically and ideologically.25
The cognitive alignment that spurs individuals to participate in or support 
collective action falls along the methods of influence presented in social movement 
 Understanding how the 
insurgent adversary conducts influence warfare against population groups and to what 
degrees it attains effectiveness provides insight into undermining those same efforts. 
                                               
24 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, 5–8. 
25 Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla 
Mobilization,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 296. 
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theory.26 Cognitive alignment begins with an individual’s relationship within its 
interpersonal social networks. These networks and their associated environments directly 
influence the micro level (individual) and meso level (social group) within various 
cultures and sub cultures.27
Whether by design or intuitive action, insurgent groups and other nonstate actors 
demonstrate the capacity to operationalize SMT as they seek to affect local and wider 
social constructs either directly and indirectly. Figure 1 displays an aggregate of 
prevailing SMT factors that serve as the foundation for an influence strategy.
 Effective influence activities can favorably affect behavior 
through deliberate offensive and defensive influence actions, both of which are done 
through a coupling of physical acts and messages.  
28
                                               
26 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 








Figure 1.   SMT Attributes and Functions for an Influence Strategy29
1. Social Change 
 
Social change is the disequilibrium between segments of the population and the 
state. According to Chalmers Johnson, if disequilibrium exists between a portion of the 
populace and the prevailing social strata, and no homeostatic mechanism exists to bring 
them into equilibrium, the rift between the two will create an increasing climate for social 
change.30
2. Opportunities and Threats 
  
Opportunities and threats represent the contribution of the political process model 
to the development of SMT. As proposed by Sidney Tarrow, in his written work, States 
                                               
29 Everton, Lecture on Social Movement Theory. 
30 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 54–60. 
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and Opportunities, the political process model reflects the convergence and exploitation 
of political, economic, and social vulnerabilities. 31 Insurgencies typically do not emerge 
merely because of widespread political instability, but also due to broad social processes 
that have strengthened the aggrieved population’s political power.32 Insurgents use their 
inherent strengths to exploit ungoverned free space, ideological friction points, and “the 
presence of certain shared cognitions within the minority community” to canalize a social 
movement’s malleability to its cause to emerge and grow.33 These factors, “in 
combination with a fourth factor: the shifting control response of other groups to the 
movement,” enable the insurgents’ influencing agents to exploit grievances while 
simultaneously disrupting the status quo and threatening the validity and presence of 
potential competitors.34
3. Mobilizing Resources and Structures 
  
Mobilizing resources and structures is the ability to gather logistical and financial 
resources, as well as human capitol. It incorporates the gathering and use of relatively 
ungoverned or under governed political areas within a state that an insurgent or other 
nonstate actor can exploit for control and growth. The encompassing scope of structure 
and resource mobilization includes the “micromobilization [of] structural locations that 
are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be 
generated,”35 which includes family networks, friendship networks, professional 
networks, social networks, and individuals or groups that bridge the various structures.36
                                               
31 D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge, MA, 1996), 58–59. 
  
 
32 Everton, Lecture on Social Movement Theory. 
33 Ibid. 
34 John D. McCarthy, “Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing,” in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142. 
35 Ibid., 141. 
36 Ibid. 
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Conversely, resource mobilization can be an influence target when the influence actor 
initiates activities and messages that may serve to disrupt or deny resources to an existing 
or potential influence competitor. 
4. Frame Alignment 
Frame alignment is the linkage of individual or groups with a social movement 
organization’s ideological orientations in which sets of individual interests, values, and 
beliefs are congruent and complimentary with the activities, goals, and ideology of the 
sponsoring social movement organization.37 Frame alignment is the mechanism in which 
insurgents, terrorists, and other nonstate actors adapt their purpose and reasoning (aka 
their narrative) to resonate with the target population’s cognitive interests. Exploiting 
grievance, discontent, and political free space is their primary access point. McCarthy 
and Zald demonstrated that grievances and discontent can be defined, created, and 
manipulated by issue “entrepreneurs and organizations.”38
5. SMT Process 
 Misinformation, 
disinformation, and selective disequilibrium exploitation allow an elite/professionalized 
influence element to manipulate the disequalized population and channel it into a support 
base, generate passive tolerance/support, or at a minimum, repress it from resistance. The 
same methods can likewise be employed for influencing population dispositions toward 
dissent, discord, or even fear. 
These factors set the conditions for the cognitive susceptibility of target audiences 
toward desired influence objectives and collective actions or inactions.39
                                               
37 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 464. 
 These 
objectives and actions can include active or passive support for the influencing agent, 
establishing a rift between the audience and the state or establish power holder, and or 
generating discord within the status quo of an adversary’s social structure. 
38 Ibid., 469. 
39 McAdam et al., “Introduction,” Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 5–6. 
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SMT and SNA theories help identify the links that influence and mobilize people 
toward desired behaviors, dispositions and actions. Insurgents and nonstate actors 
operationalize factors identified by SMT through a relatively decentralized approach 
allowing them to extend and bridge their influence framework across diverse and 
disparate social networks using adaptive influence efforts relevant to the target 
audiences.40 Insurgents and other nonstate actors intuitively identify this rift as a critical 
or key opportunity to exploit the discontent between disparate populations and the state 
or prevailing power holders. Insurgents and nonstate actors possess an intuitive 
knowledge for mobilizing resources and social structures, while also taking advantage of 
social opportunities and threats. They generate a target audience consciousness 
susceptible or malleable to align with the insurgent ideological framework. Successful 
adaptation of the frame alignment processes enables the insurgent or nonstate actor to 
influence target audiences towards a desired set of collective actions or inactions,41
I. HOW INSURGENT AND NONSTATE ACTOR INFLUENCE 
OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED 
 
which articulates a general strategy for affecting various target audiences.  
Success or failure is dependent upon the insurgent or nonstate actor’s ability to 
conduct influence using deeds and messages, channels, and mediums successfully and 
succinctly. Figure 2 illustrates the framework and methodology in which an insurgent or 
nonstate actor intuitively or deliberately executes influence warfare against audiences in 
their confrontation against a state or power holder. 
                                               
40 Corman and Dooley, “Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape.” 




Figure 2.   Insurgent Influence Model 
1. Deeds and Messages  
The verbal and nonverbal narratives facilitate ideological purpose by shifting the 
audience’s cognitive alignment toward the insurgent’s or influence an actor’s ideology 
and objectives. To affect perceptions and behaviors using positive or repressive actions, 
the messages and deeds must resonate with local indigenous population groups to be 
credible. Moreover, adversarial or competing groups within the target population affect 
the propagation and validity of the insurgent’s influence effort. Exploiting, subverting, 
marginalizing, or eliminating the competition is a necessary condition to build and 
achieve influence superiority in the shortest amount of time with the least of amount of 
required resources. Equally essential is the synchronization and massing of deeds and 
messages.42
                                               
42 The “massing of words/messages and deeds” is in keeping with the joint military definition of 
concentrating force, effort, capability, and combat power against an adversary or target set. Concentrating 
the influence effort along multiple lines of influence activities is the massed effort to affect a target set, 
erode and adversary's ability to influence the same target set, and prevent effective counter narratives in 
order to seize the influence initiative. The influence effort is the combination of messages and actions 
(deeds). 
 Through synchronization and massing, the insurgent or influencing agent 
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builds credibility and legitimacy while simultaneously diminishing the credibility, 
legitimacy, and control capability of the existing political system or competing narrative. 
Concentrating multiple lines of influence activities is the massed effort to affect a target 
set, erode an adversary's influence, and prevent effective counter narratives to seize the 
influence initiative. In summation, the following causal mechanisms exist with respect to 
deeds and messages. 
Indigenous resonance states that the more local norms and idioms are used, the 
more effective the message (verbal or nonverbal) will be. The degree in which the 
messages and deeds of the influencing agent are emotionally relevant and fit within the 
audience’s daily patterns of life determines the degree of resonance leading to the 
audience alignment with the desired influence effect. 
Exploiting/subverting the competition means that the more an adversary’s (or 
influence competitor’s) mistakes and vulnerabilities are exploited, the more effective the 
influence operation becomes in repressing or swaying the audience. Mistakes made by 
either actor serve to reduce the opponent’s influence saliency. Exploiting mistakes may 
also induce emotional reactions that create dissonance.  
Massed and synchronized messages and deeds assert that when deeds and 
messages are synchronized and mutually supportive, the greater the impact and resonance 
will be among the target audience(s). 
2. Channels 
Channels are individuals within a social network who propagate information to a 
greater number of actors, nodes, or groups within and across networks in the shortest 
amount of time. These actors populate the interpersonal and electronic gossip grape vines 
within and across informal social networks, inherently affecting the formal social and 
socio-political structure of a community and society. Although other actors and nodes 
exist within social networks, such as brokers, bridges, monitors, and leaders, channels are 
the natural retransmitters of the verbal and nonverbal narratives that amplify the desired 
influence effect. Insurgents and similar nonstate actors inherently understand the need to  
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send a message (verbal and physical) to a community through its natural social lines of 
communication. The causal mechanism for activating the channels is the influence 
message naturally or artificially infiltrating the local networks and propagating. 
Infiltrating local networks maximizes the use of local actors with high levels of 
centrality propagate a message, and as such, the more effective the delivery will be. 
Central actors are those who serve as informal links between social or information 
networks within the wider target audiences. They occupy positions within a network 
where their visibility is low but they spread information to a greater number of people or 
nodes in the shortest amount of time. This characteristic may increase or reduce the 
negative implications of actions or messages due to their ability to spread information 
rapidly at a homogeneous (audience) level. These agents may also reduce negative 
implications for the counterinsurgent or insurgent. 
3. Mediums 
Mediums are the interpersonal, physical, and electronic conduit used by the 
channel(s) and the influencing agents to convey the message. Those used for discussing 
daily events and exchanging information range from local face-to-face gossip grape 
vines, to neighborhood gathering points, and to leveraging mass media outlets. This 
method also includes intermediate conduits for information flow, such as text messaging, 
eSocial networks, blogs, and low-tech examples to include community plays, councils, 
etc. The causal mechanism for mediums is the method and mode in which the channels 
and their associated audience propagate the influence message through technological or 
gossip grapevines. When the latter use locally diffused technology for message 
dissemination, the more the message’s level of validity and acceptance increases among 





Utilizing commonly used technological methods of social interactions and 
information gathering will increase the distribution of the intended influence, as well as 
its legitimacy. Examples include cell phone text messages, local gathering points were 
people discuss daily events or gossip, Internet social networks, and locally owned and 
operated broadcast stations.43
As illustrated in Figure 3, the successful and congruent employment of the 




Figure 3.   Decisive Influence 
While each one of the causal mechanisms can lead to effective influence, case 
study analysis should illustrate that when these causal mechanisms are in synergy, a 
decisive influence effect is achieved. The decisive influence effect is directly proportional 
to the success of all three variables and their causal mechanisms. A degree of effective 
influence can be achieved if one variable is less prominent than the other two, but 
decisive influence cannot be achieved unless they are proportionally employed. 
                                               
43 Current events in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Iran exemplify this mechanism.  
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J.  CASE STUDIES 
Using SMT and the variables of message and deeds, channels, and mediums, this 
thesis analyzes four case studies to illustrate how insurgents and nonstate actors execute 
influence warfare. Case selection includes the Viet Cong’s fight for control of the rural 
hamlets, the evolution of Hezbollah and its fight against Israel, Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) 
violent extremist insurgency in South East Asia, and the rise and fall of Shining Path in 
Peru. These cases display a grassroots approach to insurgent and nonstate actor influence 
warfare, and provide insight toward answering the question: what are effective insurgent 
and terrorist influence operations and how can these be exploited or subverted to provide 
the United States with an advantage?  
 20 
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II. THE VIETCONG 
A. BACKGROUND 
How did the Vietnamese communists, who possessed inferior and limited 
resources, win the war of influence, and ultimately, the Vietnam War itself against the 
South Vietnamese government and the United States? Throughout the 1960s, North 
Vietnam and its sponsored insurgent force, the Viet Cong (VC), waged a “people’s 
revolution” against the South Vietnamese government (GVN) and U.S. military forces.44 
Under the guidance of Ho Chi Minh and the direction of General Nguyen Giap, an 
insurgency and irregular war was fought to gain control over the people, territory, and 
natural resources in South Vietnam with the ultimate goal of reunification and national 
independence.45 Based in Mao’s strategies for mobilizing the population, the 
communist’s military campaigns spanned three strategic phases: social movement, 
liberation, and legitimization/militarization.46 These phases supported the insurgency’s 
primary effort, a struggle for “hearts and minds,”47 and not a war in the conventional 
sense as defined by prevailing U.S. and western military doctrine. The Viet Cong utilized 
holistic influence tactics and techniques as their preeminent grassroots weaponry to 
ensure the defeat and fall of the South Vietnamese government.48
                                               
44 William R. Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh 
Tuong Province, 1960–1964 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 156. 
 The following quote 
epitomizes North Vietnam’s and the Viet Cong’s warfare effort by focusing all military 
and political actions toward defeating the United States and South Vietnam through a war 
of influence: 
45 Ibid. 
46 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong; the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 154. 
47 Douglas Pike, “Second Indochina War Symposium,” spon. the Center of Military History and 
comp. John Schlight (presentation, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 101. 





Every military clash, every demonstration, every propaganda appeal was 
seen as an integrated whole; each had consequences far beyond its 
immediately apparent results. It was a framework that allowed us to view 
battles as psychological events and to undertake negotiations in order to 
strengthen our military position. The Americans seemed never to 
appreciate fully this strategic perspective, which among ourselves we most 
often simply called Danh va dam, dam va dahn (“fighting and talking, 
talking and fighting”). It was, after all, a traditional Vietnamese approach 
to warfare, a technique refined over centuries of confrontation with 
invaders more powerful than ourselves.49
The incongruent social conditions between the rural population and the urban 
focused South Vietnam government generated a wealth of exploitable conditions. The 
South Vietnam government was largely inactive throughout the rural villages, creating 
large swaths of political and security uncontested regions, or free spaces. The rural 
population remained a village-based society, a stark contrast with the urban populations’ 
more national focused ideology. Local grievances were far more important to the village-
based segment of society who saw little relevance in the calls for reunification or 
resistance to communism. The Vietcong recognized this political opportunity and adapted 
their ideological framework to align with the needs and expectations of rural villages to 
mobilize sufficient resources, while also exacerbating the growing discord between the 
people and the South Vietnamese government.  
  
Vietnamese society endured centuries of “foreign occupation,” instilling a 
heritage of clandestine social organizations that served as the only outlet for political 
discourse and preservation of their culture.50 Due to the clandestine nature of these 
organizations, a series of clandestine social networks were in place for exploitation and 
easy infiltration by the Vietcong into the rural Vietnamese society. Consecutive years of 
foreign occupation also created a history of resentment and mistrust for “foreign 
occupiers” and fostered a spirit of independence, or Doc Lap.51
                                               
49 Trương Như Tảng, David Chanoff, and Van Toai Doan. A Vietcong Memoir (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1986), 86. 
 Through subjugation and 
50 Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam, 1. 
51 Ibid., 2. 
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self-preservation, conditions were ripe for Vietnam’s communist-backed insurgency to 
appropriate and mobilize these organizations on behalf of Vietnamese “independence” 
from the South Vietnamese government, which followed on the footsteps of the French 
defeat to the Vietminh and the subsequent division of North and South Vietnam. 
As early as 1955, communist insurgents were actively conducting influence 
operations to infiltrate and subvert the population against the new Government of South 
Vietnam (GVN).52 From 1955 through the 1960s and ‘70s, communist insurgent 
influence operations systematically targeted villages as the “fundamental unit of peoples’ 
war.”53 Vietnamese communist party leadership developed a comprehensive process to 
take control of a village using clandestine teams to infiltrate and socially embed within 
target villages allowing the insurgents to subvert the village social structure. Communist 
cadres established secret village councils, socially marginalizing political rivals affiliated 
with the GVN. They repressed any opposition or potential ideological competition using 
propaganda, coercive activities, social intelligence, social targeting, and tailoring “party” 
goals to fit the short-term socio-political demands of local populations.54
A review and analysis of Viet Cong operations shows their influence operations 
were implemented using three Lines of Influence (LOIs) as detailed in Table 1. The use 
of specific messages, deeds, channels, and mediums under each LOI at the village level 
mutually supported the other influence lines of effort in pursuit of social mobilization 
along with military and political objectives. 
 The communist 
insurgents’ organizational structure and their use of psychologically impacting deeds to 
validate their propaganda messages enabled the insurgents to subvert a village’s political 
and social status quo. The influence effort was individually tailored to each village’s 
unique social dynamic, which allowed for rapid consolidation and expansion throughout 
and within rural provinces.  
                                               
52 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 22. 
53 Ibid., 25. 
54 Ibid., 26. 
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Influence Line of Effort Message and Deeds Channels Mediums
Dissent and Discord (Separate People from Government)
Civil Affairs, Land Reform, Shadow Gov't
Entertainment Programs (Ideology Focused)





Disrupt/Attack Government Control Mechanisms and Social Structures
Post US/GVN Visit Counter-Propaganda Efforts 
(Countersweep Operations)
Counter Strategic Hamlet Operations
Social Margilization of Gov't Leaders









Repression, Consolidation and Expansion
Co-opt Outside Groups (such as Buddhist and 
Catholic)
Information Manipulation (Media)
Control Village Movement 
Coercive "police-like" Efforts
Intra Village Mistrust via "Neighborhood Watch"
Recruitment
Proselytizing in Villages









Table 1.   Vietnamese Communist’s Lines of Influence (LOIs) 
B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS 
Western political-military doctrines tend to regard civilian population groups 
within a theater of conflict as an obstacle or object, which impedes the ability to engage 
and defeat the enemy quickly and decisively.55 In Vietnam, the Viet Cong’s main effort 
was the political mobilization of the population down to and including the village level,56 
which was a unique relationship completely alien to the U.S. and South Vietnamese 
government attempting to counter the insurgency.57
                                               
55 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971 (Department of the Army, 1973), 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/90-23/90-23C.htm.  
 The Viet Cong’s organizational 
structure was designed to influence a population alignment shift toward Vietcong 
objectives. The Vietcong designated a committee to manage an influence campaign for 
each village, hamlet, and targeted surrounding areas. Each village committee possessed 
Civil Affairs Committees (CACs), agitation propaganda cells, administration cells, social 
intelligence agents, and security personnel. Each entity executed a unique function, 
generating an equally unique influence effect. However, the simultaneous and 
synchronized efforts always contributed toward the same end state with each subordinate 
56 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 23. 
57 Ibid. 
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cell trading primacy of action dependent on the necessary desired effect. Cadre cells, 
such as those within the Civil Affairs committee, had unprecedented latitude to develop 
messages, institute social structural changes, use deliberate violence, attack opposition 
(physically or nonphysically), and promise desired deliverables. By integrating into a 
village and hamlet, special cadre cells tailored messages and deeds to the local populace’s 
interests in pursuit of overall influence objectives. 
1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition 
Using a network-like approach, the Viet Cong established a comprehensive 
methodology for taking control of a hamlet or village. Each hamlet and village within a 
province underwent a four-step process to subvert the existing socio-political structure 
within a village and province. Special cadre teams (such as social recce teams) conducted 
overt and covert social intelligence to develop comprehensive area and village 
assessments, building robust intelligence databases to further the Viet Cong’s 
understanding of even the most subtle nuances of daily village life and socio-political 
actions. Their implementation is similar to U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine but is 
much more interpersonal and comprehensive across the operational and strategic levels.58
Cadre teams surveyed villages to identify concentrations of Roman Catholics, 
families with ties to the government and military, government representatives, formal and 
informal social committees, police, tax collection personnel and their schedules, micro to 




                                               
58 U.S. Department of the Army, “Field Manual 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces 
Unconventional Warfare,” 2–1. 
 When compared to other groups analyzed in this thesis, the Viet 
Cong were more willing to co-opt other religions to use in the social mobilization 
process. For example, Shining Path demonstrates the ramifications marginalizing or 
attacking religious groups, which impedes cognitive alignment and social movement. 
Vietcong civil affairs committees subverted and eventually replaced existing village 
socio-political systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities identified in their social 
59 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 42–45. 
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intelligence and through the nature of their socially embedded status.60 The communist 
agents socially embedded themselves into a village in such a way that they became 
“symbiotic,” rather than parasitic.61 Comprehensive understanding and familiarity gained 
by Viet Cong cadre enabled them to conduct specific and tailored messages against 
potential rivals, simultaneously gathering increased support from amiable or indifferent 
members of a village. Communist messages were framed in ways to resonate with the 
individual, ranging from building rapport and support, to vilification of government 
agents or representatives, manipulation and co-opting social structures, and eventually 
focusing messages on consolidating and expanding social alignment. These messages 
were indoctrinated through deliberate actions that fall into five general categories: 
targeted violence and coercion, “counter sweeps,”62
After infiltrating a village, the communist cadres focused on destroying the 
“social adhesiveness” that historically had integrated a villager into the local social 
strata
 responsive and present local shadow 
governments, proselytizing, and social marginalization.  
63 to eliminate the traditional sense of identity. Rather than targeting individuals 
within the populace, key institutions and their functions were targeted to disrupt 
established social norms and complacency.64 Discontent between the population and the 
government regarding various social needs and expectations was targeted using rumors 
and local forums to vilify the ineffectiveness of the status quo. Coupled with actions to 
disrupt key government institutions, such as security and subsistence activities, the 
messages became ratified as discontent turned into dissent.65
                                               
60 Alex V. Simmons, Socially Embedded Insurgencies (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514335&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 Once dissent took shape, 
the communist CACs expanded lines of influence (LIO) through overt actions to further 
61 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 132. 
62 Central Office for South Vietnam, A COSVN Standing Account of the Situation in South Vietnam 
from the End of 1961 to the Beginning of 1964, Captured National Liberation Front Document, Vietnam, 
1969, 1-17-20, http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/232/2320113002a.pdf. 
63 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 




divide the population and subvert the existing social framework. With government 
institutions increasingly discredited, villagers with ties to the government, direct or 
indirect, were vulnerable for deliberate targeting. 
Villagers who opposed the Viet Cong, who had ties to the government or military, 
or whom represented potential obstacles to influence objectives were left physically 
unharmed but became socially marginalized.66 Social marginalization was a psychic 
shock to Vietnamese society, which places a high value on dignity and virtue:67
They treated me rather well and I was not beaten…. I was, however, 
blindfolded and tied up all the time. On the sixth day, they led me back to 
[my village] and I had to stand up in front of the villagers gathered in 
meeting to acknowledge my errors and apologize to them. I was only 
released thereafter because the Party judged that I had not yet been a party 
to any bloody affairs. This was a reduction-of-prestige campaign aimed at 
me and I felt very ashamed when, from the villagers’ ranks, some people 
came out to curse me. My emotional life was then very hard. I felt 
wretched. None of the villagers were willing to talk to me…..”
 
68
The reduction-of-prestige campaign was a subordinate influence effort within the 
line of influence aimed at disrupting and attacking the socio-political system. After 
targeting an individual for attack, the propaganda and agitation cell would spread 
messages denouncing the target, which would then be followed by sudden disappearance. 
Once a person was disconnected from the social hierarchy and marginalized, the cadres 
exploited the event to assert their ability to administer the village in lieu of the previous 
status quo. This cyclical process coerced villagers opposing or wanting to be perceived as 
opposing the communist cadres. 
 
These efforts were done with “a scalpel, not a broadsword.”69
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 Influence directives 
from the strategic echelon of the insurgency were succinct, but also facilitated sufficient 
latitude for cadre cells at the tactical and operational levels to tailor and execute village 
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and provincial influence campaigns. The VC, through Ho Chi Minh's insight and 
leadership, codified organizational guidelines that stressed not to “smash the existing 
social system; don't destroy opposition organizations, take them over.”70 To attack larger 
opposing organizations, the VC’s influence front maintained an amorphous existence, 
which allowed them to infiltrate opposing organizations socially. They accommodated 
rivals while working to subvert them. Messages and deeds were tailored to bridge or 
amplify common grievances or interests between the VC and rival organizations in an 
overall effort to absorb the targeted organization. Consequently, the opposing 
organization’s leadership was fragmented through terror, coercion, and/or 
marginalization. The message was muted into base terms, and specific messages and 
agenda regarding communism’s “class struggle” was only discussed among cadre. Cadres 
blended the “materialistic appeals of communism” with patriotism so the populace would 
see themselves as nationalists rather than communists. Conceptually, this process bred 
conditions for the population’s cognitive alignment shift toward a social movement in 
line with the Viet Cong’s and North Vietnam’s strategic end state.71
This flexibility also enabled the use of violence through controlled and deliberate 
targeting. The Viet Cong incorporated violence, coercion, and targeted killings as a direct 
method for subversion and exploitation of its competition. In contested areas, CACs 
received the greatest leeway in executing enemies and possessed the “absolute right” to 
kill those who were overt opponents and government agents.
 Broad guidance and 
operational flexibility given to tactical and operational cadre facilitated the communist’s 
overall strategic objectives, rather than the strategic endeavors dictating actions of cadre 
at the grassroots level.  
72
                                               
70 Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam, 41. 
 Violence was used 
primarily against political groups or GVN organizations/programs to create a security 
vacuum that the Viet Cong would fill. It was not violence for military gains or lack of 
rationale. Violence was also leveraged to eliminate effective opposition leadership. 
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However, ineffective and corrupt opposition leadership was not eliminated. If violence 
was required to influence the population, the Viet Cong would also use or create a 
scapegoat to reinforce their narrative. Additionally, reprisals would also create a self-
policing commune-like culture. Captured Viet Cong documents stated: 
In each village…We compiled a detailed dossier of the various local 
despots. If someone merited the death penalty we sent a group to deal with 
him. Afterwards we used loudhailers to explain the crimes 
committed…we posted names of other tyrants who would be dealt with if 
they did not cease their activities…The executions...and the warnings 
played a major role in breaking the grip of the enemy throughout the 
country…and created conditions under which we could move back into 
the villages, either permanently or in organizational visits...73
Violence against institutions or individuals (real or created by the VC) 
representing the government demonstrated the Viet Cong’s messaging credibility. 
Moreover, targeting an individual or organization focused public attention and provided 
an outlet for the populace’s grievances, which continued to align the population with the 
VC, or at a minimum, against the government.
  
74
In addition to violence, one of the most robust methods used by the Viet Cong for 
subverting opponents and competition were “counter sweep” operations. Any time a 
GVN or U.S. entity entered a village, the Viet Cong would subsequently enter and 
engage the villagers. “After leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, or government sweeps 
through the village, the cadre frequently called meetings to discuss the government 
propaganda. One technique was to point out that government actions always went counter 
to what it said...”
  
75
Rallies were often organized to foment dissent against the GVN. Items left behind 
by U.S. or GVN forces were exploited and used as props during rallies. Corpses, 
regardless of who killed them or how they died, were a primary tool of the VC’s 
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propaganda and agitation teams.76 Cadre recited biographies, focusing on the deceased’s 
sympathetic hardships, and tying them to actions or inactions of the United States and the 
government.77
Proselytizing ideological themes, entertainment, and villager education were also 
essential in subverting GVN and U.S. efforts at the village level. Young males were 
cultivated into active participants, typically undergoing indoctrination while being used 
as a source of labor. Viet Cong schools spent roughly 60% of their time teaching literacy, 
supporting understanding of cadre messages and also building support for the communist 
cause because of the provided education services.
 Messages were redistributed among insurgent combat forces with ties to 
respective villages undergoing counter sweeps. This perpetuated discord toward the 
government, galvanizing morale among the Viet Cong’s rank and file fighters. 
78
A significant deed employed by cadre, and perhaps the tipping point
  
79 in their 
message and deeds portion of their influence operations, was land reform. Land reform 
solidified messages of dissent against a “corrupt” South Vietnamese government and an 
“imperial” United States, while simultaneously validating messages echoing the 
communist’s validity and support for the people.80 By addressing and capitalizing on 
grievances in this manner, the Viet Cong were able to develop further an “insurgent 
consciousness” necessary for social mobilization. Cadres confiscated land from 
'imperialists and their agents' and subsequently redistributed it to local farmers and 
families possessing no direct or indirect ties to the government or military.81
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seized.82
Simultaneous implementation of the Vietnamese communist’s multiple lines of 
influence enabled the Viet Cong to establish shadow governments throughout villages, 
hamlets, and provinces by incorporating the use of fines, regulations, penalties, police 
power, and terror.
 Cadres would identify “patriotic” farmers and landlords whose land would not 
be targeted. So long as their rent to villagers working their land was deemed reasonable, 
the land was safe from confiscation. This created a repressive atmosphere of conformity 
among the various village social classes, providing the opportunity for villagers to 
purchase land previously unattainable under the GVN system. It also prevented the 
alienation of the rural landlords and farming class. 
83 The Viet Cong influence efforts created a GVN power vacuum, 
while filling it with their own form of government. The goal was to build and field 
competent armed forces, taxation systems, schools, regulated commerce, and dispensed 
justice that would rival and subvert GVN efforts at the village level to shift popular 
alignment and increase social mobilization.84
2. Indigenous Resonance 
 
For message and deeds, indigenous resonance was the critical component in 
achieving desired effects. By tailoring messages and their supporting acts at an 
introspective and personal level, VC cadres ensured individuals adopted the issues and 
themes into their daily hierarchy of concerns. Influence efforts enabled messages to 
infiltrate local villages with minimal disruption because of situational awareness 
developed by social recce cells well before any attempts to initiate active influence on the 
village. 
The Viet Cong used cohabitation in the village as a primary method to achieve 
indigenous resonance. By living with the villagers, all influence efforts could be 
continuously adapted to actual conditions occurring within communities. VC cadre (and 
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eventually converted local family members used as trusted proxies) achieved acceptance 
because of the personal interaction established through social network ties throughout the 
immediate and surrounding communities.85 This process enabled the gradual introduction 
of “soft-pedaled” Marxist intentions to attain short-term gains over time.86
…he thought [Viet Cong] propaganda was effective because it was very 
specific (how many pigs and oxen were killed in a bombing attack, how 
many houses burned, etc.), it was carefully tailored for each audience (“the 
Vietcong analyze every one of their targets of activity, and try to find the 
likings and wishes of each”), it stresses a person-to-person relationship 
(the cadre lives close to the people; they wear the same clothes, behave 
amicably, and in turn, gain trust and friendship), and it is persistent (the 
cadres talk constantly, and eventually the people have to listen). He 
contrasted this approach with the one used by the government propaganda 
teams, which set up their loudspeakers, give [sic] public lectures, and then 
move [sic] on.
 The 
effectiveness of this technique was expressed by a villager during an interview: 
87
This exemplifies the strategy of socially mobilizing the population by adapting 
ideological framework to align with the needs, expectation, and conditions within each 
village. The comprehensive process to “take control of a village” was specific in its 
purpose but broad enough to allow precise implementation.
 
88
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subversion, and coercion techniques were effective because the cadres understood the 
local population’s psychological pressure points and how to manipulate them. Exploiting 
these cognitive vulnerabilities ensured messages and supporting actions impacted the 
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...district and village entertainment cadre should develop their [local] 
cultural knowledge of the people, encourage them to write plays which 
can be published in time to stir up the [local villagers]. Along with the 
above mission, villages should organize children's dances, popular 
entertainment groups and village entertainment groups if possible. In 
particular, children's dances should be popularized. Thus, the 
entertainment activities can by stirred up in a broad front.89
Other examples are evident in a U.S. Government document, The Vietnamese 
Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967), which highlights instructions taken 
from a captured Viet Cong manual: 
  
Good technique does not consist in collection of materials about our 
policies and programs and then giving a “certified copy” to the masses. 
Neither does it mean picking up a megaphone and explaining general 
policies in a general way. It means ceaseless effort and taking detailed 
care to persuade the [local] masses, to clarify their thinking… Many 
cadres simply distribute slogans and the result is that the masses know the 
slogans but do not know what actions to take. Agitation to create public 
opinion, the easiest way to attack the enemy, is best based on some sudden 
incident created either by the enemy or by us, such as regrouping of the 
people, drafting young men… or a people’s victory. When an incident 
takes place, hang flags, make an effigy, [and] distribute leaflets… 
Organize [local] meetings for the masses to discuss the event. Recount, or 
invent concrete stories.90
Continuous emotional and subconscious impact reinforced LOI objectives toward 
the overarching goal of shifting the village’s cognitive alignment. The effects of the 
cohabitation and interaction process constantly fed the influence cycle through 
continuous proactive, reactive, and adaptive messaging and actions, which, in turn, 
reinforced the process and enabled infiltration into new areas of expansion. 
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3. Synchronization and Massing of Message and Deeds 
The increasingly synchronized and mutually supportive nature of messages and 
deeds ensured compounding desired effects and resonance with targeted audiences. For 
the Viet Cong, a successful influence strategy meant every message possessed 
corresponding supporting action to validate the message and extend the message’s shelf 
life.  
When the VC conducted an assassination (deed), the killing supported a larger 
influence message, but it was also supported with leaflets, letters, or other literature in 
combination with face-to-face interaction on the justification of the action.91
The plan for elimination of tyrants (i.e. assassinations) must be very 
carefully worked out. Investigation of those to be eliminated must be 
meticulously conducted. Leaflets must be disseminated to make the people 
clearly understand the crimes of the tyrants to be executed and our motives 
in executing them and to warn other tyrants. The plan for the elimination 
of tyrants must be very detailed so that our personnel can withdraw safely 
after accomplishing their mission. Men must be deployed to prevent 
enemy pursuit, if any, and leaflets disseminated (by those departing) as 
mentioned above...
 The United 
States Mission in Vietnam published a 50-page document in 1966 entitled Viet Cong Use 
of Terror. Captured Viet Cong correspondence in this document outlines the 
methodology used: 
92
Targeted killings were not isolated events but were deeds in support of a corresponding 




August 23, 1960—Two school teachers, Nguyen Khoa Ngon and Miss 
Nguyen Thi Thiet, are preparing lessons at home when Viet Cong arrive 
 This number only reflects planned and targeted killings used to support 
overall influence efforts. The document is laden with numerous first-hand examples of 
the synchronized effects inherent in targeted killings. One small example states: 
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and force them at gun point to go to their school, Rau Ran, in Phong Dinh 
province. There they find two men tied to the school veranda. The Viet 
Cong read the death order of the two men, Damed Canh and Van. They 
are executed. The Viet Cong stage the execution…to intimidate the school 
teachers.94
When psychologically attacking a village, the VC would use messages and deeds 
sequentially, consecutively or both, depending on the nature of the targeted community. 
For example, a counter sweep operation would implement land reform or social 
marginalization, reinforced with reduction of prestige campaigns or targeted 
assassinations. Not only did cadres mass efforts within a village, the organizational 
structure from the tactical to the strategic level massed influence efforts across multiple 
villages and provinces. This exemplified massing effort and deliberately affecting 
adjacent and distant villages based on the various degrees of closeness centrality,
 
95 which 
linked both geographically and demographically separated villages.96
C. CHANNELS 
 
Upon infiltrating a village overtly or covertly, the Viet Cong similarly used a 
combination of natural and artificial channels to begin the propagation process, which 
ensured influence effort consistency across established information channels for the 
village and neighboring communities. When the individuals who served as the natural 
information channels in a village adopted communist messages, the messages and their 
effects would virally propagate, which further enabled cadre cells to infiltrate new 
villages physically and begin generating the social intelligence needed to initiate, expand, 
or increase influence efforts.97
                                               
94 United States Mission in Vietnam, Viet Cong Use of Terror, 9. 
 As cadres increasingly exploited (directly or indirectly), 
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effectiveness increased. The Viet Cong realized that finding and utilizing channels was 
not an easy task but recognized it as a critical task. Hanoi would send older 
revolutionaries to serve as recruiters and organizers in the south, who would find every 
conceivable way to find and exploit channels.98
The most common and widespread channel used by the Viet Cong to infiltrate and 
initiate influence operations occurred using family members. For example, a son's 
occupation played an important role in determining the sympathies of the whole family.
 
99 
Families with members involved with the Viet Cong not only gave more assistance to the 
Viet Cong, but also were also more susceptible to its propaganda and influence.100
In at least one province (Puoc Tuy) the procedure was to persuade a 
family to work for the [VC] and then to have that family move in to the 
strategic hamlet. Once inside, the mission of this family was to make 
friends with other families and recruit more supporters for the insurgents. 
Agents in the hamlets, who were known as “secret young men,” were 
instructed to exploit any conflict between the population and the local 
officials.... He was instructed not to identify himself as a Viet Cong agent, 




In 1966, the Rand Corporation published a 274-page document entitled Viet Cong 
Recruitment: Why and How Men Join. The text contains hundreds of interviews with 
active or former Viet Cong members. The document repeatedly illustrates how the Viet 
Cong used family members as channels for recruitment and influence efforts. One 
powerful example from the document reflected the story of a former youth recruiter who 
operated near the city of Cantho: 
 
I was with a youth proselyting [sic] group. We made propaganda among 
the young men from 18 to 25 years old and their families. As for the 
young people, we would arouse their hatred for the enemy and urge them 
to join the Revolution. With regard to the families, we would make 
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propaganda and then urge them to call their sons in the cities back to the 
village to join the Revolution. We investigated very efficiently; we knew 
exactly which family had a son in the cities. When we succeed in making 
the young man join the Front [thorough use of his family] we would turn 
him over to the local men, i.e. the guerillas.102
The Viet Cong also relied on children as channels. The susceptible nature of 
children combined with their access across multiple social structures made them uniquely 
suited to serve as channels to propagate messages, but also bridged influence operations 
across multiple networks: 
 
Emotional and fearless, the youth groups could be used to catalyze other 
factions and movements, and to provide cadres who could direct the street 
revolution when it came…. Dang now asked me to create a city-wide 
youth movement that would gather all the various youth movements not 
yet associated with us - the Buddhist youth, Catholic youth, high school 
and university student associations, working class youth, and others...this 
was not to be done directly. Instead the aim would be to create an 
umbrella organization that we would control surreptitiously, brining 
forceful antigovernment leadership into play when conditions had 
sufficiently matured.103
Learning from years of experience with the Lao Dong Youth League during the 
French occupation,
 
104 the Viet Cong saw young people as a key element in their 
influence operations. They developed extensive programs to recruit, train, and utilize the 
youth because of their unique ability to infiltrate social networks and overall utility for 
the long-term fight. The Viet Cong established the Youth Liberation Association, Village 
Children’s Group, the People’s Revolutionary Party Youth League, and the Student 
Liberation Association illustrating some of the more formal elements of Viet Cong 
targeting of the youth.105
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sappers from the N-10 and N-13 Viet Cong Battalions had infiltrated Saigon and were 
recruiting high school students to carry out terrorist attacks in the capital.”106
Official intelligence sources in Saigon disclosed…that the Viet Cong had 
launched a stepped-up nationwide drive to recruit South Vietnamese 
children…when indoctrinated, these children…[serve] as guerrillas, 
sappers, political cadres, spies, and terrorists.
 The 
document continues to address how the Viet Cong ultimately developed and pursued a 
nationwide program for using children: 
107
The use of natural channels (local individuals who adopt and innately spread 
information and gossip to various connectors and mavens within and across social 
networks) increased the validity of communist cadre messages and actions. The use of 
natural channels allowed messages and effects to diffuse virally because individuals 
serving as natural channels existed in traditional and trusted social network information 
conduits. In many cases, the use of natural channels facilitated access to social networks 
higher in the Vietnamese social hierarchy. Local landowners with social and political 
status, targeted directly or indirectly, who fell under cadre influence and authorized to 
keep their land, were dubbed “political landlords.” Although “political landlords” 
possessed political influence at the local level, they were used as channels and persuasive 
voices against the GVN at the district level and higher because of their political and 
economic status, which allowed them to tap into multiple social structures.
 
108
                                               




 The Viet 
Cong reinforced the use of natural channels at the local level with natural and artificial 
channels at the national level to create an inflated level of influence within regional and 
national level government systems. For example, within government and social networks 
in Saigon, the Viet Cong covertly used powerful “Saigonese” personalities (such as 
respected government officials, celebrities, etc.) to pressure the GVN to steer political 
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discourse in favor of Viet Cong aims in response to direct Viet Cong actions at the local 
or district levels.109 These “Saigonese” level personalities used their political status to 
convince government officials to negotiate with, rather than try to destroy, the VC 
because “the VC were too powerful to be destroyed.”110 Malicious petitions, supported 
by print propaganda, were also generated to influence the government to negotiate with 
the VC citing military direct action against the VC as harmful and unproductive for the 
local villager.111
D.  MEDIUMS 
 The use of “Saigonese” personalities as channels provided a natural and 
artificial channel hybrid for exploitation by communist cadre at the operational and 
strategic level. These channels disrupted GVN counter influence efforts at the strategic 
and operational levels, which shielded communist cadre influence at the tactical levels. In 
short, tactical and operational levels of their influence campaigns were bottom up and 
supported or reinforced by strategic and operational (or top-down) influence activities. 
Meanwhile, GVN and U.S. influence activities attempted to counter communist influence 
at the strategic level with supporting efforts occurring at the tactical and operational 
levels. While the United Stats achieved some successes in countering VC influence, they 
were isolated and strategically unsupported. 
The Viet Cong used a variety of mediums integrated into its influence campaign 
across South Vietnam. However, they placed primacy on face-to-face and direct 
interpersonal communication/interaction; other mediums were solely designed to 
facilitate and support this end.112
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were mechanisms to mobilize potential insurgents, with face-to-face delivering the 
greatest effect.113
Mass media, to the [Vietnamese] Communists, are reinforcement tools 
only, and not considered strong enough to carry the burden of convincing 
the unconvinced. Thus, VC agit-prop cadre are employed to explain to 
ordinary citizens the current line of the party and also to justify by 
whatever arguments are most likely to be effective, the current party line 
and whatever changes are necessary. The complex VC political 
infrastructure is in fact part of the VC propaganda apparatus; the 
Communists, since about 1961, enmeshed the rural Vietnamese in a 
network of so-called “liberation associations”…and under the guidance of 
propaganda cadre, these are used as the vehicle for the communication of 
ideas. In every village where they operate, the VC uses this organizational 
weapon to indoctrinate the people at rallies, mass meetings, etc.
 The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967) 
explains this philosophy in detail: 
114
Noninterpersonal mediums, such as print and audio, were mostly used in denied 
areas to shape the environment and support influence operations implemented through 
face-to-face efforts. For example, the Vietnamese communist party had a specific use for 
print mediums, which were often covertly disseminated. Leaflets were often left in 




Cadres at the village level used mediums, such as radio and motion pictures, and 
coordinated all cultural activities, such as operas and plays, to reinforce face-to-face 
interaction. Although the Viet Cong did operate larger mediums, such as “Radio 
Liberation” and “Liberation Film Studio,”
 These mediums would support conditions for activation or introduction of 
overt and covert channels into a social structure, and expand political-military tactical 
level influence effects to the operational and strategic levels. 
116
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the operations of entertainment cells in the villages, which provided various forms of 
entertainment, nuanced with Viet Cong messages. In addition to putting on plays, dances, 
and other forms of entertainment,117
…[operate] reading cells, radio listening cells and children's newspaper 
reading cells by using and explaining [to the locals] all news contained in 
the information Bulletin (sic), and the Giai Phong [liberation] newspaper 
of the province…
 these cells would also directly explain print and 
radio broadcasts in an interactive, face-to-face manner. An excerpt from a captured Viet 
Cong manual on the Tay Ninh Province entertainment plan explains how this portion of 
the village program was conducted: 
118
Although the Viet Cong used radio and other conventional media platforms, they 
were only utilized if the Viet Cong could maintain control to ensure the messages to 
support the face-to-face influence operations.
 
119
Regardless of the medium, cadre members would elaborate on messages 
conveyed in the mediums, further generating social intelligence and refining future 
efforts toward social mobilization. Without the face-to-face medium, other mediums 
lacking interpersonal contact were insufficient to “convince the unconvinced.”
 While the exploitation of foreign media 
and press was conducted and supported Viet Cong influence efforts, it was executed by 
North Vietnam, but the effects were a byproduct that favored Viet Cong influence efforts.  
120
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E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES  
1. Summary of Viet Cong Influence 
Influence operations were not the Vietnamese communists’ end state in and of 
itself (such as the classic statement of winning hearts and minds). Influence operations 
were used as a tool to shape conditions effectively, which ultimately facilitated some 
form of control over a sufficient portion of the population. As is the case with many 
insurgencies, the control was malicious in nature rather than benevolent. To shape the 
operational environment and establish desired levels of social control, Vietnamese 
communist influence operations were divisive in nature. These operations used deceit, 
misinformation, manipulated logic, emotional resonance, social vulnerabilities, and the 
manipulation of truth to shift behavior and cognitive alignment, which in turn, created a 
divergence to the social status quo in those areas in which the Viet Cong was allowed to 
thrive and spread. The VC battled to shape the environment by establishing influence and 
control over people, groups, and social networks, resulting in a relative influence 
superiority (real or perceived) that enabled them to persevere through multiple 
conventional military defeats. 
The Viet Cong maximized the use of messages and deeds, channels and mediums 
to illicit cognitive social alignment and social mobilization in South Vietnam. Their 
bottom-up/grassroots/village-level approach, facilitated by the adaptability of local 
cadres, exemplified the causal mechanisms captured in the first chapter. This case study 
is the strongest example for highlighting the causal mechanisms leading to successful 
influence warfare and special influence operations. Although the Viet Cong made 
mistakes, the United States failed to assess and address the Viet Cong’s influence 
operations sufficiently. 
VC influence operations epitomized the carrot and stick methodology, presenting 
positive and violent characteristics to coerce, persuade, deceive, and eventually compel 
targeted population centers to align with their cause. One of the Vietnamese communist’s 
largest vulnerabilities for exploitation emerged during the consolidation of power 
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phase.121
The destruction of the village social framework left the villager physically 
unharmed but socially isolated.
 During this phase, overt repression was levied against a village or province’s 
populace to ensure compliance. Once the true nature of Vietnamese communist intentions 
was revealed, the populace often seemed to appear isolated from reaching out to the 
United States and GVN who were not perceived as trustworthy. This mistrust placed the 
population in a catch-22 situation. 
122 This social vacuum enabled communist cadres to build 
and operate armed militia forces, taxation systems, schools, commerce regulation, and 
justice services.123 In areas in which high levels of targeted violence were an unnecessary 
tool for the communist cadres, these systems substantially validated cadre interpersonal 
and nonverbal messages favoring their cause. By living among and/or maintaining an 
active presence with villagers, the VC developed and used social intelligence to tailor 
influence locally to increase feelings of discontent on the part of the people before trying 
to mobilize them. This influence occurred in areas in which aggressively repressive 
tactics were not used or needed. Cadre cells and communist propaganda teams explained 
efforts the “enemy” made to divide the Viet Cong from the population; they educated the 
people about the “struggle’s” purpose, and stressed the importance and legality of the 
effort, basic policies, and other selective world news.124
The Vietnamese communists recognized a dedicated, resourced, and capable 
influence opponent as a critical vulnerability to their overall operations and took 
deliberate measures to remove local competitors systematically. This removal was 
especially easy in the rural villages in which the GVN and United States were not readily 
providing security and stability for the populace. Communist counter sweep operations 
exemplify a focus on pre-empting and countering GVN and U.S. psychological special 
influence operations. Counter sweep operations were a mission-essential task of every 
 
                                               
121 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 104. 
122 Ibid., 132. 
123 Ibid., 140. 
124 Ibid., 53. 
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cadre cell. Captured Viet Cong documents (such as an internal review from the Viet 
Cong Central office of South Vietnam (COSVN)) indicate counter sweeps were key 
operations to counter any GVN or U.S. attempt to disrupt VC influence. Counter sweep 
operations were an integral component toward ultimately mobilizing the populace. The 
Viet Cong Central office of South Vietnam stated: 
At present, the troops, militia and guerrilla forces realize that countering 
sweeps is one of their primary duties and they are confident in the success 
of countering sweeps, are constantly and determinedly resisting sweep 
operations, have adopted countering sweeps as a mission to annihilate the 
enemy and train ourselves in effectively supporting the mass movement, 
and through countering sweeps were indoctrinated in improving their 
ideological, technical, and tactical standards. This marks a great maturity 
of our armed forces.125
Local VC cadres vehemently challenged even the most benign influence 
endeavors of the GVN and United States through passive and active means. No opposing 
influence was tolerated. In many documented instances, communist cadre would bait 
GVN and U.S. forces into areas, knowing conventional forces would ultimately create 
destruction, alienate local villagers, and create exploitable influence vulnerabilities 
against the GVN and United States. Once allied forces cleared an area, communist cadre 
would re-enter it and exploit the second- and third-order effects created by the 
conventional security operations. The use of vilification and misinformation techniques 
allowed VC cadres to redirect the focus away from any shortfalls of their own. 
 
2. Viet Cong Influence Vulnerabilities 
Many shortfalls, vulnerabilities, and mistakes existed throughout the Vietnamese 
communist’s influence warfare execution and methodology. The communist-led 
insurgency was not attempting to sway the population to their cause for some selfless 
purpose. The goal of the communist influence campaign was control of the population 
and the destruction of all opposition in support of the ultimate goal of seizing control of 
South Vietnam.  
                                               
125 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 18. 
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Prior to the robust commitment of U.S. ground forces in 1965, captured VC 
documents portray a somber view of communist insurgent operations. Communist cadre 
believed over half of the population of South Vietnam was still under the direct control 
and influence of the GVN and  United States. While the Viet Cong believed they held the 
influence advantage at the local village level, they were greatly concerned about the 
dominance of the GVN and United States at the urban, district, province, and national 
levels.126 A significant effort to conduct grassroots influence warfare could have reversed 
previous gains by cadre cells infiltrating rural villages. If the United States had 
committed to programs, such as the Marine’s Civil Action Programs (CAPs) and Special 
Operations Forces’ (SOF) hamlet security programs, communist cadres would have faced 
an influence competitor not susceptible to the communist cadre’s social exploitation 
waged against the local populace. U.S. Marine and SOF village programs experienced 
significant successes, but these were limited to the immediate operating environment of 
these U.S. teams. Even when U.S. messages and deeds were synchronized at the local 
level, support from the operational and strategic levels were inconsistent at best. For 
example, the Viet Cong had taken masonry, carpentry, and metal-smithing tools from 
villagers. The CAPs requested replacement tools to regenerate local economies and re-
establish previous social structures, but the CAPs received western tools that were too 
heavy or too culturally different from traditional Asian tools.127 This lack of 
understanding at the operational and strategic level stymied the efforts of the CAPs in the 
villages. Ultimately, the CAPs had to search for support from humanitarian organizations 
in an attempt to correct these deficiencies, but even then, support was usually insufficient 
to meet the missions’ needs.128
                                               
126 Central Office for South Vietnam, A COSVN Standing Account of the Situation in South Vietnam 
from the End of 1961 to the Beginning of 1964, Captured National Liberation Front Document, Vietnam, 
1969, 13. 
 The Marine CAPs vignette serves as a small example of 
isolated successes not exploited through a comprehensive and appropriately designed 
U.S.-led influence methodology. 
127 Lewis Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam (New York: Funk & 
Wagnalls, 1970), 82–83. 
128 Ibid. 
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Supported with deliberate messages and deeds designed to influence the 
operational environment directly and indirectly, the successes developed by the Marines 
and SOF units could have spread and allowed an island hopping type of influence war 
that would propagate similar to the Vietnamese Communist infiltration and infection of 
the South Vietnamese villages. Using comparable influence principles, the communist 
insurgency could have suffered and potentially lost its ability to influence the population. 
Instead, the United States essentially snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in 1964–
1965. The U.S. operations methodology ignored the VC’s critical vulnerability of 
operating above the local village level, and allowed sufficient time and space for the Viet 
Cong to overcome their self-identified shortfalls to improve social mobilization efforts 
discussed throughout this case study.129
The Viet Cong did not possess overwhelming support throughout the rural 
masses, with far less support in urban areas.
 
130
My people are very poor. Only a few of them went to school. They did not 
understand the Viet Cong in the first years. They believed what the Viet 
Cong said. After nine years of living with the Viet Cong they can now 
 However, the VC benefited from the 
perception that they were widely supported. This influence effect permeated the strategic 
level and affected national decision-making and international perception. VC cadre also 
used terror, conscription, land reform, seizure or personal property, and denied access to 
government sponsored markets to reinforce their authority. Throughout the process of 
fighting for control of a village and consolidating said control, communist cadre’s use of 
repressive measures created gaping vulnerabilities susceptible to exploitation. Local 
villagers were not blind to the nature of the Viet Cong and were not deceived for long 
periods of time. Early on, the rural uneducated population did not understand the VC, and 
initially, believed the misinformation and disinformation. One village elder wrote: 
                                               
129 Central Office for South Vietnam, A COSVN Standing Account of the Situation in South Vietnam 
from the End of 1961 to the Beginning of 1964, Captured National Liberation Front Document, Vietnam, 
66. 
130 The Catholic Church was also a direct competitor to the communist leadership. Any attempt to 
overly abuse or violently target the Church risked mobilizing the masses against their cause. Elimination of 
church systems and leadership required provincial communist approval, exemplifying higher-level 
authority control systems and situational awareness for sensitive and secondary effects that could impair 
the influence campaign. 
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understand. The people do not want the Viet Cong. They fear them and 
hate them. The villagers have learned that what the Viet Cong say is from 
the mouth alone; it is not from the heart. The people know that the 
Americans have come to help them. The Marines have not taken rice from 
the people. They do not take farm tools. They do not murder and torture. 
They do not take money. They do not take hostages.131
Once the VC consolidated their power over a village or hamlet, repressive 
controls were instituted and individual liberties sacrificed. Local villagers would need 
permission to leave the area to travel to markets or neighboring villages. In doing so, 
their families were held as collateral (or hostage) to ensure the travelers returned. Village 
cadre established an intra village spy network in which villagers would spy on one 
another to ensure compliance with cadre policies in hopes of either building favoritism 
with cadre leadership, preventing perceptions of loyalty shortfalls, or both.
 
132
When communist cadres began the elimination of influence operations targeting 
village leadership and accused GVN agents, and failed to follow this with the 
development of a mass base, those same cadres defaulted to repressive measures to 
maintain their control and authority over villages.
  
133 This reversed favorable supportive 
influence from the local population for the VC and NV cadres, but without a counter 
force to confront VC repression, villages lacked the ability to resist.134
The use of targeted assassinations and an over use of violence were also 
exploitable vulnerabilities but similarly overlooked or ignored by GVN and U.S. strategic 
and operational leadership.
 
135 The killings terrorized villagers into obedience to save 
their own lives; “the same frame of mind pushed the youths to join guerrillas.”136
                                               
131 Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam, 111. 
 
Lacking the choice of not having to pick a side between the VC and GVN and the United 
132 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 133. 
133 Ibid., 134. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 58. 
136 Ibid. 
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States, locals would often tacitly support, or fall in line with, VC influence operations 
because of the lack of GVN credibility, local resonance, lack of responsive for security 
and stability, and or a heavy handed direct action approach by conventional military 
operations against the VC. Aside from the small number of U.S. SOF, Marine, and even 
fewer Army village security and civil action programs, most GVN and U.S. operations 
treated civilians as a terrain obstacle rather than a decisive point for their operations. 
The strength of the Vietnamese communists operated nearly exclusively at the 
tactical level, with some strategic operations (such as Saigonese channeling) but lacking a 
balanced use of strategic mediums, which was an almost insignificant vulnerability 
because of their effective influence manipulation at the tactical level, which overlapped 
with operational level activities. The inflated perception of mass support was propagated 
by national and international media, which provided a sufficient level of strategic 
communication support for disrupting GVN and U.S. strategic leadership. 
Simultaneous implementation of the Vietnamese Communist’s multiple lines of 
influence enabled the Viet Cong to establish shadow governments throughout villages, 
hamlets, and provinces by incorporating the use of fines, regulations, penalties, police 
power, and terror.137 The Viet Cong influence efforts created a GVN power vacuum, 
while filling it with their own form of government. The goal was to build and field 
competent armed forces, taxation systems, schools, regulated commerce, and dispensed 
justice that would rival and subvert GVN efforts at the village level to shift popular 
alignment and increase mobilization.138
                                               
137 Pike, Viet Cong; The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam, 279. 
 Multiple attributable, miss-attributable, and 
nonattributable messages supported by overt and covert deeds could have diffused VC 
efforts. Eliminating VC influence effects required a long-term commitment and 
investment, but those costs would have paled in comparison to the cost in lives, dollars, 
and material the conventional military campaign waged to destroy physically the 
communist-backed insurgency. Without disrupting and denying VC influence operations, 
the longevity perceptions of NVA and VC capabilities and message credibility grew. The 
138 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 140. 
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inability to destroy the VC decisively, coupled with a lack of locally relevant messages, 
security actions, and credible governance, created an influence and power vacuum readily 
filled by the communists’ own activities.139
Continuously executing the primary lines of influence across the three variables 
of message and deeds, channels, and mediums in a cyclical and comprehensive manner, 
enabled the Viet Cong to seize and retain control of villages once all competition was 
marginalized or eliminated. Creating a resonance chain reaction depended on the Viet 
Cong’s ability to duplicate the process across villages and communities tied with one 
another. In contrast to U.S. methodology governing a centralized and highly controlled 
message, mass media was a tertiary effort, and strategic party propaganda was a 
secondary effort.
  
140 Instead, a dedicated communist cadre was assigned to influence and 
attack each target village and province. Unlike the United States and GVN whose 
strategy epitomized an outdated 20th century strategic influence model, communist 
cadre’s possessed sufficient latitude and authority to identify, develop, and target social 
pressure points that would separate the targeted audience from the social status quo and 
subsequently create a control vacuum.141
                                               
139 Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964, 140. 
 Local effects spread across the rural village 
social network structure creating a cascade of desired effects in favor of the Viet Cong 
and Vietnamese communist leadership. Cadre cells would deliberately, accidently, and 
sometimes blunder their way through filling the influence vacuum ultimately to seize 
cognitive control of the village, but without a capable competitor to oppose these efforts, 
the communist cells had sufficient time and space to adapt their messages and support the 
messages with planned kinetic or nonkinetic actions. This vacuum also allowed cadre 
leadership to react to emerging or unforeseen reactions by the local populace. Marine 
CAPs, SOF village security programs, and similar programs, were isolated examples 
capable of disrupting communist influence operations, but they lacked strategic 
resourcing and synchronization with messages and deeds to achieve galvanizing and 
replicating effects with local populations. 
140 Corman and Dooley, “Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape,” 2. 
141 Ibid. 
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III.  SHINING PATH 
Because guerilla warfare basically drives from the masses and is supported 
by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their 
sympathies and cooperation.142
- Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare 
 
On September 12, 1992, Peru’s National Directorate Against Terrorism 
(DINCOTE) arrested 58-year-old Carlos Abimael Guzman, the self-proclaimed “Forth 
Sword of Marxism,” and fellow central committee members of Sendero Luminoso, 
known commonly as “Shining Path.” After the rather anti-climatic raid on the 
committee’s middle-class home in the capital of Lima, Guzman warned his arresting 
officers that, “even if [a leader] is killed, his followers will remain.”143 Two weeks later, 
Guzman, who was known by his followers as “Chairman Gonzalo” and the “Red Sun,” 
was presented to the world’s media in a cage dressed in striped prisoner garb. He ranted 
over the playing of the Peruvian national anthem that Maoism would continue to “shape 
the new wave of proletarian world revolution.” Yet approximately two years later, and 
contrary to his assertion, many of Shining Path’s members did not remain.144 Such an 
ending seems especially peculiar. Up to that point, Guzman had orchestrated what was 
seen as a highly successful Maoist insurgency. Prior to his capture, Shining Path was 
styled as “the largest threat” to the Peruvian government.145
                                               
142 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Champaign, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2000), 46, http://www2.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/FMFRP%2012-
18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf. 
  
143 Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, 1 U.S. ed. (New York: Times Books, 
1992), 267–268; Simon Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, Conflict Studies 260 
(London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), 1–2; Carlos I. DeGregori, “The 
Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path,” 
The Legitimization of Violence, December 1, 1996, 33; Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in 
Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1998), 63. 
144 Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, 1–2. 
145 Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1990), 5, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3781.html. 
 52 
At face value, Shining Path appeared to incorporate proven methods of influence 
used by other successful Maoist-based movements, such as the previously discussed Viet 
Cong. Likewise, much of the analysis regarding Shining Path prior to Guzman’s capture 
had forecasted, at worst, a collapse of the Peruvian government, and at best, a stalemated 
continuation of this protracted, hyper-violent struggle.146
While it may seem odd beginning this case study with Shining Path’s disruption 
and loss of equilibrium with the Peruvian government, doing so simply illustrates that 
this movement is no longer what it once was. Pursuant to this thesis’s purpose, this 
chapter demonstrates that Shining Path’s misuse of social movement influence 
accelerated its loss of power rather than prolong it. This chapter shows that the Shining 
Path’s narrative, with its preoccupation on dialectic violence, did much to undermine its 
ability to influence broader support and limited its ability to topple the Peruvian state.  
 Despite such predictions, and 
despite the fact that Shining Path maintained a stranglehold on the countryside and 
shantytowns around the capital of Lima, the group fell into rapid decline without 
Guzman.  
A. BACKGROUND 
To appreciate the Shining Path’s messages, deeds, use of channels, and its use of 
media better, it is first necessary to provide a broad overview in understanding Guzman 
himself. Second, it is crucial to understand the environment in which the Shining Path 
grew. Having completed these two tasks, it is then possible to put its narrative and 
organization into context, which will prove exceedingly important because Shining 
Path’s narrative lays the groundwork for why and how it used influence.  
So who was Guzman? Guzman grew up as the illegitimate son of a wealthy 
import wholesaler.147
                                               
146 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 9–10; all sources cited and written prior to Guzman’s capture make this assessment.  
 As a young man, Guzman’s acquaintances remembered him as a 
147 Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, 6–7; Guzman’s relationship with his 
father was strained and adversarial. He reportedly held a grudge against his father because his father 
favored his brother over him. A friend of his father even stated that Guzman’s own father wished he were 
dead.  
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student who was aloof, a loner, and yet a hard worker. Teachers noted his neatness, good 
behavior, and passion for organizing students. After his high school years, he “excelled as 
a student at the exclusive La Salle College.” At 19 years of age, Guzman attended the 
National University of San Agustin, where he became the protégé of Miguel Angel 
Rodriguez Rivas, who was a teacher of Kant and an inflexible “masochistic 
disciplinarian.” Under Rivas’ friendship and mentorship, Guzman was educated in 
German philosophy and studied socialist-themed works of contemporary Chilean and 
Peruvian poets. Guzman soon gravitated towards Marxist convictions based on 
inspiration from the Cuban Revolution and a Stalinist painter named Carlos de la Riva. 
Guzman then joined the Peruvian Communist Party but became increasingly critical of it 
because the party had become “idle, bureaucratic, and lacking in political presence.” 
Further insight into Guzman’s worldview can be learned from his two doctoral 
dissertations. The first, The Kantian Theory of Space, reflected his growing distance from 
Rivas’s mentorship and his “firm adherence to a dialectic materialism and Marxism.” The 
second, for a doctorate in law, The Bourgeois Democratic State, “poured scorn” on both 
notions of liberty and equality and argued that electoral law, the press, and media 
manipulate elections.148 Perhaps the capstone experience for Guzman’s as a devout 
communist was his studies in Maoism at a cadre school in Peking, China during 1964, 
1967, and 1975. Guzman’s subsequent political thought and works adopted much of 
Mao’s vocabulary in framing his notions and narrative of true communism.149
While Guzman was on the path of becoming a committed Marxist and Maoist, 
Peru was simultaneously facing serious challenges as a nation. Despite the fact that Peru 
had a free press and demonstrated a unique political culture in Central America, one that 
accepted divergent political thought and participation in the government, random peasant 




                                               
148 Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, 4–9. 
149 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 65. 
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nation in which the lack of economic opportunity would lead to the political opportunity 
for Shining Path to exploit.150 With decades of economic turmoil and scant prosperity, 
Peru was ripe for a sweeping change.151
Shining Path’s rise began in 1964 because of a spilt within the Peruvian 
Communist Party (PCP). While the entire party sought political control of the country, 
the split resulted from a fundamental disagreement over the role of armed conflict against 
the Peruvian government. More specifically, the fissure was along Sino-Soviet lines, with 
pro-Soviet members opting to abandon revolutionary violence to work within the current 
political system as a means for political change. It was this very split that gave birth to 
Shining Path. It was during this time that Guzman began his insurgency. Originally 
calling his group “Partido Comunista del Peru,” Guzman soon added the moniker, 
Shining Path, in deference to Peru’s first prominent Marxist, Jose Carlos Mariateguima, 
who asserted that Marxism-Leninism would become a ‘shining path’ for revolution.
 
152
Guzman’s overall military strategy was based on Mao’s peasant based, three-
phased war. This strategy begins with a defensive posture in ungoverned and rural areas, 
then reaches a strategic equilibrium with the state, and lastly, conducts overt offensive 
  
                                               
150 Tina Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America (New York: William 
Morrow & Company, 1991), 191–192; Peru’s previous conservative, leftist, and social democratic 
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“they could not win a battle with the Peruvian economy.” This situation is a classic example of an 
exploitable political opportunity. 
151 David S. Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 2; As Palmer 
observed, “the high cost of these failures… could not help but give Shining Path new opportunities to gain 
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152 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 64–65. 
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operations for total control.153 In accordance with Mao’s first phase, Shining Path 
initially maintained a low profile during the majority of the 1970s, during which it was 
content with educational activities of its members and cadre. Then Guzman solidified the 
movement’s ideological base, its theory of victory, and began to establish its initial 
support base.154 As the primary architect for Shining Path’s ideology, Guzman crafted an 
ideology that combined an interpretation of a Maoist peasant-based revolution with 
aspects of Peruvian “native socialism.”155 Therefore, it was, no coincidence that he chose 
to educate students in Ayacucho since it had little governance and a poor ethnic Indian 
population.156 Like Mao, Guzman would first seek a strong footing in that which was 
ungoverned; he would “attack the hollow.”157
As Guzman refined Shining Path’s Andean-Maoist narrative into what was called 




                                               
153 Cynthia McClintock, Sendero Luminoso in Comparative Perspective (Washington, DC: George 
Washington University), 65, http://www.cholonautas.edu.pe/modulo/upload/lasaclintock.pdf; Guzman’s 
devotion to Mao was characterized as ‘slavish.’; Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear 
(London: Latin America Bureau, 1992), 51: Unlike Mao, Guzman reinterpretation of Maoism, or “Gonzalo 
Thought,” applied ‘scientific’ and ‘universal laws’ of violence and contradiction to the revolutionary 
process. He modifies Mao’s principles of encircling cities from rural areas by also seeking to engage in 
armed struggle in the city in a parallel struggle. 
 Armed struggle would be Shining Path’s hallmark. It would be the lens 
through which history and their future would be viewed. Unlike most leftist movements, 
which attempt to form coalitions among left and Marxist groups, Shining Path was 
“sectarian and uncompromising in its Maoism.” The group held what was described as 
“total conviction of their own rectitude against a pervasively corrupt society.” All other 
communist parties and governments were forsaken as sellouts and revisionists, including 
the Soviet Union, and especially Deng Xiaoping’s China. Guzman considered Deng 
Xiaping’s supporters as “dogs” that betrayed their Cultural Revolution and regarded Fidel 
154 McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 4. 
155 Ibid., 4. 
156 Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, 11; Ayacucho totaled 450,000 people, with 
three quarters living by subsistence agriculture, and one fifth essentially acting as serfs on a patrons’ 
haciendas. When haciendas were sold or divided, dependent peasants “had no protection.”  
157 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare. 
158 Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 52–56. 
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Castro as a “puppet” to socialist imperialism. Its Marxist rivals in Peru were especially 
hated for participating in Peru’s elections during the 1980s. Guzman considered the 
Izquierda Unida (United Left) coalition the “sewer of contradictions.” This rival was 
considered nothing but an opportunistic electoral front that would not bring true 
transformation of the political landscape. In summary, any other form of government was 
considered the antithesis to Guzman’s thesis; they were to be destroyed. 
Shining Path’s dialectic messages, violent deeds, artificial channels, and its 
mediums were used in both urban and rural areas. Their influence lines of effort left little 
room for positive change and placed great emphasis on “propaganda of the deed.”159
 
 
While Gonzalo Thought has strands of influence requirements, all are hinged on the 
primacy of armed struggle for frame alignment of the peasants. 
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Table 2.   Shining Path’s Lines of Influence (LOIs) 
This prognosis for change, along with a failing state, motivated members of 
Shining Path. Its members waged a hyper violent and protracted struggle that lasted 13 
years and cost 30,000 lives. They sowed terror by attacking government institutions, rival 
organizations, and assassinating noncompliant members of the populace. In sum, Shining 
Path’s attacks cost Peru approximately 20 billion dollars in economic losses, equivalent 
                                               
159 McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 25. 
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to ninety percent of the total national debt.160 Furthermore, Shining Path essentially 
rendered vast portions of loosely governed southern highlands completely ungovernable 
by the state.161 From the core 50 members of the early 1970s, the group grew steadily by 
1992 to over 5,000 members and thousands of supporters in the field.162
Despite this success, examples demonstrate that Shining Path’s overall ability to 
sustain influence was flawed. Despite Peru’s poor economy and the populace’s dislike of 
the government, Shining Path was still unable to motivate people completely in 
undertaking a sustained armed struggle. While Guzman’s arrest may have been a single 
point of failure in terms of the group’s hierarchy, it does not lesson the fact their 
influence efforts were flawed and faltering prior to his capture. The following sections 
also demonstrate that the movement’s method of influence did not advance its cause as 
rapid as it may have by using influence techniques founded in the principles of social 
movement theory. 
 Shining Path 
seemed to have the upper hand against the government in all facets of the conflict, 
including support from the populace. 
B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS 
Let’s go Peruvian people, let’s go to war, with dynamite and lead we will 
topple the old state. I want to be outside in the burning fields, tears, sweat 
and blood. That’s how we sing; that’s how we dance. 
- Shining Path Song163
As mentioned previously, Shining Path’s dialectic narrative transcended 
fundamental methods of influence used by other communist groups and the legal left.
 
164
                                               
160 Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, 1. 
 
161 Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 30. 
162 Ibid., 30; Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America, 147. 
163 Ibid., 196; This song personifies Shining Path’s message and was sung by female members while 
in prison. 
164 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 63; The Khmer Rouge is the exception to this rule. Both groups attributed violence as a necessary 
condition for change and a fundamental requirement in the revolutionary process. It has been surmised that 
Guzman may have even met Pol Pot during his visits to China during the Cultural Revolution. 
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Beyond its Maoist appeal, its narrative evoked notions of a legendary history of armed 
conflict and bifurcated the struggle in the simplest of terms—good versus evil. As a 
result, Shining Path’s deeds and messages often resembled those used in religious-based 
extremism. Only through manifest, ‘cosmic’ conflict, could Shining Path collapse the 
existing Peruvian government and build upon that foundation of ruin.165 In this section, 
numerous examples show how Shining Path’s use of all facets of armed ‘cosmic’ struggle 
to gain compliance from the Peruvian populace was ultimately ineffective. These 
examples demonstrate that even using violence in pursuit of its cosmic war, Shining Path 
was unable to garner the peasants’ complete buy-in to ‘Gonzalo Thought.’ Additionally, 
Shining Path’s violent deeds and message ultimately acted as a self-limiting construct for 
growing its movement that could not even capitalize on the Peruvian state’s errors.166
1. Indigenous Resonance  
  
Shining Path was simply not concerned with using local norms and idioms in its 
messaging (verbal or nonverbal) or trying to influence the populace at an individual’s 
needs-based level. Its messaging and deeds more often seemed preoccupied with 
reinforcing its narrative to current members rather than to external audiences. While this 
created an almost cult like devotion among its members, it may have possibly accounted 
for lost opportunities in influencing people outside the group and explain its rapid demise 
after Guzman’s capture. While peasants were certainly compliant in most of the areas 
governed by Shining Path, such compliance does not translate well into meaningful 
influence. 
 
                                               
165 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 149–150; Images in a cosmic war appear larger than life, 
and take on a history of their own. This draconian view of a divine-like struggle shapes and propels a 
groups’ worldly political battle. Juergensmeyer contends that “absolutism of cosmic war makes 
compromise unlikely, and those who suggest a negotiated settlement are as excoriated as the enemy.” In 
such a narrative, acts of violence seemingly eclipse their political purpose and become ritualistic in and of 
themselves. Violence is almost script like, purifying and sacred. Moreover, a “bellicose stance 
fundamentally contradicts the purpose of compromise and understanding, and adopting an inflexible 
position of militancy early in a dispute calls into question the motive for doing so.” 
166 Ibid., 149–150. 
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Shining Path moved cadres into the countryside and began party work in rural 
villages in 1977 and 1978. Its schoolteachers, theatre groups, and students all lent a hand 
in attempting to teach young peasants their dialectic messages. From these initial efforts, 
many rural youths were recruited during the subsequent years. Most were unwilling to 
continue living in abject poverty with no positive outlook on life. Oftentimes, according 
to a young man interviewed in Cangallo, the youth of a village would simply join Shining 
Path because “they were desperate to learn about arms… for them handling dynamite was 
a big thing.”167 Many Senderistas felt they would also gain social mobility as a member. 
During an interview with Carlos Ivan Degregori, one youth echoed this sentiment saying 
“in 1985 the revolution is going to triumph and then those of us here in Sendero, those 
who have more time as militants in Sendero, we are going to be Ministers.”168
Once Shining Path began its campaign of violence, its deeds were far more 
oppressive.
 This 
rationale, while it may have motivated the young, does not show that Shining Path’s strict 
ideology was itself a motivation for recruits to join, but more of an excuse. Recruitment 
seems to have often been more of a function of the poor economy and personal 
empowerment rather than an embrace of Marxist ideology. 
169
                                               
167 Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 61–62. 
 For example, when occupying a contested village, Shining Path would first 
enter a town, and bomb municipal and government buildings, along with financial 
institutions. ‘People’s trials’ were then performed after the town was herded together, 
with local leaders executed on the spot. Special malevolence was reserved for leaders and 
members of other communist parties or legal leftwing parties. After the murders, Shining 
Path members would then review the town’s civil registry and line up the remainder of 
168 Ibid. 
169 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 68; All who stood in Shining Path’s way were to be killed. A Shining Path poem reflects this notion 
by stating “blood does not drown the revolution, but irrigates it.” McClintock also notes, “only 17 percent 
of Shining Path’s victims were members of the military or police; most victims were unarmed civilians.” 
Moreover, “between 1980 and 1992, Sendero murdered at least eight ecclesiastics, nine foreign 
development workers, 44 grassroots leaders, 203 businessmen, 244 teachers, 303 students, 424 workers, 
502 political officials (primarily local officials such as mayors), 1,100 urban residents, and 2,196 
peasants… eyes were gouged out; men were castrated; children disemboweled; and human bonfires were 
set. Sendero socialized its young recruits to violence; children of five and six were taught to kill chickens 
so that they would be accustomed to blood.” This predication on violence would be an asset and a liability. 
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the people, who would be informed they were now Shining Path members and placed 
into artificial committees. A youth chief would be designated, along with a food and 
health chief. Prudent villagers went along with this coercion into service lest they be shot 
themselves.170
The use of messaging predicated on cultural resonance was often extremely weak. 
First, Shining Path’s messages often claimed it represented the 60 percent of Indians that 
comprise Peru’s population. In reality, and contrary to popular sentiment, little about 
Shining Path was Indian. Their core leadership was predominantly of Spanish heritage. 
Additionally, most of the symbols used in its messaging dealt with Marxism and Maoism 
and reflected its narrative that “posits class as the sole form of social contradiction.” For 
the Shining Path, ultimately class rather than ethnic identity mattered. Its messages also 
often referred to Chinese historical figures rather than Andean ones. Shining Path’s 
literature was also purely Marxist in content. Little effort was used to place it in social 
context that most peasants could understand. One member of Shining Path interviewed in 
prison reinforces Shining Path’s lack of concern in using lines of persuasion that would 
resonate with locals, “Many times the campensino wants only a piece of land and he’s 
happy... whether he’s happy or not doesn’t matter.”
 While its use of violence allowed Shining Path to occupy and control 
numerous towns in the Sierra successfully, it did so at the expense of cultural norms. 
171 Another member summed up the 
perspective regarding peasants, “you talk to the masses in simple language… and the 
clearest is with bullets and dynamite.” This same individual emphasized that Shining 
Path did not want to “personalize the revolution.” 172
Despite Shining Path’s lack of cultural messages and resonance, many people 
initially accepted it because of the central government’s equally harsh response to 
  
                                               
170 Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America, 199; Poole and Renique, 
Peru: Time of Fear, 27–29. Shining Path has a long list of atrocities. In 1987–1989, five miner’s union 
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1990 alone saw over 1,249 peasants killed by Shining Path, with 27% of the victims classified as slum 
dwellers. 
171 Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America, 212. 
172 Ibid., 152, 193; Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 63. 
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Shining Path’s emergence. Over 6,000 people in Ayacucho “disappeared” from 1982–
1988 alone. Put into perspective, General Pinochet of neighboring Chile was responsible 
for 3,000 deaths during his entire 17 years of military rule. Pinochet was a dictator, while 
Peru’s president at the time, Garcia, was a democratically elected leftist and a “reformer 
committed to social justice.” As a result of this abuse, the idea of tearing down Peru’s 
government resonated with the populace, especially since the government often behaved 
just as bad if not worse than Shining Path. Peasants often accepted Shining Path as a 
lesser of two evils.173
As Shining Path occupied more towns in the countryside, it was also quick to 
preach a strict code of morality required in a corrupt world. It would impose rigid, 
puritanical laws. Drug addicts, alcoholics, adulterers, wife beaters, thieves, and 
homosexuals were warned and then shot if they persisted in their behavior. Armed cadres 
also provided security from cattle rustlers and punished abusive bandits and merchants. 
During the early years enforcing these laws, many peasants, especially women and the 




This admiration was often short lived because Shining Path also considered 
traditional social events and traditions as ‘archaic’. Luis Arce Borja, a Shining Path 
spokesman, remarked that Andean religious practices were ‘irrationalities which continue 
to have influence over the most backward inhabitants of Peru… [Andean] cultural 
tradition has nothing to absolutely nothing to do with the war and the revolutionary 
struggle.’
 In terms of winning the war of support by the peasants, a lack of 
meaningful governmental influence existed in the region. In other words, Shining Path 
did not have to undermine competing influence initiatives by central authorities in Lima, 
which may have also led to Shining Path believing that its influence efforts were 
adequate and sufficient. 
175
                                               
173 Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America, 200–202. 
 A pro-Shining Path newspaper further echoed this belief in its attack on 
intellectual and political programs that take into account “Andean peasant traditions.” 
174 Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 62. 
175 Ibid., 62–63. 
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The paper likened Andean traditions to ‘magical whining nationalisms’ and called for 
their eradication because they were the ‘residue of a moribund bourgeois ideology.’ 
Consistent with this attitude, Shining Path also banned “fiestas, rituals, and festive 
drinking.”176
Many peasants were simply not willing to concede all facets of their life to the 
party. Many peasants openly rejected Shining Path’s heavy-handed interventions into the 
operation of farming collectives, local methods of marketing, or dismantling existing 
authority hierarchies based on experience and age.
  
177 Attempts at denying peasants 
access to markets deprived them of basic sundry items, and would sometimes create 
minor classes against the insurgents.178
In summary, the preceding examples illustrate a generally low degree in which 
Shining Path’s messages and deeds were emotionally relevant and fit Andean peasant’s 
social and cultural norms, let alone their daily patterns of life. While its membership 
continue to grow, it is unlikely that much of its support was generated from the message 
of Gonzalo Thought, but rather was more of a reflection of compliance based upon the 
threat of violence for noncompliance with the movement.  
 
2. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition  
Shining Paths used all facets of sabotage and violence in its attempts to exploit 
Peru’s weak central government. This attempt created a general perception that it was 
able to dislodge the government and rival groups at will in rural and regions and the 
urban slums of Peru. As stated previously, Shining Path simply had little competition in 
                                               
176 Ibid.; Most peasants eventually saw Shining Path’s enforcement of puritanical laws as akin to their 
historic discrimination under Spanish rulers. Many villagers saw the world in terms of race, culture, and 
ethnicity and considered Shining Path no better than their ruling elite mistis (a derogatory term used for 
landlords, merchants, and government officials derived from the Spanish word mestizo meaning of mixed 
blood). 
177 Ibid.; Dwight B. Billings, “Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis,” The American Journal 
of Sociology 96, no. 1 (July 1990), 1, 17–8, 22, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2780691.pdf; Shining 
Path’s contempt for local practices mirrored that of an American union in the early 1900s. In this case, the 
contempt for local striker’s practices and lack of indigenous resonance proved to be an ineffective strategy.  
178 Billie Jean Isbell, “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho,” in The Shining Path 
of Peru, ed. David S. Palmer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 66–67; a peasant interviewed 
complained, “where would we get our salt and matches?” 
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these remote regions. Government control was nominal at best. As a result, it was able to 
establish structure in these areas, but its deeds often went too far for it to establish a 
robust and resilient level of influence. The effect was a populace that looked supportive 
but was merely compliant.  
Shining Path’s subversive attacks began during 1980 in the central highlands to 
disrupt and sabotage the national economy, deny food and energy to Lima, and 
undermine the viability of independent peasant and labor groups. These actions were 
designed to prepare for overt confrontation with the government in 1986. As armed 
Shining Path groups often entered villages and forced villagers by gunpoint to listen to 
Senderista’s propaganda on armed struggle, ‘quotas’ of money were taken from villagers 
while they distributed literature and painted hammer and sickle symbols on buildings. 
One villager of Cochas summarized how Shining Path members would also threaten to 
kill any villager who attempted to remove its graffiti or communist flags from building 
walls. A sense of paranoia would take hold among the villagers; Shining Path reminded 
villagers that they were always being watched. It would also stop peasants and stamp 
their electoral identification cards with PCP-SL’s hammer and sickle logo.179
By 1988, Shining Path’s acts of violence and sabotage in support of their message 
reached climatic levels. In December of that year, it conducted over 18 bombings of the 
Central Railway to cut Lima from mines in Junín and Pasco. In August, a Jesuit-run 
development and educational center was destroyed in Jarpa, along with communal farms 
in Yanacancha and Cachi.
 
180 From November to December, Shining Path also destroyed 
vast portions of Cahuide’s largest agricultural units belonging to the Agrarian Society of 
Social Interest (SAIS) and one of Peru’s largest milk and dairy plants in Concepción.181
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This plant was a cooperative that employed over 800 workers and supplied Huancayo and  
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Lima with milk. Adding to this, Shining Path murdered so many mayors throughout the 
central highlands that 195 out of 298 mayors resigned from their office. Union activists, 
leaders, and their families were also threatened.182
While these attacks played into Shining Path’s narrative, they also reinforced 
peasant resistance to them. Cahuide’s general assembly opted to create a new agricultural 
collective from remaining SAIS facilities despite the threats and retaliation by Shining 
Path.
  
183 Despite Shining Path establishing its own popular committees in former SAIS 
communities, many peasants still resisted it. In one such instance, Shining Path members 
in 1989 stopped a bus in the Mantaro valley and killed 12 prisoners from the town of 
Chongos Alto who attempted to recover their lands and livelihoods. Due to Shining 
Path’s attacks on miners, who represented the “core of the Peruvian labor movement,” 
mining collectives formed self-defense brigades and drew government intervention in the 
region through a general strike. During a congress held by these miners, along with other 
peasant and women’s organizations, all parties agreed to oppose Shining Path’s rampage 
of violence. Furthermore, rank and file residents of Lima were becoming harder to 
intimidate. After murdering a handcart merchant named Ramirez Huaranga, Shining Path 
also killed his daughter and her husband because they opted to keep the business going 
and refused to cow to the threat of violence.184
While the Peruvian government initially downplayed Shining Path’s initiation of 
violence in 1980, it was forced to respond by early 1981 with broad anti-terror laws and 
penalties to anyone supporting such activities. By 1982, over 2,000 government troops 
attempted to enforce a state of emergency in eight of Ayacucho’s districts.
  
185 Due to the 
government’s overreaction to Shining Path, acceptance appeared in the eyes of many 
people in Shining Path’s message of tearing down Peru’s government, especially since 
the government often behaved just as bad if not worse than Shining Path.186
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183 Shining Path killed a peasant organizer, Victor Lozano, and university professor, Manuel Soto, 
who were working with peasants to rebuild their collective farms.  
184 Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 82–84. 
185 McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 17–18. 
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Seeing this escalation by government forces and their atrocities against civilians, 
Shining Path simply ramped up its own operations; it conducted between 450–550 attacks 
in Ayacucho emergency zone alone by 1983, and up to 700 by 1984. By the end of 1983, 
the insurgency gained significant ground throughout Peru’s sierra region. Shining Path’s 
struggle had moved into the Maoist third phase of conflict and was directly challenging 
Lima’s competitive influence over the populace. In attempts to gain lost influence, the 
government continued to play into Shining Path’s narrative by committing repeated 
atrocities by its forces on Shining Path members and villagers.187 Shining Path 
capitalized on an overly oppressive Peruvian police and military’s mistakes in the 
beginning of its struggle. It exploited the government’s inability to govern remote areas 
and provide meaningful forms of due process. Due to historic regional mistrust of the 
central government, sympathies of the urban population in Ayacucho and Huanta initially 
leaned towards Shining Path despite its authoritarianism. However, such support, which 
at face value seemed to be receptive of their message calling for armed struggle, hid its 
true nature: that of individual self-interest.188
An example of this self-interest occurred in 1982 during the burial of Edith Lagos, 
who was killed by police. During the burial of this well-known Senderista, thousands of 
mourners attended her funeral. While Shining Path used this event to create the 
perception of mass support for its cause, this event transcended its ideology. Many of the 
attendees saw Prada as a romantic figure who had the courage to fight the central powers 
in Lima. Many identified with her because they had lost relatives to police death squads. 
Moreover, her funeral was presided over by the anti-communist Catholic bishop of 
Ayucucho, Frederico Richter Prada. This show of solidarity illustrates peasants placing 
precedence over victims of violence rather than just “Lagos’s identity as a Senderista.”
  
189
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Another example that seems to illustrate Shining Path’s ability to subvert 
government actions and influence support was its attacks on government sponsored civil 
defense groups. Called rondas, these groups often used their organization and civil 
authority not only as a means to defend against bandits and Shining Path, but as a means 
to exact revenge against rival towns. Many would exact revenge for historic disputes over 
land usage and missing livestock. Towns persecuted by rondas, along with ones that did 
not want to be forcibly relocated by the government in support of their civil defense plan, 
would, therefore, turn to Shining Path as a means to counter this threat. In one such case 
in April 1984, Shining Path led 300 dissidents in an attack on a strategic hamlet in 
Pampacancha that contained four relocated communities. Those peasants who sided with 
Shining Path attacked and killed 40 of their own neighbors, not in a show of solidarity for 
Shining Path, but rather “in an attempt to recover their old lands, communities and 
freedom.” Many Shining Path members and supporters were not necessarily being 
influenced to wage a Marxist armed struggle as much as they were using Shining Path as 
a means to gain revenge for historic rivalries between families and villages.  
Overall, Shining Path used violence in an attempt to subvert all adversaries, but it 
did not drive peasants to join them. These cases demonstrate that the peasants often used 
Shining Path more as a vehicle for their own needs rather than Shining Path manipulating 
peasants.190
3. Synchronization and Massing of Deeds and Messages  
 It also reflects Shining Path’s misunderstanding of its competitive influence 
advantage over the state. Shining Path’s use of intimidation and violence often 
undermined its legitimacy. The group forced compliance rather than cognitive 
realignment by the very people they are trying win over to their movement. While such 
tactics inflated numbers and created the perception it was growing, ultimately, it built an 
organization that had a weak foundation. The loss of Guzman illustrates this weakness.  
As demonstrated thus far, Shining Path’s use of violence was generally 
synchronized and mutually supportive of its messages. Regardless of this, the group’s  
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messages often failed to resonate and motivate peasants to their cause. As suggested 
previously, just because Shining Path’s deeds reinforced its message, it did not make the 
message any more palatable for many peasants. 
Additionally, and again counter to many impressions of the group, the group’s 
deeds sometimes did not reinforce its narrative. One former Shining Path supporter from 
Cangallo province recalled that an army patrol “inflicted massacres and assaults on the 
communities… they even took livestock… beat peasant men and women… and make 
them disappear.” This same witness also recalled Shining Path’s “failure to provide 
protection from the army’s abuses lost the party the support of all but the most committed 
younger students.”191 Feeling betrayed by Shining Path, 32 of Cangallo’s communities 
had over 3,000 families abandon homes and relocate to government camps between 1981 
and 1985. Thus, Shining Path simply sought revenge on those who stayed in the 
communities, oftentimes following the departure of the army into villages and executing 
“stoolpigeons” and “collaborators.” With the collapse of their established committees, 
Shining Path’s acts of violence also lost the façade of the “people’s trials.” One peasant 
remarked during an interview, “the people were unhappy because the Senderistas 
committed many stupidities. They killed innocent people… I think that if someone has 
made mistakes they should be simply punished… not like Sendero has done—killing [the 
town mayor] like a pig.”192
In summary, it would seem Shining Path’s synchronization of esoteric messages 
calling for cosmic-conflict and use of violence provided a mixed bag of results. On one 
hand, its acts of sabotage, assassinations, disruption of political rivals, and armed 
propaganda generally did reinforce its message and bring about a mixture of devout 
young followers and compliance from peasants writ large. One the other hand, simply 
synchronizing its message was insufficient in specific instances to enforce even 
compliance by the peasants. 
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Moreover, Shining Path’s use of force was so out of touch with social norms and 
needs, some communities resisted the group outright or rallied behind their oppressive 
government.193 Actions that hurt the population ultimately undermined Shining Path’s 
quest for active and organic support. Only compliance was gained using needs based 
coercion.194
C. CHANNELS 
 Shining Path’s deeds hurt exoteric appeals because it destroyed existing 
economies, social norms, and did not take into account the individual’s concerns. In 
many ways, Shining Path’s use of terrorist tactics simply illustrates an acknowledgement 
that its message would never resonate on its own merit. Its message was a failure. As 
seen in the next section, its use of force also did much to cut channels of influence that it 
might have been able to use to generate legitimate, lasting support.  
Shining Path’s ability to channel influence through local actors with high levels of 
centrality was largely nonexistent.195
                                               
193 Poole and Renique, Peru: Time of Fear, 68. Numerous examples of such responses to Shining Path 
exist, such as in 1983, when villagers in the village of Chuschi demanded government police or a military 
presence in their town after Shining Path killed their mayor and four peasants. The peasants of the town 
ended up self-mobilizing a ronda for civil defense. Similar acts occurred in the towns of Lucanamarca and 
Huancasancos. In Huamanga, rondas began to spring up across the province to combat Shining Path. These 
civil defense forces also did much to undermine Shining Path’s artificial “popular committees” within 
villages and towns. In adjacent regions, such as Ayocucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica, towns have also 
formed government sponsored militias and community organizations to combat Shining Path’s influence. 
 As with its deeds and messages, channeling was 
conducted in strict adherence to its cosmic-narrative. Shining Path’s ability to use 
channels was handcuffed by its political culture from achieving the broadest level of anti-
state support. Its primary channel of influence was the barrel of a gun and dynamite. It 
cared little in using natural agents as a conduit of influence and to help reduce a negative 
194 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2005), 109. 
195 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 70–72; According to McClintock, Shining Path was “extremely hierarchical.” There was no 
acknowledged second in command after Guzman. The “Central Committee” was the formal apex of the 
group, under which six regional committees existed. Each regional committee oversaw cells comprised of 
five to nine members operating in sectors or zones. Only one member of the cell would know of or 
communicate with its higher headquarters. 
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perception of itself.196
To begin, rather than relying on local actors to influence audiences for purposes 
of expanding its power and influence, Shining Path preferred to use “generated 
organisms,” which were basically political front groups staffed by its own members.
 In lay terms, Shining Path was in a suicide-pact with its own 
prognosis for change, and because of this, it passed over vast opportunities to tap into 
local channels of influence. This section demonstrates that it is not so much a question of 
what Shining Path did, but more of what it failed to do. 
197 
The overarching character of Shining Path’s front groups was artificial in nature. The 
groups were designed to penetrate the masses and broaden mobilization. Various groups 
were created to do this, such as the Movement of Classist Workers (MOTC), the 
Revolutionary Student Front (FER), the Single Trade Union of Educated Workers of 
Peru, the Popular Women’s Movement (MFP), and the Movement of Poor Peasants 
(MCP). Many of these groups were instituted not in recognition that natural channels 
were better, but rather as simple extensions of Shining Path’s attempt to move its 
movement to urban areas after 1986. Rather than co-opt existing local agents of 
influence, Shining Path would force its cadre-run front groups in to compete for popular 
support.198
Unlike the Viet Cong’s agitprop cadres that embedded with the people, Shining 
Path often left no one in charge or simply left converted teenaged recruits in charge of the 
villages. Without an embedded cadre within the villages, many peasants never had a 
permanent channel of influence. Interviews conducted in 1986 in the department of 
Ayacucho provide insight on how itinerant Shining Path cadres were negatively 
perceived. Many Quechua speakers never associated the group as an integral part of their 
communities. They often labeled Shining Path members as puriqkuna, meaning “people 
who travel.” This term contrasts directly with llaqtamasi, the peasants’ term for village  
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mates. This drive-by administration of villages, coupled with their brutal methods, led to 
Shining Path members being seen not just as foreigners to the peasants, but even worse, 
“as flesh-eating naqas.”199
Attitudes towards Shining Path worsened when most cadres remained in a town 
just long enough to attract a hostile government response. When they departed the area in 
an effort to avoid a direct confrontation, many local sympathizers felt betrayed because 
they were now defenseless. One Huanta villager recalled, “they told us to be prepared for 
war, to defeat the enemy, and we believed them… they escaped through here and we 




When teenage members were left as part of Shining Path’s popular committees, 
the result was often worse. Shining Path relied heavily on its recruitment of young 
members to grow the organization. It understood the young “have little or no political 
past” and they “do not have to be reeducated, only educated.”
 Despite gaining the support, or most likely compliance of villagers, Shining 
Path’s use of artificial committees was not only a poor attempt at channeling influence 
but probably hurt it more if it had done nothing at all.  
201 While this fact helped to 
assimilate new recruits into Shining Path, the ability of immature youths to channel 
influence was generally “undermined by their status as junior members of communities in 
which age was an important element in traditional conceptions of authority.” Despite the 
fact that many were indeed natural actors, in the sense they had been recruited from the 
village in which they lived, this notion was undercut by their nonindigenous messaging 
and because they were immature. Often, their family connections made them interested 
actors in different family rivalries and feuds.202
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The worst thing Sendero did was to rely on the very young kids… they left 
young sons of the community in charge. Perhaps one of their fathers had a 
dispute with another’s father over property boundaries, animals, theft, 
domestic fights. Since Sendero left kids in charge, they began to take 
reprisals, to take revenge.203
Another peasant interviewed from Huamanga province corroborates this 
perspective, stating “the jefes (leaders) were kids, know-it-alls. Then the Party 




Further opportunities to channel natural support are evident in Shining Path’s 
relationship with educational and church organizations. Like the legal left, it viewed the 
Catholic and Protestant churches, and other religious affiliated organizations, as 
adversaries that made people dependent on charity and outside support.
 
205
The staunchly Catholic department of Ayachucho’s University of San Cristobal 
de Huamanga, one of Latin America’s oldest universities, was founded in 1677 as a 
bastion of religious education. Reopened in 1959 after years of dormancy, Guzman 
subverted the university for use as a base to recruit and training of Shining Path cadre.
 Guzman 
understood that the Catholic Church retained a high degree of influence in many 
communities, and did his best to attack its influence rather than co-opt it. Simultaneous to 
this, Guzman would be able effectively to use the Church’s university as a channel to 
influence and recruit Shining Path members. 
206
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As the director of philosophy, Guzman also became the administrator of a compulsory 
204 Ibid., 65–66. 
205 Billings, “Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis,” 1, 17–8, 22; Billings’ research on 
religion provides a parallel to Shining Path’s channeling of churches. In his research on the role of religion 
in unions, he highlighted the “prominent yet paradoxical role” religion played in class conflict during the 
early 1900s in the United States. He cites two cases in which union leaders in the United States either used 
religion as a channel or refused to do so. When one Communist union in Kentucky embraced local 
religious leaders and the beliefs of coal miners, they were able to channel “religious legitimacy” into 
effective support that forced mining companies to concede to union demands. When a New England-based 
textile union attempted to influence workers in North Carolina, they conversely opted not to channel the 
religious beliefs of its members, which resulted in both the company and the local religious leadership 
successfully driving a wedge between their workers and the union. 
206 Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, 12. 
 72 
first year lecture course called ciclo básico that taught the “scientific concept” in 
conjunction with Darwinism. Catholic education was soon undermined by Marxist-
Leninist indoctrination. After years of young students abandoning religious activities, the 
Church then opened the Catholic University of Ayacucho. Guzman simply repeated his 
earlier method of subversion by planting his teachers into its administration.207 
Moreover, Guzman began to build Shining Path’s cellular network among students and 
staff alike. The courses were designed to influence the Indian students. First-generation 
Indian migrants to the towns were becoming “disillusioned and alienated” and were 
recruited in universities to become cadre for a network of front organizations representing 
secondary school and university students, pheasants, and industrial workers and women. 
Guzman also set up a school of practical studies on communism in the countryside, 
whereby teaching students could return to their Indian villages to disseminate 
propaganda.208
More overt examples of Shining Path attacking religious channels of influence 
include the killing of two Protestants in 1982 while their church was holding a 24-hour 
prayer vigil for peace. The effect of this attack not only limited a potential channel of 
influence upon emerging Protestant populations; it had the additional effect of reinforcing 
the beliefs of churchgoers that their parishioners were martyred in accordance with their 
beliefs just as Christ was. These religious narratives were simply reinforced and Shining 
Path was unable to influence the population to support its cause.
 
209
In 1988, Shining Path orchestrated a wave of violence against progressive church 
organizations. Violence grew steadily in the form of bombings, murders, attacks on 
economic infrastructure and destruction of property. After destroying three church-
managed farms, the net effect was not a degradation of support for these church 
organizations or submission by the populace to Shining Path, but rather a renewed  
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unification among the peasants. The peasants chose instead to conduct strikes on their 
own, calling on the central government for reform. Garcia’s government relented, and 
Shining Path was unable to compete successfully in the department of Puno.210
In 1989, a column of Shining Path fighters entered Huasahuasi, Junin, demanding 
to see the ‘Yankee’ nun, Irene Teresa MacCormack. MacCormack, actually an 
Australian, was accused of corrupting villagers with free medical care and food. After 
forcing her to kneel in the town’s plaza, she was shot along with other prominent town 
members. Another example is seen in 1991, with the killing of two Franciscan 
missionaries from Poland during a raid at Pariacoto, Ancash. Shining Path rationalized 
their murders as an attempt to prevent “agents of imperialism” and “obliging” servants of 
the CIA from penetrating the clergy and controlling the masses.
  
211
Ultimately, Shining Path’s campaign against churches provided varied results. It 
was able to infiltrate and subvert religious educational institutions to its advantage. While 
its acts reinforced its narrative of destroying competitive groups, in the long run, it did 
not deny religion as a channel of influence and often reinforced the churches’ role in 
society. The churches were a natural channel of influence Shining Path could have 
exploited to meet its ends. Despite tactical gains in attacking natural religious channels, 
churches began to sponsor vicarías de solidaridad (vicariates of solidarity) along with 
social action committees at local levels to highlight the human rights abuses of not only 
the government forces but also Shining Path. As economic conditions continued to 
worsen after the implementation of the Fijimori regime’s “Fujishock” policy, much of 
Peru’s poor were even more beholden to church-sponsored programs and charities. 
Lima’s Caritas charity served over a million Peruvians by 1990 alone, and images of the 
Virgin Mary weeping tears of blood appeared in many neighborhoods in response to 
Shining Path attacks. By attacking church groups rather than using them as channels of 
influence, Shining Path failed to capitalize on religious institutions’ resonance among the 
people and also failed to see that many people were dependent on the church. Peasants 
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were often not left without a viable alternative to church services.212 Lastly, the ability to 
use channeled influence to exploit rifts in emerging evangelical church groups and the 
Catholic Church were also underdeveloped; both groups were competitors of each other, 
yet Shining Path saw both as enemies. If Shining Path had co-opted one, it may well have 
helped provide genuine, rather than artificial, support while limiting the efficacy of a 
rival.213
Beyond its use of schools and neglecting to channel religion, Shining Path also 
did much to limit its use of channels by attacking the legal left along with nonstate actors, 
such as the Chinese and the Soviet Union. It opted not to penetrate wider target audiences 
with natural channels of influence, but rather eradicate them and occupy the remaining 
political vacuum. Shining Path even attacked “the meeting of the socialists international, 
the home of the Cuban military attaché, and the Lima offices of Aeroflot.”
 
214 Its own 
beginning also illustrates its inability to cooperate with groups that desired similar 
political goals. As mentioned previously, a split occurred within PCP over the use of 
armed struggle. The splinter group, PCP-Bandera Roja, favored an agrarian-Maoist style 
of armed struggle against the state. Bandera Roja (Red Flag) saw the nonviolent, legal 
left as selling out the revolution and as political adversaries. Despite calls for dogmatic 
intolerance of both the state and legal left, Bandera Roja was slow to practice political 
violence, and in practice, looked no different from other leftist groups.215
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 Thus, PCP-
Bandera Roja itself went through a period of internal rifts beginning in 1967. Many 
members felt the movement was not acting fast enough upon their call for armed 
struggle. By 1970, a group of 50 members was expelled for their cult-like devotion to 
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charismatic leader of this group. In a move to insulate his 50 followers from the legal left, 
he relocated it to the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga. During the same year, he 
assumed leadership of the philosophy department.216
Last, and perhaps the most obvious and significant example of Shining Path’s use 
of channeling, is its overly centralized system of leadership. Guzman has been described 
as “the force behind the scenes.” He cultivated himself as a “historic individual” to his 
followers and presented an image of “genius and omnipresence.”
 
217 Max Weber would 
describe an individual like Guzman as a “charismatic mode of authority.”218 Other social 
movement theorists would also observe, “charismatic leadership is unstable because it 
lacks both institutional restraints and institutional supports.”219 Shining Path is an 
example of this. Ultimately, what Guzman wanted, Shining Path did. The group was a 
direct reflection of him, and when he was out of the equation, its identity went with him. 
Since Guzman’s pivotal role as founder and leader of Shining Path, the role of secondary 
and mid-level leadership was relegated significantly. “The principal role of the members 
was effectively to serve as a link between the leader and those who are sent out to do his 
bidding.” 220
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 Officially, a publicly recognized second in command never existed. In fact, 
Guzman’s own wife, Augusta La Torre, reportedly mysteriously committed suicide in  
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1988 after she openly opposed her husband taking the war to Lima.221
The aftereffects of Guzman’s capture illustrate he was the penultimate channel of 
Shining Path’s influence. Having created the group, he proved he could also undo it—the 
coup de grace came in 1993, when he reversed the group’s bellicose narrative in a 
seemingly unprovoked step towards a disengagement from violence. To the amazement 
of many, especially his devout followers, Guzman called for more peaceful forms of 
resistance in an apparent attempt to reconcile the group’s goals with reality. Subsequent 
to his call for change, Shining Path splintered in 1994 and formed two subgroups. While 
one group was able to accept Guzman’s call for peace, the other rebranded itself under 
the moniker “Sendero Rojo” (Red Path) and promised to keep fighting a protracted war 
against the state.
 Her mysterious 
death indicates Guzman’s maintained total control on Shining Path’s day-to-day 
activities.  
222 The remaining key leaders who are still committed to violence are 
arrested regularly. Only an estimated 300-committed fighters remain.223 Essentially, 
Shining Path mystique and strategic parity have been destroyed.224
In summary, the key lesson from Shining Path’s version of channeling 
demonstrates that artificial channels can be effective, notably in the short term, whereas 
natural channels provide lasting and true support. Guzman’s use of teachers as a means to 
deliver its narrative to peasants in schools was indeed a success. Using established 
universities, remolding the curriculum, and sending his converted teachers to then teach 
at village levels was also effective. It is the closest the group came to incorporating 
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organic structures as channels. By channeling the education system, Shining Path did 
achieve an economy of influence. It was able to both subvert the Church’s influence and 
its educational system while channeling influence to impressionable students.  
However, because of its restrictive narrative, it was locked into a method of 
insurgency that all but prevented it from successfully using other natural channels of 
influence. Shining Path’s message was a “hard sell,” which seems to have confused 
compliance with support. Its divergence from social movement methods of infiltrating 
local networks and organizations governed and limited its ability to maintain control of a 
populace beyond tactical success. Attacking the left was Shining Path’s biggest failure in 
terms of channeling. Local groups were eradicated rather than absorbed. Moreover, had 
its narrative allowed it to do so, Shining Path could have co-opted these organizations, 
and subsequently, subverted them once power was achieved. Possible support from 
nonstate actors, such as the Soviets and Chinese, was also spurned.225
D. MEDIUMS 
 Support from these 
nations would have arguably provided an asymmetric influence advantage, sustained the 
movement, and facilitated a takeover of the government.  
Of all the case studies researched in this thesis, Shining Path exhibited the least 
developed use of mediums. Shining Path showed a primacy to direct violence and 
“propaganda by the deed”226
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 over the use of more subtle, developed, or nuanced 
mediums. Shining Path’s use of these other mediums was minimal and relatively 
unsynchronized with any overall influence objective. One of the main reasons Shining 
Path did not identify a need to utilize more advanced mediums is related to its initial 
focus on rural, isolated, and uncontested villages where modern mediums were relatively 
nonexistent. In 1991, Christina Meyer from Rand Corporation analyzed that Shining Path 
did not pursue multiple mediums in its influence approach on the villages “because these  
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villages [were] isolated and insular, [and local villagers] would probably have been 
immune to propaganda attacks in any medium.”227
When Shining Path attempted to use more advanced mediums, such as radio or 
television, it would violently “coerce a legitimate station into broadcasting its 
messages.”
 Thus, Shining Path’s primary medium 
for influence was face-to-face communication.  
228 This methodology was inconsistent and sometimes did not appear to be 
well coordinated when compared to other Peruvian guerilla groups, such as Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement, which would synchronize the takeover of several stations 
simultaneously to maximize coverage of its message.229 In most cases, Shining Path 
spent more time trying to destroy modern mediums than actively utilizing or co-opting 
them. For example, in 1982, Shining Path operatives purposely destroyed television relay 
equipment during the World Cup, which won little favor from average Peruvians.230 
Although Shining Path did not actively pursue the use of radio and television, its violent 
acts still benefited from media coverage from independent media outlets that assisted in 
propagating Shining Path influence.231
The most prominent example of Shining Path’s use of conventional media when it 
did incorporate other mediums is its takeover of El Diario newspaper in 1985. El Diario 
was more than a medium of influence for the group but also a means to coordinate with 
its dispersed and clandestine members outside of Lima. El Diario was sold at newsstands 
only, with no subscription lists that the police could use to find members. By 1988, its 
estimated circulation was approximately 6,000, and claimed an audience of over 30,000 
readers. After a new law was passed in December 1988 that outlawed the incitement of 
terrorism, the paper disappeared from circulation for several months but reappeared as a 
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weekly in March 1989. The paper was ultimately an effective way to perpetuate the myth 
of and message of Shining Path while maintaining operational security within the group 
and its followers. Results from party meetings, such as someone’s Party Congress day-to-
day contact and influence within the group, could be maintained without compromising 
the network. Results of the Shining Path Congress could be disseminated knowing that its 
regional leadership could receive guidance and meet to address similar issues.232
In keeping with its concept of cosmic war, Shining Path also often defaulted to 
using unique print mediums to reinforce its ideology among members and to also threaten 
its enemies. This form of print media took the form of “death lists.” Such letters were 
generally posted in towns and listed the names of all enemies of the movement to be 
liquidated with the intent to intimidate and prompt an exodus of local actors from 
villages. In doing so, Shining Path then hoped to occupy a village uncontested. As was 
seen in the previous section covering its deeds, Shining Path was often able to use such a 
medium to intimidate villagers because entire villages had often been massacred due to 
their cooperation with the government or noncompliance with the insurgents. Mutilation 
of bodies was also common as a medium designed to amplify fear of Shining Path 
further. 
 
233 In one such case, Shining Path shot dead a deputy-mayor in front of her own 
children and then blew up her corpse with dynamite.234
The most common mediums used by Shining Path were more nontraditional in 
nature, such as the use of symbols, effigies, songs, graffiti, and similar methods. One of 
the most famous nontraditional mediums used by Shining Path was to sabotage Lima’s 
electrical grid, creating a blackout while a large burning hammer and sickle burned on a 
hill overlooking the presidential palace.
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deterring voter participation by 35% during the first round of 1990 general elections.236 
This method was also used during Guzman’s birthday and during the very moment the 
Pope’s plane was landing in Lima.237
Another memorable implementation of a nontraditional medium was Shining 
Path’s use of dead dogs. The group would hang dead dogs from lampposts in towns and 
in the capital as a warning to its foes. In December 1980, members of the group hung 
dead dogs from street signs and lampposts around Lima.
 
238 Unfortunately (at least from 
the perspective of the Shining Path) this powerful symbolism, which took Shining Path 
members considerable work to execute and intended to affect upcoming elections, did not 
resonate with the Lima populace. Shining Path members attached signs to the dogs 
stating “Deng Xio-Ping [the conservative successor to Mao Zedong of China] son of a 
bitch.”239
 
 While this specific medium seemed logical to Shining Path members, the 
Chinese political reference had mostly esoteric and internal meaning to them. It did not 
garner the true intended impact with the Lima populace in creating a positive frame 
alignment with the Shining Path’s objectives. Although Shining Path generally failed in 
terms of effectively using a diverse mix of mediums, it did succeed in using education to 
drive its influence efforts. 
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Figure 4.   Maoist Influence on Shining Path’s Propaganda240
For Guzman and Shining Path, schools, education camps, and education systems 
became a quintessential medium in propagating Shining Path ideology and influence. By 
the early 1970s, Shining Path had a strong foothold in universities, such as those in 
Ayacucho. It used many of its professors to put students through what it called the “basic 
cycle,” essentially creating its own classes to indoctrinate students into Shining Path and 
its ideology.
  
241 Over time, universities throughout Peru had students discussing Marxist-
Leninism and other communist precepts through dissemination of communist literature 
through what was given the name of “the handbook revolution.”242 Likewise, Shining 
Path capitalized on an effort to increase education among the rural Andean population to 
send its teachers into rural areas to indoctrinate the Andean youth. Initially, this worked 
well with Andean youth looking for something to replace a “traditional Andean world 
view,” and Shining Path’s strict ideology was attractive because it provided the “illusion 
of absolute coherence.”243
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In general, Shining Path demonstrated its use of mediums were mostly designed 
for internal, esoteric influence and group communication rather than externally focused 
for social mobilization. The lack of diverse and orchestrated mediums combined with a 
monolithic use of violence greatly impacted Shining Path’s ability to conduct successful 
frame alignment needed for building, growing, and maintaining a social movement.244
E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES 
 
1. Summary of Shining Path Influence 
In summary, Shining Path snatched defeat from the jaws of victory when it had 
the perfect environment and opportunity for generating a social movement. Shining 
Path’s use of monolithic violence, lack of indigenous resonance, inability to mass and 
synchronize appropriately, poor use of channeling, and its minimally effective use of 
varied mediums (as compared to other case studies analyzed in the thesis) created 
conditions that seems to have hurt its influence efforts. Shining Path was simply unable 
to exploit political vulnerabilities and grievances fully with the masses, which led to an 
inability to capitalize on resource mobilization opportunities or structures and provided 
no effective means for frame amplification, extension, bridging, or transformation.  
This case study is not an attempt to “ridicule” Shining Path because it 
misunderstood social movement methods of influence, Andean culture, and Peruvian 
societal needs. However, the key takeaway is that its influence strategy reflected a 
narrative that ultimately did not resonate with the masses. The group’s narrative directly 
reflected Abimael Guzman Reynoso, and like him, was uncompromising in its ideology. 
The destruction of Peru’s status quo was what the group was about, and this did not 
resonate with vast portions of the population. Moreover, Shining Path’s method of 
influence reflected top-down methodology of influence. “Sendero is derived from the 
university, not from the peasantry. This means that its perspective on armed struggle is 
fundamentally intellectual and ideological rather than practical and developmental.”245
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2. Message and Deeds 
In terms of how well its narrative resonated, Shining Path’s messages and deeds 
often failed to consider Peru’s peasants as rational actors. Peasants’ support was mainly 
dependent on their cost-benefit analysis. If it were in the peasants’ best interests to submit 
to Shining Path, they would have. Once it became apparent to them that power had 
simply transferred to Shining Path and that they were subordinate to foreign insurgents’ 
puritanical conditions, many peasants opted to support the group no longer. Many times 
Shining Path alienated peasants in their attempts to mobilize them.  
In broader terms, what can be gleaned from this case study? As for Shining Path’s 
violent influence, the methods needed to be strictly governed. Violence can just as easily 
limit influence as gain it. Additionally, submission is not the same as acceptance and 
should it be confused as such. Once the target audience feels the threat of violence is no 
longer applied judiciously, the group loses support. It seems likely that Shining Path 
confused its initial success as a sign that its model of influence (violence) was indeed 
effective. 
Shining Path also violated Mao’s guidance on guerilla warfare, which prescribes 
themes congruent to the hypotheses presented in this thesis for effective influence. 
Contradictory to Maoist doctrine, the group’s inconsistencies were distinct:246 Mao 
warned that the moment a resistance “disassociates” from the rank and file members of 
the populace, it also disassociates itself from victory.247 Mao understood the populace 
must be motivated to cooperate voluntarily and not be forced to; otherwise, their support 
will be ineffectual.248 “Organization depends largely on local circumstances” and to “ not 
steal from the people” and “be neither selfish nor unjust.” 249
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that guerilla war may fail if the populace’s aspirations do not coincide with a movement’s 
political objectives, but rather it “must fail.” The peoples’ cooperation and sympathy are 
a necessary condition for any movement.250
Beyond its lax adherence to Mao, Shining Path’s cosmic-war narrative was also 
not conducive to social movement methods of influence. If the narrative sees all other 
groups as antithetical to its goals, attempts at channeling local actors as mechanisms of 
influence becomes a paradox. Doing so simply undercuts the narrative. Ultimately, as 
Guzman did from his jail cell, the narrative must be adjusted to facilitate a change in 
tactics and strategy. Guzman’s change of heart may reflect the recognition of the need to 
incorporate more proven forms of influence. 
 As was seen in this case study, Shining Path 
members often violated this tenant.  
3. Channels 
Front groups are also not the same as local actors, nor are they an acceptable 
substitute in terms of influence. If the front group does not generate local support, it is 
just another extension of the group and not a means to grow. Shining Path seemed to 
believe its “generated organisms” would garner the same level of support as if it had used 
local actors to infiltrate existing organizations to bend them towards the movement’s 
overall goals. Often Shining Path used its members to penetrate groups not to influence 
the group but as a way to gain intelligence so that it could later subvert it. Moreover, as 
Palmer notes, these front groups were also the vehicles through which Shining Path tried 
to impose foreign set of relationships, or new relationships that were not distinct in the 
minds of the peasants from the old ones. Peasants began to see these new groups as 
limiting rather expanding their options.251
                                               
250 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 43. 
 For Shining Path, effective channels could 
have provided needed resources and the co-opting of unique social networks and 
organizations for funding and accelerating its growth and strength as a social movement. 
By directly attacking entities, such as religious organizations or potential rivals, rather  
 
251 Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, 244–245. 
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than attempting to infiltrate and ultimately win them over, Shining Path essentially 




Mediums must take into account the target audience’s culture and symbols. 
Shining Path failed to incorporate Andean themes and symbols sufficiently into their 
mediums. It is not that peasants did not understand what a hammer and sickle meant, but 
it was not something to which they immediately related. Had Shining Path used local 
mediums , they may have been able to channel their message more effectively. A similar 
example is the Viet Cong’s use of local songs and theatre for peasants. By inserting their 
ideology into peasant songs and love of theatre, the Viet Cong seamlessly weaved their 
narrative into cultural resonance. Villagers were able to more readily cognitively realign 
because the mediums used were familiar to them. Mediums provide the gateway to 
successful frame alignment and help fuel current, or generate additional, grievances 
useful for propelling social mobilization.253 In the case of Shining Path, the over reliance 
on violence and its limited, disjointed use of mediums greatly suppressed its ability to 
remain flexible. Specifically, the limited use of mediums prevented Shining Path from 
conducting any effective type or frame amplification, bridging, extension, or 
transformation needed to shift the cognitive alignment of the Peruvian masses virally 
toward action.254
                                               
252 John D. McCarthy, “Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing,” in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142–145. 
 In general, the lack of varied mediums gave Shining Path little 
flexibility to adapt to issues created by the state or to create an emotional connection 
effectively in a way to create large-scale cognitive shifts across multiple, diverse target 
audiences. 
253 Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 466. 
254 Ibid., 467. 
 86 
5. Shining Path Influence Vulnerabilities 
Unlike most failed or failing insurgencies, Shining Path did not gradually loose 
strength over time; its downfall was relatively dramatic and mimicked the model of 
decline for a state toppled by insurgency.255 This case study shows that although Shining 
Path could have used violence to topple the Peruvian government, it highlights that even 
before Guzman’s capture, Shining Path was conducting ineffective influence and losing 
mass appeal for generating and sustaining social mobilization. Shining Path perceived it 
was conducting effective influence, but in reality, it was simply acquiring uncontested 
cognitive terrain. Additionally, a narrative predicated solely on “Gonzalo Thought,” 
where essentially Guzman was the single point of success or failure of the narrative, did 
not have the flexibility to conduct aspects of frame alignment needed to illicit a mass 
cognitive shift. Two years after Guzman’s capture, the group was no longer in a position 
to topple or challenge the state. This is not to say that Shining Path could not continue 
with its use of terror and acts of sabotage, but since the mid-1990s, it has been more 
preoccupied with its own survival than advancing its ideology. In final analysis, Shining 
Path was not only “a compensation for impotence” but also that strong-arm tactics do not 
compensate for ineffective influence methods.256
This case study highlights two of Shining Path’s major vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited. First, groups whose form of influence is predicated on violence are highly 
vulnerable to demise if the state refuses to fulfill the group’s narrative through the 
application of over reactive counter-violence. The refusal of the state to implement acts 
of extreme violence can facilitate reduction in the potency of the group’s narrative, 
slowing and potentially reversing its social movement efforts. Secondly, influence 
strategies (like Shining Path’s) predicated on an inflexible, penultimate channel of 
influence that do not adapt social mobilization techniques become highly vulnerable to 
defeat with the removal or marginalization of that individual. While this is a critical 
  
                                               
255 McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla 
Mobilisation,” 295–320; This likely indicates Shining Path’s inability to influence constituted a 
catastrophic failure. 
256 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining 
Path, 69. 
 87 
vulnerability, a state’s counter influence response must ensure it does not inadvertently 
force the group to implement more decentralized and distributed form of social 
movement influence. A state must ensure removal of this type of key individual does not 
generate more political opportunities/grievances, frame alignment opportunities, and 
mobilization structures increasing the group’s overall influence potency.  
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IV. THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 
A. BACKGROUND 
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim populated country and, as such, possesses 
hundreds of religious and cultural institutions that naturally facilitate collective action. 
For decades, social and political conditions in Indonesia served as a breeding ground for 
Islamist insurgencies and violent extremist groups who first used European colonialism 
as a rallying call to their cause.257 As colonial rule gave way to Indonesian self-
governance, the groups justified continued calls to arms by declaring Indonesian political 
regimes as corrupt and apostate governments. Kumar Ramakrishna, the Head of the 
Center of Excellence for National Security in Singapore, asserts, “Indonesian society can 
be conceived of structurally as a collection of overlapping Salafi, proto-Islamist and 
Islamist social networks built around influential religious figures.”258
Jemaah Islamiyah emerged from the foundations of an earlier Indonesian Islamic 
movement, Darul Islam (DI), which sought the establishment of Islamic Law across 
 Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s (JI) recognized Indonesian susceptibility and incorporated this tendency as it 
exploited fissures in Indonesian society. Exploitation of these characteristics enabled the 
group to grow and action its violent extremist Islamist ideology. To analyze JI’s influence 
effects from 2000 to the present, it becomes necessary to include Islamist groups that 
emerged following JI’s transformation. Following events in Bali in 2002, JI fractured 
under Indonesian government and international pressure, which gave rise to two more 
prominent Islamist movements based on JI principles, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI) and Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT).  
                                               
257 In his paper, “Islamism,” from multiple entries (including “Islamism,” “Christian Identity” and 
“Abu Sayyaf Group”)” Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, 2005, Jeffrey Bale defines Islamists as: 
radically anti-secular and anti-Western political current of contemporary Islamic thought with both 
revolutionary and revivalist characteristics. This definition coincides with Mehdi Mozaffari’s article on 
“What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept,” publ. Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions 8, no. 1 (March 2007): 17–33. 
258 K. Ramakrishna, “Constructing” the Jemmaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry,” (2004): 
22, http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/4471.  
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Southeast Asia.259 JI formed from fissures that divided DI leadership and members. 
Ideological differences between DI leaders and the founders of JI, Abdullah Sungkar and 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, resulted in separate Islamist movements.260 Intent on establishing a 
regional Southeast Asian Islamic Caliphate, JI was a departure from competing 
Indonesian Islamic movements. Built on cross-cultural ties and bonds forged during the 
Soviet-Afghan War, JI used its historical ties to DI, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) in the Philippines, and other groups across Southeast Asia to establish a regional 
presence in the form of the Mantiqi system spanning Malaysia, Singapore, Mindanao, 
and parts of Australia.261 JI’s organizational framework was decentralized and designed 
to facilitate coordination at the administrative and operational levels and managed 
through regional leadership.262 JI became an ideological hybrid based on Indonesian 
Islamist ideology coupled with the founders’ experiences in Afghanistan fighting 
alongside Islamist fighters from the Middle East who possessed a penchant for secrecy 
and violent jihad.263 JI’s founders believed an Islamist Islamic society could be grown 
from the bottom up using both dakwah264 and jihad and felt that their ideal Islamic state 
could be realized.265
                                               
259 S. Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International 
Crisis Group Asia 63 (2003), 1–5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-
asia/indonesia/063-jemaah-islamiyah-in-south-east-asia-damaged-but-still-dangerous.aspx. DI’s goal was 
the establishment of an Islamic Indonesian state to supplant corrupt Indonesian regimes. When the Soviets 
invaded Afghanistan in 1979, DI saw an opportunity to grow veteran fighters by waging armed jihad 
abroad. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, mujahedeen recruits were segregated based on geographic origins. 
Fighters from Southeast Asia were kept together as a group; enabling social bonds to form that would prove 
an invaluable attribute for JI to leverage after the fighters returned from Afghanistan. 
  
260 Ibid., 6.  
261 B. Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 
25 (2003): i, http://web.rollins.edu/~tlairson/easia/singji.pdf, 500. 
262 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist 
Network Operates,” 2002, 1, 
http://www.babylonscovertwar.com/Terrorist%20Groups/Piracy/JemaahIslamiyah.pdf. 
263 Ibid., 3. 
264 The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-
Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI), 5. Dakwah is the Indonesian variation of Da’wah, which is Arabic for 
proselytizing and preaching Islam. The authors obtained a copy of the original JI PUPJI doctrinal 
document, translated into English, by the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.  
265 Ramakrishna, “Constructing” the Jemmaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry,” 10. 
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JI began its bombing campaign in 2000, culminating with several high-profile 
bombings of hotels and embassies including the Bali bombings of 2002. From 2002–
2005, JI was the most lethal terrorist group in the world.266 After killing 202 and 
wounding another 248 victims (predominantly Australians and Indonesians) through the 
Bali bombings alone, JI was placed on the UN terrorist watch list and targeted by 
governments across Southeast Asia.267 After which, hundreds of JI leaders and operatives 
were arrested, imprisoned or executed, causing it to splinter and fracture. “The Jemaah 
Islamiyah or JI terrorist organization [sic] is split into two main factions—the bombers 
and the JI mainstream.”268 The bombers represented the fundamentalist JI population 
whose action framing espoused violence to expedite an Islamic Caliphate. JI mainstream 
represented traditionalists who discouraged premature violence in favor of proselytizing 
and exploiting existing socio-political structures to set the conditions for armed jihad. As 
the two factions fractured, JI lost its ability to coordinate and implement influence 
warfare at a grassroots level.269
In 2000, JI founder Ba’asyir formed Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) as an 
umbrella organization for militant Islamist organizations, including remnants of JI. MMI 
became the political arm of JI, predominantly concerned with conducting dakwah and 




                                               
266 Zachary Abuza, “The State of Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five 
Years After Bali,” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies 2, no. 1 (November, 2007): 1, 
http://www.simmons.edu/undergraduate/academics/departments/political-
science/docs/Abuza_JCCTS_ResearchSeries_2.11-2007.pdf. 
 Using legal loopholes and Indonesian political inaction, MMI exploited 
267 M. Cianflone et al., “Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation into the 2002 Bali, 
Indonesia, Bombings,” 2007, 18, 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/50173/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/33258a30-
8ad8-43c3-8ca5-f41a882af9c5/en/07_Bali.pdf. The Bali bombings of 2002, along with several other JI 
related bombings across Southeast Asia, prompted the United Nations to place JI on its list of terrorist 
organizations noting direct ties to Al Qaeda.  
268 Radio Singapore International Interview with Sidney Jones, An Insight into Jemaah Islamiyah's 
Factional Structure, 2006, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/sj6jan06.pdf. 
269 N. H. Ismail and C. Ungerer, “Jemaah Islamiyah: A Renewed Struggle?” ASPI Policy Analysis 46 
(July 16, 2009): 2, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ASPI_JemaahIslamiyah_RenewedStruggle.pdf. 
270 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry, 2008, 4, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/47c6c9912.pdf. 
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these opportunities to infiltrate and subvert the political and religious systems. Presently, 
MMI has grown to 58 branches throughout Indonesia. It also retains its status as a 
legitimate political organization.  
In July 2008, claiming MMI had become too democratic, Ba’asyir stepped down 
as MMI’s leader and formed Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT).271 Ba’asyir organized 
JAT in a similar fashion to MMI, but altered the group’s focus. He focused it toward 
more transparency, outreach, and Islamic education as a means to “revitalize the Islamic 
movement in support of full victory for the struggle of the Indonesian faithful.”272 
Presently, JAT focuses more attention on media and public relations as it seeks to 
position itself as an above ground organization intended to attract wider Islamic 
audiences than its MMI and JI predecessors, but continues to pursue militant and 
nefarious agendas.273 JAT is associated with terrorist training camps, planned attacks 
against government infrastructure, and it is the latest Islamist organization to appear in 
Indonesia’s conglomerate cartel of Islamist movements.274
                                               
271 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), 2010, 1–
3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B107-
Indonesia%20The%20Dark%20Side%20of%20Jamaah%20Ansharut%20Tauhid%20JAT.ashx. 
 JAT has ties to no less than 
seven major Indonesian Islamist groups as depicted in Figure 4. 
272 Ibid., 3. 
273 Ibid., 1. 
274 M. Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The 
Rise of JAT, ICPVTR, 2011, 16. 
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Figure 5.   JAT Organization and Affiliations275
Two prevailing LOIs operationalize JI’s initial influence objectives. Since 
splintering after government crackdowns, MMI and JAT expanded aspects of JI’s initial 
LOIs in an attempt to improve their respective influence operations and achieve their 
goals, defiance and subversion, and expansion and justification. The LOIs have the 
potential to provide mutually supporting subordinate influence operations, but appear 
uncoordinated and asynchronous as evident by the splintering of JI, MMI, and JAT. 
Similar to the Viet Cong, the JI-affiliated Islamist Cartel intuitively utilizes LOIs in an 
attempt to employ influence operations utilizing SMT principles (as detailed in Table 3). 
 
                                               
275 Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The Rise 
of JAT, 8. 
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Table 3.   JI, MMI, and JAT Combined Lines of Influence (LOIs)  
Since fracturing, Jemaah Islamiyah has survived by aligning with other Islamist 
organizations, such as MMI and JAT, and incorporating themselves into the industrial, 
political, and educational Pesantren (Indonesian Islamic school) network throughout 
Indonesia and across the region. Across Southeast Asia, JI maintains its robust messaging 
capability and an extensive and sophisticated media and publishing industry as a member 
of the wider Indonesian Islamist network. Coupled with JI’s predominant reliance on its 
trust networks, it has systematically continued its grassroots social movement influence 
operations.  
B.  MESSAGE AND DEEDS 
JI, MMI, and JAT use familial ties, divisive education, and social programs to 
exploit socio-political conditions. Jemaah Islamiyah, like the Vietcong, exploits familial 
ties to spread its influence into new areas and networks to expand resources and audience 
alignment. Following the Indonesian government’s attempt to purge JI after the Bali 
bombings, JI’s trust networks enabled the group to absorb its losses and restructure the 
organization. As a result of the government offensive against JI, the group morphed from 
a violence-oriented organization that utilized spectacular and focused violence against 
western and local government targets, to a decentralized one that has infiltrated political, 
media, and commercial spheres. After the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesian forces 
discovered a draft of JI’s organizational guide, the Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-
Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI), which detailed JI’s administrative infrastructure, 
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ideology, and religious underpinnings.276 PUPJI provides an operational strategy and 
framework for recruitment, maintenance of the organization’s integrity, and how to 
establish a counter state systematically, which includes proselytizing through dakwah, 
cooperation and coordination with other Islamic organizations (jemaah) of similar 
ideological attributes, goals, and manipulation of jihad.277
The group’s adaptability to changing security environments allowed it to maintain 
its violence influence mechanism through its militant arm, while also adapting their 
messaging methodology.
 JI operationalized both violent 
and nonviolent methods by exploiting political opportunities and vulnerabilities within 
the Indonesian socio-political system.  
278 Prior to Noordin Top’s death in 2009, JI employed a violent 
message and deed influence approach to attack western influence and religious minorities 
to foment sectarian divide. By attacking religious minorities, JI wanted to incite reprisals 
as mobilizing mechanisms for aligning Muslim communities with JI. Their desired effect 
was, and is, the subversion of the existing political framework to a Sharia-centric 
governing system. The group’s ability to exploit familial ties, and their subsequent 
familial obligation, allows JI to prosecute its violent and nonviolent message and deed 
lines of influence to subvert rival Islamist organizations, the Indonesian government, and 
the social status quo.279
                                               
276 E. Pavlova, From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI, 2006, 
8, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP117.pdf. 
  
277 Ibid., 1. 




279 Ibid., 1. 
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1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition 
The most significant deed JI has instituted was the creation of its own Islamic 
school network, known as the Pondok Ngruki network.280 JI manipulated the traditional 
concept of the Indonesian Islamic boarding schools, called pesantrens, as a primary 
means of indoctrinating recruits. During its formative years, JI established networks of 
pesantrens throughout Indonesia and into Malaysia to preach its Islamist ideology and 
mobilize resources and manpower to their cause.281 By 2002, JI’s education network was 
estimated at over 100 strong, with a core of ‘Ivy League’ pesantrens located throughout 
Java. The elite JI pesantrens were attended by children of core members to ensure 
consistency of messaging and ideological frames for JI’s future leaders.282 The education 
network as a whole not only propagates JI’s ideological frame, it serves to grow a trusted 
member base across the Pesantren network. Not all JI Pesantren students enter JI’s 
ranks, but their exposure and their cognitive alignment from their attendance and their 
immersion within the curriculum creates a network of natural channels and tacit 
supporters for the organization. Graduates of JI’s schools become deed and channel 
hybrids who return to their communities with JI’s messaging and serve to sponsor and 
recruit siblings and other family members to attend JI’s Pesantren system, which creates 
a social network that serves to grow the “counter state” from within.283
                                               
280 Z. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2003), 126. 
JIs endurance during the past two decades is attributable to the system of religious boarding schools that 
then DI followers, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, eventually located in the town of Ngruki, 
and known as Pondok Ngruki, in Central Java in 1971. These schools form the ideological base from which 
all of JI’s senior leadership attended starting from a core of 30 students, and eventually producing almost 
2,000 by 2003.  
 Graduates are 
also encouraged to marry other members within the network to solidify socio-familial 
bonds, enabling JI to exploit traditional family obligatory loyalties. 
281 Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” 3. Before JI could 
establish a foothold in Indonesia, its founders had been exiled to Malaysia in 1984. In Malaysia, they 
received sanctuary. These social bonds are the reason that the inter-JI relationships are strongest between 
the Indonesian and Malaysian governances  
282 Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” 26. 
283 Pavlova, From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI, 5. 
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Intermarriage is one of the most significant deeds that has cemented JI together as 
an organization. It has allowed JI to establish bridges between similar Southeast Asian 
Islamist movements and subvert them by co-opting or aligning potential rivals to JI. A 
complex network of marriages bonds JI with the wider Islamist movement across 
Indonesia. “In some cases, JI leaders appear to have arranged marriages for their 
subordinates to serve the interests of the organization.”284
Indonesian permanent resident of Malaysia, now detained there, who in 
1998–1999 was the head of the Selangor wakalah. Ferry’s elder sister is 
the wife of Wahyudin, the current head of Pondok Ngruki. Ferry himself 
married the stepdaughter of Abdullah Sungkar, a woman named Isnairin 
binti Abdul Rosyid, in 1987 in what appears to have been an arranged 
alliance. His wife may be the sister-in-law of Syawal, since Syawal is 
married to another Sungkar stepdaughter. Ferry, a native of Medan, North 
Sumatra, met Abdullah Sungkar in Germany in the late 1980s when he 
was studying at the Technische Fachhochschule in Berlin.
 Through marriage ties, JI has 
bred a social movement from within; ensuring ideological framing is inculcated with 
future generations. Statements of an arrested JI operative demonstrate the complexities of 
JI’s familial ties and the propensity to propagate those ties within the greater JI network: 
285
Familial networks span political boundaries and become mutually supporting, 
with messaging and narratives, which are ideologically self-sustaining.
  
286 “Kinship is 
particularly important in a clandestine organization like JI where maintaining relations of 
trust and confidence is crucial for survival.”287
                                               
284 Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” 26. 
 Familial ties allow JI to control its 
message, select target audiences, cement loyalties, and select of channels and mediums. 
JI’s intermarriage deeds are comparable to how Al Qaeda infiltrates new territories to  
 
285 Ibid., 28. 
286 Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” 502. 
287 Noor Huda Ismail, “The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya,” Terrorism Monitor 4, 




establish footholds and mobilize resources.288
After the Bali bombings and the subsequent government offensives against JI, the 
group was suppressed and began to splinter. In its original manifestation, JI was unable to 
challenge or subvert the wider socio-political status quo successfully. However, its 
suppression and splintering forced its member base to transform and align under MMI 
and later JAT. Under these social organizations, which possessed a legitimacy and 
populace support base that JI never achieved, the Islamist ideology began to spread to a 
wider popular audience. Surviving JI leadership prevailed within the leadership hierarchy 
of MMI and JAT, and through these organizations, the Islamist message and deeds took 
on an increasingly nonkinetic influence methodology.
 The secretive and exclusive nature of JI 
limits growth, but effectively removes competing ideologies and messages from 
interfering with the JI narrative.  
289 Under MMI and JAT, JI’s 
violent message and deed activities were selectively retained for use in exploiting 
religious contention between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Nonviolent 
messages and deeds served to fulfill social and civil needs where the Indonesian 
government was not present or unable to meet the needs of the population. As an 
example, both MMI and JAT deploy crisis response teams after natural disasters to 
deliver needed aid, as well as ‘spiritual guidance’ to victims. The teams are not explicitly 
focused on humanitarian work. Their primary goal is to provide spiritual guidance to 
victims, assist in reconstruction of mosques and madrassas, and guard against the 
religious and social influence of non-Muslim relief agencies.290
                                               
288 S. Phillips and R. Shanahan, Al-Qa’ida, Tribes and Instability in Yemen (Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2009), 6, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/LOWY_AlQaida_Tribes_Instability_Yemen.pdf. 
 As documented by 
Abuza, “MMI has grown increasingly combative in dealing with the government which it 
accuses of leading a witch hunt against Muslims. MMI has begun issuing summons, or 
official complaints, to the police in order to intimidate them and influence investigations 
289 Many of JI’s leaders hold concurrent positions in MMI (and JAT) giving themselves a patina of 
legitimacy and political cover. See Z. Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” Middle 
East Quarterly (2009), http://www.meforum.org/2044/jemaah-islamiyah-adopts-the-hezbollah-model. 
290 Ibid., 6. 
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of suspected terrorists.”291
2. Indigenous Resonance  
 Combined with the increasing amount of crisis and civil 
support activities, MMI and JAT (inclusive of JI) demonstrate an active effort to 
challenge and delegitimize the government.  
After a decade of bombings and assassinations, Indonesia’s government still 
refuses to outlaw JI as an organization. In part, this is due to the organization’s name, 
Jemaah Islamiyah, which literally means ‘Islamic Community.’ JI’s name was intended 
to resonate with local Muslim populations. Its very meaning possesses deep religious and 
social sentiment, making it difficult for the Indonesian government to attack it with its 
own messaging for risk of alienating the population, or feeding into JI’s allegations of 
government targeting of Muslim populations.292
A substantial and growing susceptibility toward Islamist radical ideology exists 
throughout Indonesia and greater Southeast Asia.
 Targeting an organization with such a 
commonly accepted and resonate moniker risked a perception of government injustices 
against its own constituency; especially considering JI’s operating area is the most 
densely concentrated Muslim population in the world.  
293
                                               
291 Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” 4. 
 As evidenced by the vast quantities 
of JI and MMI radical publications sold over the past several years, JI and its affiliates’ 
messages resonate within Indonesia’s Muslim population. Their messages serve as a 
manifestation of discontent with the socio-political status quo against the corrupt and 
292 S. Osman, Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
2010), 6, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP194.pdf. 
293 Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” 496. “There are signs that the 
Muslim community there is also increasingly subscribing [sic] to a world-view where a radical Islamic 
reading of political issues portrays the west as oppressors and the global ummah as under threat… the 
religious teachers in the pondoks of Thailand reject the mainstream Thai cultural identity and stress a global 
Islamic identity instead… the Cambodian authorities have noted the increasing influence of Wahhabi 
doctrines among their Cham minority, resulting from Middle Eastern financial support and the use of Arab 
and Pakistani teachers in their madrasahs. While the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia back the 
governments of the Philippines and Thailand in their fight with Islamic separatist movements, popular 
support for the insurgents exists at the ground level.” 
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perceived ‘apostate’ national government.294 Since 2008, Sharia law has been adopted in 
some capacity by 16 of Indonesia’s 32 provinces, with Aceh being completely governed 
by Sharia law.295 This governance is contrary to Indonesian constitutional law. The 
central government has the power to block provincial laws, but showed little willingness 
to do so for fear of alienating itself from local populations.296 As of 2008, the Indonesian 
government had only pledged to review 37 of 600 Sharia-based ordinances passed by 
local provincial governments.297 The seepage of Sharia law into Indonesia’s political 
system at the provincial level below demonstrates the disequilibrium unfolding between 
the population and the government.298
In 2006, Indonesia’s corruption ranked 144 out of 180 surveyed nations,
 
299 and 
although a 2010 poll indicated that the situation had improved, the nation remained one 
of the world’s most corrupt countries.300 The level of corruption rampant throughout the 
Indonesian political system served as a cognitive rally point for JI’s grievance influence 
messaging, which called for a return to Islamic teachings and a denouncement of the 
apostate government.301
Disconnects existed between JI’s messages and its use of violence as an influence 
tactic. Miscalculations with its use of indiscriminate violence, the death of innocent 
Indonesians, a lack of government targeting, and JI’s lack of brand recognition due to its 
 JI’s messages coincided with Islamist separatist sentiments 
propagating across the region at grassroots levels: 
                                               
294 Specific quantities and time frames will be discussed in the Mediums section. See International 
Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry, paper for additional details and 
information. 
295 “Sharia-Based Laws Creep into Half of Provinces,” Compass Direct News, February 9, 2009, 
http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/indonesia/1949. 
296 Ibid.  
297 Ibid. 
298 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 54–60.  
299 infoplease, “The 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,” 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html. 
300 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,” 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.  
301 N. A. Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Bahasa 
Indonesia and Malay Language Extremist Websites, ICPVTR, 2011. 
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secrecy prevented message and deed pairing. Decentralized radical JI factions, such as 
Noordin Top’s terrorist cell, pre-empted JI’s ability to mobilize the population 
sufficiently through coordinated message and deed influence operations that would be 
relatable to target audiences. From 2003–2009, Top’s bombings against western tourist 
locations killed and wounded hundreds of fellow Indonesian Muslims. These actions 
contrasted the group’s messaging calling for attacks and the downfall of the acclaimed 
corrupt and apostate Indonesian government. Message and deed disconnect, coupled with 
a perception organizational ambiguity and secrecy, resulted in the population doubting 
JI’s formal existence and purpose.302
In contrast to JI, MMI (and later JAT) have displayed a coordinated and holistic 
message and deed application. They built on JI’s grievance line of influence but have 
maintained a “near enemy” focus that resonates with local Muslim communities due to 
the disequilibrium between the populace and the national government.
 
303 They have 
expanded their local resonance by focusing violence predominantly on government 
institutions and infrastructure, and their respective social and civil support programs have 
served to attract target audiences and alienate the government’s relevance and legitimacy 
in the eyes of the population. 304
3. Synchronization and Massing of Message and Deeds 
 
Once JI became an overt organization aimed at mobilizing wider target audiences, 
its message and deeds lost sufficient synchronization. JI’s governing document, PUPJI, 
states operations should always be conducted in coordination with other operations, and 
by extension, these operations should be mutually supporting.305
                                               
302 S. Syah and B. Begawan, “Does Jemaah Islamiyah Exist?” The Brunei Times, June 23, 2007, 29, 
http://www.bt.com.bn/classification/opinion/2007/06/23/does_jemaah_islamiyah_exist. 
 These operations are 
inclusive of influence, propaganda, kinetic, and nonkinetic activities. The splintering of JI 
after 2002 into semi-autonomous cells demonstrates the inability of the organization to 
303 Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The Rise 
of JAT, 14. 
304 Ibid. 
305 The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-
Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI), 8. 
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coordinate and synchronize its efforts across its decentralized organization. Its messaging 
could not mass because the relative individual agendas of JI’s decentralized network 
adversely affected its ability to maintain a coherent and meaningful narrative.306
JI’s revitalization within MMI and JAT displays a transformation of previous 
message and deed synchronization shortfalls. Unlike JI’s uncoordinated and violent 
tactics, JAT and MMI maintain a grassroots presence through social and civil programs 
and the Internet.
  
307 Their respective co-opting of JI and other Islamist organizations 
shows a massed and synchronous effort to consolidate constituencies, and target the 
alignment of other vulnerable audiences.308 Although former JI members lead both 
groups, the groups are far more open and recognized. Both retain facets of JI’s robust 
publishing infrastructure and have expanded upon it with other mediums that allow the 
groups to distribute Islamist ideology through wider-reaching mediums that support the 
interpersonal influence efforts at the grassroots level.309 While JAT is more militant than 
MMI, both groups retain the use of targeted violence against the Indonesian government, 
which is seen as the “near enemy” supported by western apostate states. Several 
examples include JAT’s anti-government messaging, which supported its attacks on the 
police precinct in Hamparan Perak, the Medan Bank Robbery, and Aceh military training 
camp.310 MMI’s militant arm was used to distribute aid and Islamist religious teachings 
during the 2004 Tsunami throughout areas where the Indonesian government was unable 
to respond. MMI followed its support activity by successfully lobbying the government 
for the withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign religious influences.311
                                               
306 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist 
Network Operates,” 3. These agendas can be attributed in part to the differing of philosophies between the 
militant and fundamental elements of JI. After Sungkar’s death, Ba’asyir was criticized for establishing the 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), which by definition, was an organization designed to operate from 
within the Indonesian political framework seen as antithetical by many JI operatives, who saw any 
concessions away from Sharia as an aberration from Sungkar’s teaching.  
 MMI and JAT’s 
307 Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The Rise 
of JAT, 6. 
308 Ibid. 
309 This will be discussed and assessed further during the mediums section of this chapter. 
310 Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The Rise 
of JAT, 4. 
311 Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” 6. 
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actions not only build varied levels of support in targeted areas, the effects of their 
messages and associated social support deeds undoubtedly spread through the natural 
channels linking each village and social group exposed to their influence operations. 
C. CHANNELS 
Social networks permeate every facet of the Jemaah Islamiyah structure. JI’s 
ability to adapt can partially be attributed to its use of natural and artificial channels. JI’s 
PUPJI doctrine established dakwah as a principle component for developing and using 
artificial channels as a means of mobilizing a community’s and population’s natural 
channels of informal information propagation.312 Dakwah is supposed to serve as the 
guiding mechanism to guide the religious preaching and framing of JI’s ideology.313 JI’s 
PUPJI and dakwah principle exemplify its recognition of the necessity to utilize networks 
and natural channels by inserting or developing JI representative figures within local 
communities. Pesantren teachers and religious leaders served as JI’s artificial channels 
meant to mobilize natural information propagation. However, the schism between JI’s 
traditionalist and militant factions prevented a synchronized and coordinated 
implementation of PUPJI’s dakwah principles, as evidenced by Noordin Top’s terror 
attacks before JI had mobilized sufficient resources and populace support.314
                                               
312 Dakwah is the Indonesian variation of Da’wah, which is Arabic for proselytizing and preaching 
Islam; JI and its affiliates’ use of a dakwah to proselytize and preach radical and literal Islamist ideology. 
 Coupling 
JI’s difficulty in using its dakwah methodology to enter and attract new audiences was 
the group’s extensive secrecy. Credibility of JI proselytizing efforts was hamstrung by 
the group’s covert nature and security protocols to protect itself from compromise. 
Conversely, JI’s offshoots, MMI and JAT, approached the dakwah principle of engaging 
audiences more in line with the PUPJI doctrine through more overt and identifiable 
methods with local populations.  
313 The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-
Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI), 5. 
314 According to JI’s PUPJI doctrine, the phases of establishing a successful jihad are: develop the 
jemaah or core; develop the strength by mobilizing education, Dakwah, emigration, recruit, establishing 
support base, training, intelligence, financing, and aligning other like minded groups; and then issue a 
warning through Dakwah upon entering armed jihad. See PUPJI beginning on page 6 for additional details. 
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Islamic teachers and preachers represent a cornerstone of JI’s dakwah network. 
The Pesantren network established by Sungkar and Ba’asyir formed the core of JI’s 
vanguard. Essentially, pesantrens became clearinghouses for natural and artificial 
channels. Due to their positions within local populations, teachers and preachers are 
leveraged as artificial channels to propagate JI, MMI, and JAT messages and effects.315
But the most successful distribution may be by word of mouth. As soon as 
a book is published, the JI network arranges for several launches, usually 
at mosques, where JI ustadz (teachers) will lead a discussion on the 
contents. It will be the subject of Friday sermons, religious discussion 
groups variously called pengajian or taklim, and may get photocopied and 
distributed in whole or in part. The publishers are not particularly 
concerned about intellectual property rights; the important thing is for the 
message to be disseminated.
 
For example, JI fused its book launches from their affiliated publishing companies with JI 
teachers and preachers to disseminate messages: 
316
This leveraging displays the group’s ability to identify and utilize key communicators at 
grassroots levels by exploiting the legitimacy of Islamic teachers and preachers within 
Indonesia’s familial and religiously oriented society. 
 
JI formed channels across the socio-political spectrum. MMI lobbies for the 
establishment of Sharia, or components of Sharia, to all major legislative action in the 
Indonesian government.317 For example, MMI lobbied to align Indonesian penal law to 
confirm with Sharia to support recruitment of suitable members, since Indonesia’s penal 
system was filled with both unlawful prisoners and those detained under questionably 
corrupt circumstances.318
MMI and JAT’s operationalized JI’s PUPJI through their social programs, which 
also serve as artificial channels for mobilizing local population natural information 
  
                                               
315 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry, 12. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” 4. 
318 International Crisis Group, ““Deradicalisation” and Indonesia's Prisons,” Asia Report N 142 
(November 2007), i, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-
asia/indonesia/142_deradicalisation_and_indonesian_prisons.ashx. 
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networks. Acting as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their services allow them to 
implement dakwah to local communities under a legitimate banner. The groups seek 
vulnerable populations who are distressed or lack sufficient support from the Indonesian 
government. Take, for example, MMI’s participation in relief efforts in the wake of both 
the 2004 tsunami and 2006 earthquake in Indonesia. Following the 2004 tsunami, MMI 
won a contract from the United Nations World Food Program to deliver disaster relief for 
victims in the affected areas.319
…these groups saw the disaster as an opportunity to proselytize. Several 
groups in addition to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia indicated that their 
primary goal was to provide “spiritual guidance” to victims, ensure that 
Islamic law was being followed, and to assist in the reconstruction of 
mosques. With 400,000 refugees and mosques at the center of rural 
community relief efforts, the potential for influence was great.
 It used its NGO access and funding to not only provide 
relief services to victims, but also to exploit it as an opportunity to conduct its Islamist 
variation of dakwah: 
320
MMI’s actions exemplify its recognition of vulnerable and exploitable audiences. By 
focusing its efforts in areas where the government could not access or lacked the 
resources to support local communities, local populations were vulnerable to align and 
support MMI (and by extension JI). The lack of government support, coupled with 
MMI’s services, amplified its grievance line of influence, and the local population 
naturally began to echo the grievances against the Indonesian government. Indonesia’s 
Aceh province suffered horrendously from the 2004 tsunami, after which MMI focused a 
significant amount of resources to ‘aid’ the Aceh population. Today, Aceh is the only 
Indonesian province that has completely implemented Sharia law.
 
321
Following Indonesia’s offensive against JI, its operatives began using the prison 
system as a channeling conduit for its influence operations. Prisoners not only served as 
potential members, but also as opportunistic channels to spread JI’s narratives and 
 
                                               
319 Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” 8. 
320 Ibid., 7. 
321 D. Kurniawati, “Shariah in Aceh: Eroding Indonesia’s Secular Freedoms,” The Jakarta Globe, 
August 18, 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/shariah-in-aceh-eroding-indonesias-secular-
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ideology. Corruption in Indonesia’s prisons is rampant and conditions facilitate JI 
recruitment efforts. An interview with a former Indonesian prisoner describes his 
encounter with imprisoned Bali bomber Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, who was executed for 
his role in the 2002 Bali bombings: 
He [Ahmed] found the JI group sympathetic compared to other inmates: 
“They always defended the other Muslim prisoners and put other people’s 
interests above their own, in a way that earned them the sympathy of the 
other prisoners and some of the Muslim guards. Some … I was smoking 
the first time I met Amrozi. He advised me to cut back, and I was 
thrilled—Amrozi had noticed me! After that I began to talk with him 
frequently about Islam”… Ahmed works as a part-time teacher in a JI 
school, and clearly sees his contact with the Bali bombers as a positive 
experience that straightened out his life.322
Ahmed’s interaction with Amrozi influenced him to adopt JI ideology, and exemplified 
successful grassroots cognitive alignment. He subsequently became a model natural 
channel for propagating messaging. This approach is not dissimilar to tactics utilized by 
Islamist insurgents in Iraq’s prisons during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
 
323
In Singapore, much of JI’s initial recruiting effort was accomplished through 
natural channels, which attracted potential members whose religious needs were 
unfulfilled. JI recruiters provided an ideologically satisfying narrative: “JI sought to 
propagate its ideology through religious classes conducted in its members’ home… 
Recommended by friends or relatives, they initially attended these classes out of a desire 
to deepen their knowledge of Islam.”
 Although 
recruitment in Iraq and Indonesia did not denote collaboration of influence and 
radicalization, it does implicate the existence of influence vulnerabilities within penal 
systems. 
324
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JI doctrine recognizes the integral need for channels to spread its influence, but 
the group did not operationalize the practice effectively. JI’s channels existed 
predominantly within its Pesantren system and did not expand artificial channels to wider 
audiences, which limited its scope of audiences and reach of its messages. MMI and JAT 
expanded the audience base with their openness and accessibility that resulted in greater 
influence effects reaching a greater depth of the Indonesian population. 
D.  MEDIUMS 
Historically, JI has relied on its publishing and interpersonal communication 
through close social networks as mediums for its influence operations. Presently, MMI 
and JAT operate in more open and contemporary mediums, such as the Internet, to 
operationalize their influence. Their use of mediums is beginning to display similarities 
to groups, such as Hezbollah, in their approach to influence wider target audiences by 
using mediums to mass their narratives.  
According to JI’s doctrine, dakwah’s is a tool for educating Muslims to join the 
movement and continue building the Umma. PUPJI further delineates the primary means 
of mobilizing the Muslim community through interpersonal face-to-face communication. 
If unattainable, it directs the use of indirect communication, such as print and electronic 
media, to reach its audiences.325 JI developed a vast network of media production and 
publishing companies aimed at penetrating wider Indonesian and regional audiences.326
 
 
The companies are interconnected through familial relationships and JI-sponsored 
Pesantren networks. For instance: 
 
                                               
325 Bin Al, Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah, 40. 
326 The Al-Qowam Group founded in 1999, has several subsidiaries including Al-Qowam, Wacana 
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and Al-Alaq that reproduce JI publications for Malaysia audiences. For more detail, see International Crisis 
Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry, 5. 
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A key figure in the al-Qowam group is Hawin Murtadlo, a man with 
impeccable JI credentials. He comes from a JI family, and the translator 
Ubeid is his younder brother. He graduated from Ngruki in 1991, a 
member of the same class that produced the heads of three JI schools, and 
stayed on to teach, after marrying a classmate from Tasikmalaya.327
JI’s publishing industry is a medium for distributing its Islamist publications and 
disseminating its radical ideology. JI has secured a sizable portion of the Indonesian 
Islamic publishing market with distribution reaching across Indonesia, Malaysia, and 




1. Interpersonal Communication 
  
The JI-JAT-MMI Islamist cartel recognizes interpersonal and face-to-face 
interaction as the primary means for influencing audiences at a grassroots level, which is 
evident by its methodology governing jamaah (Islamic group) interaction between 
jamaahs and between individuals and jamaahs.329 Venues that garnered the most efficacy 
included lectures, discussions, question and answer sessions, and other forms of 
communal interaction to communicate messages.330 In Singapore, where globalization 
and secularism were hailed as a regional success, the government became concerned 
about educated and successful Muslim citizens joining JI.331 There, JI used face-to-face 
interaction to exploit local grievances among the Muslim community. Ideologically open 
and disaffected Muslims were susceptible to JI’s preaching and actively sought guidance 
from JI operatives. The founder of the Singapore JI cell, Ibrahim Maidin stated, “they 
sought out religious teachers who would be able to guide them in their spiritual quest.”332
                                               
327 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry, 5. 
  
328 Ibid., 6. Additional metrics are described later in the chapter. 
329 Ibid., 40. 
330 Ibid. 
331 See Bin Al, Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Singapore Context; Desker, “The 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” 502. 
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JAT built upon JI’s interpersonal influence methods by extending its interpersonal 
activities at a more personal level with its target audiences and potential converts. It 
deployed its teachers and preachers to conduct small group engagements within the social 
groups of a community.333 The meetings were religiously based influence operations 
designed to establish personal relationships with the attendees.334
The role of JAT’s leader (and JI’s former leader-founder) Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as 
a charismatic leader cannot be underestimated. Since Ba’asyir’s rise as an Islamist leader 
for JI, MMI, and now JAT, he has served as the symbol of Indonesia’s Islamist 
movement. He continues personally to conduct sermons, interviews, host radio shows, 
lecture, and engage audiences through interpersonal contact.
  
335 As a medium, Ba’asyir’s 
reputation adds credence to Islamist messages and validates Islamist influence effects.336
2. Publishing  
 
Due to Ba’asyir’s fame and personality, he is also able to add a degree of resonance to 
Islamist messaging, which makes him a channel-medium hybrid. 
Islamic publishing in Indonesia is a thriving business, with more than 10,000 
books produced each year specific to Islam.337 A growth industry in Indonesia, the 
Jakarta Islamic Book Fair has grown from 73 exhibitors in 2007338 to over 230 in 
2011.339 Within this industry, JI has established a small, yet formidable presence through 
its multiple and successful publishing conglomerates.340
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 Many of its publications have 
achieved bestseller ratings in accordance with Indonesian print standards. For example, 
334 Ibid. 
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bookfair.com/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1. 
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the average ‘successful’ Islamic book typically reaches 10,000 copies printed for sale.341 
JI eclipsed the standard of success with its published works achieving over 100,000 
copies.342
Prior to the current growth in Indonesia’s Internet usage, Islamic publishing in 
Indonesia was the dominant form of conducting dakwah for Islamist groups: 
  
Like all the books produced by the JI group, these are attractively printed 
on good paper with sophisticated graphics and sell for around $2 each, 
putting them well within the reach of most students. A mainstream 
Indonesian publisher said after examining the books that the price cannot 
possibly cover the production costs, so they must be subsidized [sic], 
probably by sales of other books.343
Since its establishment, JI’s publishing industry is “generally cooperative, not 
competitive.”
  
344 Although this position displays an aspect of coordinated messages, JI 
did not fully synchronize its publishing within its wider influence operations. However, 
its ideological agenda has survived through its publishing efforts following the 
Indonesian government’s crackdown on JI. The publishing conglomerates remain 
operated and managed by former JI leaders and JI associated Pesantren graduates who 
are ideologically aligned with the JI narrative, and are operationally aligned with JI’s 
remnants, MMI, and JAT.345
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342 Ibid.; While the number of copies printed does not represent the actual number of copies sold, it 
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344 Ibid., 11. 
345 Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The Rise 
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2009 that puts forth more divisive Islamist messaging than its JI and MMI associates.346
3. Multi-Media Production 
 
Consumers of JI literature represent ideologically susceptible audiences that will 
potentially seek JI or its affiliates channels for religious or ideological fulfillment. 
Like many other Islamist groups across the world, JI has taken advantage of video 
formats, such as Video Compact Discs (VCDs), DVDs, and other transportable audio and 
audiovisual media to disseminate messages and imagery.347 JI’s publishing 
conglomerates produce for the majority of its VCD and multi-media materials, but the 
content frequently contains Al-Qaeda and other jihadist materials.348 Multi-media 
products are sold or given away after religious sermons and bookstores, and disseminated 
alongside other, more innocuous materials, such as pirated copies of movies, music 
videos and karaoke music. “Others are educational, such as videos of the Islamic holy 
sites in Saudi Arabia… Some videos aim to recruit members or solicit funding for 
militant Islamic groups.”349
One video is titled The Bloody Maluku Conflict. It shows refugee camps 
and young women making Molotov cocktails. It also shows fighting 
between Muslim and Christian mobs, which has flared in Indonesia's 
Maluku province sporadically since late 1999. There is gory footage of 
wounded being treated in clinics, and pictures of mass graves allegedly 
containing the bodies of dead Muslims… They would go to a house and  
 
 
 VCDs, DVDs, and such are advantageous because they are 
inexpensive to produce and accessible to most of the local populations. The popularity 
and demand for Islamist multi-media in Southeast Asia is high. The following example 
demonstrates how multi-media impacts target audiences to operationalize their natural 
channels further propagating the message:  
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show them one of these tapes and people would naturally get very angry at 
the brutality of what they see... People getting killed and it's [sic] one 
image after another that's drilled into the heads of the viewers.350
Multi-media discs reinforce and compliment Islamist ideological and religious 
instruction because of their near universally accessible nature. According to a report 
documenting Islamist publishing in Indonesia, “Ar-Rahmah’s VCDs began appearing in 
2005 with titles such as Iraq Strikes Back and Escape from Baghram. Unlike JI books, 
which seem to sell for less than production costs, the VCDs sold for far more, with ar-
Rahmah asking Rp.30,000 or Rp.40,000 ($3 or $4) for what were just downloads.”
  
351
4. Radio, Internet, and Social Media 
 
After Ba’asyir departed from MMI and established JAT, his son, Abdul Rohim 
“Lim” Ba’asyir, began publishing his father’s sermons on Radio Dakwah Syariah and 
YouTube. Lim established Radio Dakwah Syariah and its complimentary website, 
www.rdsfmsolo.com, to reach audiences not accessible to JI’s former Pesantren network 
and publishing materials. As Indonesia’s Internet accessibility grew throughout the late 
2000s, opportunity existed to transport Islamist ideology across new mediums capable of 
reaching potential audiences. Radio Dakwah Syariah’s website not only describes the 
radio programming content, but also maintains a blog, contains links to jihadi websites, 
and solicits consumer donations.352
JI has been slow to migrate to the Internet as a medium, unlike Al Qaeda, 
Hezbollah and other Islamic groups. A modicum of evidence exists to suggest that JI has 
traditionally relied on the Internet for little more than e-mail and web surfing.
  
353
                                               
350 “Jemaah Islamiyah Uses Videos to Gather Support.” 
 In 
contrast, MMI and JAT maintain a substantial presence on the Internet and in social 
media. The website arrahmah.com (shown in Figure 6) is “owned and managed by 
Mohamed Jibril, son of Abu Jibriel—one of the key founders of Jemaah Islamiyah and 
351 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry, 10. 
352 “Radio Dakwah Syariah,” www.rdsfmsolo.com. 
353 Osman, Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind, 1. 
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current emir of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia [MMI].”354 Arrahmah.com is a MMI 
affiliated site that serves as a principle Islamist medium for JI’s former constituents, as 
well as JAT’s audiences. Its content is jihad centric containing training manuals, Islamist 
rhetoric, supports online self-radicalization, solicits funding,355 and provides access to 
“virtual ummas.”356 This practice portends a growing sophistication and alignment with 
the contemporary use of social media, eSocial networks and even mobile media access 




Figure 6.   Arrahmah Mobile Web Access 
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Arrahmah.com’s Facebook page is continuously increasing its membership base. 
Currently, the site maintains over 35,000 friends or fans that monitor daily.358
 
 In contrast 
to JI’s former channeling and associated mediums, Arrahmah.com operates in the open 
and interactively with its audiences (see Figure 7, Arrahamah.com Facebook). 
 
Figure 7.   Arrahmah.com Uses eSocial Networks like Facebook for Message 
Propagation.359
Muslimdaily.net (Figure 8) is yet another Islamist website emerging from the JI lineage. 
It purports to be a legitimate Indonesian news website, but it frequently showcases 
content sympathetic to Islamist ideology and messages. For example, when the Bali 
bombers released a pre-execution statement, muslimdaily.net published a video interview 
of the bombers on its website, which was followed immediately with a press conference 
by Ba’asyir that was simulcast through the site and condemned the Indonesian 
government’s actions surrounding the bombers’ pending executions.
 
360
                                               
358 Amarrah’s Facebook page is continuing to grow. Between May 3, 2011 and May 12, 2011, their 
Facebook fan base grew by more than 1,000 additional followers. 
  
359 Arramah.com, “Arrahmah.Com Facebook Page,” http://www.facebook.com/arrahmahcom.  
360 M. H. Hassan and M. R. Salleh, Bali Bombers' Pre-Execution Statement: How Much Islamic 
Weight?, 2009, 2, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1162008.pdf. 
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Figure 8.   JAT’s Effort to Utilize the Internet Openly through Muslimdaily.net. 
The website includes feeds into social network sites and possesses a growing following 
on Twitter and Facebook. Like its Amarrah.com cousin, Muslimdaily.net represents a 
new wave of Islamist mediums and channeling mechanism to influence wider audiences 
previous inaccessible to the groups’ interpersonal activities.  
The Internet is a new phenomenon and rapid growth industry within Indonesia. It 
is allowing Indonesians and Islamist groups access to information and audiences 
previously unreachable.361 Indonesia ranks as one of the fastest growing Internet 
consumers in the world. A 2010 global poll conducted by the BBC reported 85% of 
Indonesians are accessing the Internet for social purposes.362 Indonesians produce more 
than four million blogs,363
                                               
361 Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Bahasa Indonesia 
and Malay Language Extremist Websites. 
 and in February 2011, Indonesia became the world’s second 
highest consumer of Facebook and third highest consumer of Twitter, generating 15% of 
362 “Four in Five Regard Internet Access as a Fundamental Right: Global Poll,” BBC, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/08_03_10_BBC_internet_poll.pdf. 




all “Tweets” globally with nearly five million accounts.364
5. Assessing JI Mediums 
 Similar to current unrest 
across North Africa and into the Levant associated with eSocial networks and social 
media, these mediums pose a similar exploitable risk from MMI, JAT, and other Islamists 
in Indonesia.  
JI has the foundation for an extensive array of mediums capable of reinforcing its 
grassroots influence endeavors. Its publishing industry reaches or has the potential to 
reach a vast array of audiences throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia. It offers high 
quality and inexpensive publications to attract consumers of their messages. The 
product’s quality is itself a deed because it shows a level of pride and respect for the 
audience. The disconnect lies with JI’s implementation of its mediums. In contrast, MMI 
and JAT’s mediums are far more contemporary and align with today’s modern mass 
media trends, such as eSocial networks, social media, and mobile media. 
E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES 
1. Summary of JI Influence Operations 
As of February 2009, half of Indonesia’s provinces have incorporated aspects of 
Sharia law into their local political systems.365 The implementation of Islamic law in 
Indonesia has been rejected at the national level, but a trend of increasing implementation 
of Sharia at the grassroots level does occur.366 The Indonesian government demonstrated 
unwillingness to enforce laws to prevent Sharia from subverting the present political 
system.367
                                               
364 “Indonesia Social Media Landscape.”  
 It is reasonable to assume links exist between the growing trend in Sharia law 
with the narratives of Indonesia’s Islamist narratives due to the disequilibrium growing 
between the population and the government. 
365 “Sharia-Based Laws Creep into Half of Provinces.” 
366 R. Bush, Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom? 2008, 
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShariaRegulations08RobinBush.pdf.  
367 “Sharia-Based Laws Creep into Half of Provinces.”  
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JI, MMI, and JAT all display aspects of intuitively utilizing SMT principles 
within their influence efforts. Although JI has suffered significant tactical setbacks over 
the past decade, its narrative for an Islamist society has not lost its potency or position 
within Indonesian society. The government’s ambivalence to interfere with subversive 
trends, such as JI’s pesantren network and the growth of Sharia law, demonstrates an 
alarming growth of political free space. Groups can exploit this ambivalence to seize 
greater levels of influence and cognitively align local communities to support the 
narrative actively or tacitly. JI exhibits limited coordination of influence operations due 
to several factors, which include government crackdowns on the organization itself, 
schisms within JI, and competing Islamist groups with similar narratives and more 
resonant framing. JI’s Pesantren network allowed its ideology to survive and re-emerge 
with the establishment of MMI and JAT in its present form that demonstrates a 
transformation of Islamist framing in Indonesia.  
JI intuitively displays basic concepts for implanting influence operations, and 
subsequently, facilitating collective action. Although its messages were not synchronized 
at comparable levels to the Vietcong, they demonstrate a comparable ability for 
propagating message and influence effects at a grassroots level. However, JI’s exclusivity 
and use of violent attacks prevent synchronization with its messages and its ability to 
influence wider audiences to align with the group that was not pre-disposed to violence or 
radicalization. The lack of collective behavior in line with JI’s influence efforts 
demonstrated a lack of audience resonance. 
In contrast, MMI and JAT appear to have learned from JI’s shortcomings by 
deliberately targeting wider Indonesian audiences with more comprehensive influence 
operations. Their open use of websites, radio, and social programs provide them a degree 
of transparency and legitimacy. Their messages are less overtly violent, and approach 
audiences using subtle narratives,368
                                               
368 Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Bahasa Indonesia 
and Malay Language Extremist Websites. 
 which overshadows their more nefarious militant 
and finance resourcing. MMI and JAT continue to target individuals predisposed to 
radicalization but also draw in those seeking religious enlightenment and become 
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progressively susceptible toward participating in or tolerating radical ideology.369 Both 
MMI and JAT display increasingly effective aspects of influence operations and are run 
by former JI senior leaders.370
2. Vulnerabilities 
 They are emergent Islamist organizations and posses the 
potential to become far more dangerous than JI in both terrorist tactics and subversion of 
the Indonesian socio-political system and across Southeast Asia. 
This case study demonstrates the ability of a terrorist and insurgent group to 
transform itself in the face of opposition and remain a threat. The JI case suggests that the 
failure to practice effective influence operation principles impaired it from sufficiently 
mobilizing. Multiple vulnerabilities exist within JI, MMI, and JAT’s operations and LOIs 
that can be exploited to prevent them from manipulating the population, seizing the 
influence initiative, and achieving their Islamist goals. 
Similar to the Guzman vulnerability for Shining Path, a key vulnerability for JI, 
MMI and JAT is the charismatic leadership of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ba’asyir is the lynch 
pin among prevailing Islamist organizations in Indonesia. He brings continuity and 
legacy of Islamism in Indonesia. From his roots in DI, to his experience in Afghanistan, 
persecution by the Indonesian government, his involvement in JI, his establishment of 
MMI, and subsequent departure from MMI to establish JAT, he has become a symbol for 
Islamists and Indonesia’s general Muslim population. When Ba’asyir left MMI to 
establish JAT, a substantial portion of MMI’s membership and constituency moved with 
him to JAT wholesale.371 When the Indonesian government arrested Ba’asyir, mass 
protests for his release occurred.372
                                               
369 Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, The Rise 
of JAT, 6. 
 Marginalizing, or removing, Ba’asyir as a variable 
has the potential to cause a vacuum within the Islamist conglomerate, and thus, provide 
an opportunity for the Indonesian government to seize the influence initiative and 
370 International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Monthly Informatics Report: 
Developments in the Bahasa Indonesia Websites, 2. 
371 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), 5. 
372 “Students Protest Arrest of Ba'Asyir,” Life.com, http://www.life.com/image/1548093. 
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marginalize the Islamist movement currently seeking to subvert it. Doing so also 
increases vulnerabilities in Ba’asyir’s ideology for more moderate and resonant messages 
to challenge it through social media, online forums, and massing messages of more 
amiable and moderate Islamic narratives that also meet the religious needs of the 
population. 
The continued friction between JI, MMI, and JAT is another exploitable 
vulnerability through their competition over audiences and operational principles. 
Focused efforts to widen their rifts could weaken their influence and prevent a massing of 
effort against the Indonesian government. MMI’s political system practices are anathema 
to JAT’s fundamental Islamist principles.373
As these groups venture further into cyberspace, their ability to control the 
narrative and maintain influence primacy becomes increasingly competitive. With their 
use of blogs, interactive web forums, and social media, their messages become 
susceptible to counter arguments and fallacy exposure due to the openness and 
accessibility of the mediums. A silent majority of the population does not appear to align 
or actively support groups, such as JI, MMI and JAT, which is an exploitable variable for 
 Continuing to exacerbate the 
inconsistencies, public debate, and mutual criticisms of the two groups can further 
marginalize in the eyes of the wider Indonesian local audiences, further eroding their 
ideologies and influence, which can be done through overt and covert measures. 
Exposure of JAT’s subtle efforts to manipulate the perceptions of Indonesian Muslims 
and its limited ability to provide the social services promised by its crisis response center, 
presents yet another opportunity to the subvert the group’s influence narratives. By 
directly countering their anti-government messaging, the government possesses superior 
resources and capabilities to fill the relative ungoverned free spaces JAT and MMI seek 
to exploit. Although MMI and JAT continue to espouse dakwah to achieve their influence 
objective, these are not altruistic organizations. Further exposure of their respective 
nefarious activities must be an integral part of the government’s counter influence 
campaign. 
                                               
373 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), 3–4. 
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counter influence efforts so long as those operations are seen as credible, sustainable, and 
fulfills the needs and expectations of local populations to energize them as a retardant to 
Islamist influence. 
Islamists, like JI, remain on the fringe within Indonesia and Southeast Asia, as the 
majority of Muslims in that region do not subscribe to the extremist Islamist ideology. 
The public backlash following JI’s bombing campaign from 2000 to 2005 demonstrate 
that opportunity exists for focused initiatives to exploit the populations’ sensitivity to 
radicalization and terrorism, which can be used to marginalize those affiliated with JI and 
other Islamist groups to dismantle their support base and influence momentum. Counter 
narratives and addressing public grievances can subvert radical Islamist messaging. By its 
nature, the Indonesian government retains a dominant influence market share to challenge 
the growing trend of Sharia law and Islamist influence directly by asserting itself as the 
country’s legitimate governing body and provider for the people. However, it will need to 




Since its emergence, Hezbollah has arguably become the model guerilla, terrorist, 
and global insurgent organization in the world.374 Hezbollah solidified psychological 
warfare as an integral capability for the organization’s success, and synchronized it with 
kinetic military operations to create an influence warfare methodology,375 began 
Hezbollah’s influence operations toward achieving its political-military goals to eliminate 
Israel, dominate Lebanon, and facilitate a Shia-based pan-Islamic Caliphate. Initially, 
Hezbollah emerged and survived through its nation state sponsors Iran and Syria. Today, 
Hezbollah is a global organization socially embedded not only in Lebanon and the greater 
Middle East, but also in the Americas, Africa, and portions of Europe.376
Unlike the Vietcong whose focus was primarily at the local village level, 
Hezbollah simultaneously conducts influence operations at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic level to implement all facets of its three lines of influence. Over the past 12 
years, the terrorist organization has initiated an expansion of its ideological frame. It has 
successfully become the dominant socio-political-military organization in Lebanon, 
 This case study 
assesses the effects and application of Hezbollah’s influence operations from the 1980s to 
the present. 
                                               
374 Edward Cody and Molly Moore, “The Best Guerrilla Force in the World,” The Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300719.html. 
375 Hezbollah does not shy from acknowledging its use of psychological warfare. While the group 
does not maintain a truth-based standard as NATO PSYOP doctrine dictates, Hezbollah maximizes its use 
to the fullest as an integral component of its influence warfare mechanics. Hezbollah’s employment of 
psychological warfare is comparable to western doctrines, but with a more practiced and embedded 
approach to grassroots influence operations comprising an equal, it not greater, requirement for message 
validating actions. The closest comparison can be found in U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine, where 
deliberate kinetic and nonkinetic activities are married to psychologically impacting messaging; from Ron 
Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah Versus Israel,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 1 (2006): 1–19, 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface~content=a725841460~fulltext=713240930~frm=content. 
376 For more information on social embedding see Alex V. Simmons, Socially Embedded Insurgencies 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514335&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
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achieved transnational reach, and exists as the only military entity to have challenge 
Israel’s military power successfully in the past 40 years. Hezbollah’s successes are built 
on a foundation of effective and elaborate influence operations targeting domestic, 
foreign, and adversarial target audiences supported by a strategic form of influence 
warfare to overcome conventional political-military shortfalls,377
Following Israel’s invasion in 1982 to eliminate PLO terrorist safe havens in 
Southern Lebanon, a militia of Shia supporters of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini were 
resourced, trained, and organized to form Hezbollah with the initial goal of forcing Israel 
to leave southern Lebanon.
 which has allowed 
Hezbollah to grow as a Shia group within Lebanon while attracting non-Shia audiences to 
align with them. Hezbollah has also been able to evolve from a simple terrorist 
organization into an internationally recognized nonstate actor. 
378 The elements necessary for social mobilization were 
already present in Lebanon prior to the Israeli invasion of 1982.379 Initially, the Sunni, 
Shia, and Christian populations in southern Lebanon welcomed Israel’s expulsion of the 
PLO, which was viewed as an opportunity to reclaim control over the south.380 However, 
when Israel forged an alliance with the Maronite Christians, the Shia felt marginalized 
under Israel’s occupation and became resentful.381
                                               
377 For a more detailed assessment of Hezbollah’s primary , secondary, and subordinate target 
audiences, see Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and 
Minds,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence, Heritage and Commemoration 
Center, June 2007, http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e_0607.pdf. 
 In one form or another, the formation 




378 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 
33. 
379 According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, mobilizing structures are defined as “those collective 
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action,” based 
upon some galvanizing event, grievance, necessity, and or belief. 
380 Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads,” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 1, no. 3 (September 1997): 4, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a1.html. 
381 Ibid., 4. 
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military representation was imminent. Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon catapulted 
Hezbollah’s formation as the preeminent Shia militant organization, and more 
importantly, its legitimacy.382
Over the past 40 years, Hezbollah has proven its lethal dedication to its cause 
through multiple terrorist attacks and support activities against the United States, France, 
Israel, Canada, Greece, Argentina, Spain, Thailand, UAE, Senegal, England, Panama, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Mali, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and many others. Hezbollah is responsible 
for bombing the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon in both 1983 and 1984, as well as killing 241 
U.S. servicemen when they launched a suicide bomber attack against the U.S. Marine 
barracks in Lebanon in 1983. In 1985, Hezbollah ordered the hijacking of TWA flight 
847, killing a U.S. Navy diver in the process.
  
383 Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah 
conducted dozens of kidnappings against U.S. citizens and other westerners who were 
either used for ransom or killed outright.384 In 1989, a 10-man Hezbollah terrorist cell 
was arrested in Spain while attempting to conduct an attack. Later that year, another 
Hezbollah cell bombed a French airliner in West Africa, killing another 171 people.385 
From 1992 through 1995, Hezbollah expanded its operations into South America where it 
bombed the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, and subsequently, established finance 
laundering hubs throughout Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.386 After 
Hezbollah’s 1996 attack against another U.S. barracks and the Khobar Towers in Saudi 
Arabia, Hezbollah focused its overt terrorist activities against Israeli civilians and border 
security forces using suicide bombers, as well as rocket and mortar attacks.387
                                               
382 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 32–35. 
 At first 
glance, these events appear as unilateral military actions, but by analyzing their purpose, 




384 Douglas S. Philippone, “Hezbollah: The Network and its Support Systems, Can They Be 
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385 Ibid. 
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a more deviant and elaborate goal is visible. Hezbollah’s militant and civil activities 
directly support its ideological framework and goal to expand continuously and sustain 
Hezbollah as an organization and international entity.  
Three prevailing LOIs that operationalize these frames and combine to facilitate 
Hezbollah’s strategic goals exist: credibility and justification, expansion and control, and 
defiance and subversion. Each LOI utilizes unique or mutually supporting subordinate 
influence operations to achieve immediate, intermediary, and end state desired effects. 
Although Hezbollah employs a variety of nonkinetic and civil service activities within 
various influence operations, these are not designed or implemented for selfless 
humanitarian or benevolent purposes. Rather, its influence operations wholly support 
strategic objectives, which call for the destruction of Israel, the facilitation of a Shia 
influenced caliphate, and Hezbollah’s continued growth.388
 
 Similar to the Viet Cong, 
Hezbollah maintains LOIs to focus its influence warfare stratagem (detailed in Table 4).  
































Audio-Visual (DVDs, VCDs, etc)
Electronic/web-based
 
Table 4.   Hezbollah Lines of Influence (LOIs) 
The use of specific messages, deeds, channels, and mediums under each LOI at 
the village level mutually support the other influence lines of effort in pursuit of social 
mobilization in line with the group’s military and political objectives. Hezbollah’s 
                                               
388 Since 2001, Hezbollah has aggressively shifted away from a public ideology calling for a Shia 
influence caliphate, and now publicly promotes a Lebanese nationalism and Arab solidarity theme. 
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influence operations, in conjunction with its irregular and guerilla warfare activities, have 
melded into a cornerstone for its continued growth and longevity. It uses a robust 
methodology for employing message and deeds, channels, mediums across all levels of 
its operations to present an effective and sophisticated mix of interpersonal and 
traditional messaging mechanisms, which serve to validate its message and deed 
influence actions with its channeling techniques by using a diverse array of mediums.  
B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS 
Hezbollah regards social networks and the civilian populations as decisive entities 
and vital interests to its political-military objectives. They directly and aggressively target 
both of these interests using centralized and decentralized influence operations tailored to 
the characteristics and vulnerabilities of each subordinate audience. Varieties of deeds are 
subsequently designed to support and validate influence narratives and messages. 
Terrorism, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare techniques, civil and social 
services, financial services, medical, education, religious propagation, intelligence 
activities, intimidation, social marginalization, and coercion are all tool sets integrated 
into diverse influence operations designed to facilitate a perpetual cycle of narratives and 
messages. Each one is supported by, and supports, tailored actions and deeds that directly 
and indirectly build upon each other forming a cyclical dynamic. The same techniques 
are used to counter or exploit a competitor or adversary’s actions. Hezbollah’s messages 
fall into several categories including: martyrdom, resistance, support and solicitation, 
solidarity and nationalism, anti-Israel, anti-U.S., legitimacy, and subversion. Message 
narratives (or themes), along with corresponding deeds, are integrated throughout each of 
Hezbollah’s primary LOIs. The group’s LOIs provides its tactical and operational 
influence actors with sufficient flexibility to develop and tailor specific messages and 
deeds to the local target and objective similar to the Viet Cong’s cadre cells. 
1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition 
Influence warfare is Hezbollah’s preeminent method for challenging an adversary. 
It uses psychological warfare techniques combined with violent and nonviolent actions to 
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destabilize the opponent’s socio-political support base. Hezbollah’s military strategy is 
unique and effective because of the way it combines unconventional and psychological 
warfare. “[W]hen deciding on and planning an operation the [Hezbollah] would calculate 
its psychological impact on the enemy.”389
a. Subverting Amal in Southern Lebanon 
 Hezbollah has created an organizational 
structure that merges influence into all elements of its plans and activities. This structure 
not only maximizes the influence effect on targets and target audiences, but also enables 
the group to coordinate its messages and deeds holistically across the tri-spectrum of 
tactical, operational, and strategic operations. 
One of the first examples of Hezbollah systematically subverting 
competition transpired in the late 1980s and early 1990s during its political-military feud 
with the Lebanese sub-national group Amal. Determined to become the dominant voice 
and power in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah competed with Amal for controlling influence 
of the Shia population and southern Lebanon as a whole.390
                                               
389 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 8. 
 In contrast to Hezbollah’s 
Islamic revolution ideology, the secular and reformist Amal was focused on becoming 
the new bourgeoisie in Beirut. Over a period of five years, Hezbollah’s direct military 
clashes with Amal evolved into a combination of direct military and influence operations 
intended to erode Amal’s power base. Hezbollah exploited Amal’s raids on Palestinian 
villages and camps throughout southern Lebanon by framing Amal as oppressors and 
comparing them to Israel and the United States. While simultaneously vilifying Amal to 
the Palestinians using vanguard face-to-face influence cells, Hezbollah simultaneously 
framed itself as Palestinian liberators and resistance fighters. When Amal launched the 
“war of the camps” against Palestinian refugees in southern Lebanon in 1985, Hezbollah 
backed the Palestinians militarily and politically. The group spoke publicly throughout 
Lebanese and Arab political and religious forums on behalf of the Palestinians, as well as 
facilitating increased Palestinian access to the Lebanese economy and other political 
outlets. These endeavors solidified Palestinian loyalty and provided Hezbollah with a 
390 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 43. 
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civil and social support base far surpassing anything with which Amal could compete.391 
Assuming a Robin Hood persona with the southern Lebanese Shia, “Hezbollah was busy 
creating an array of public services, such as clinics and construction companies, while 
Amal offered its support base a “patronage system.”392 Hezbollah’s interpersonal 
influence actions within the Shia and Palestinian populations had secondary effects 
within Amal’s spheres of influence. As word spread across social networks regarding 
Hezbollah’s perceived benevolence, Amal began to hemorrhage social and personnel 
support. Amal’s inability to match Hezbollah’s resonating messages, correlating actions, 
and growing influence, increasingly ostracized Amal in the eyes of the southern Lebanese 
population. As an example, an increasing number of Hezbollah’s growing recruits were 
converts from Amal.393
b. Subversion Through Social Services 
 The lessons Hezbollah learned early on in holistically 
incorporating its influence warfare practices across the political and military spectrum 
became inculcated into its political-military doctrine. The doctrine paid dividends in 
following its ongoing confrontations with Israel. 
Since the late 1990s, Hezbollah has liberalized its strict Shia religious 
governance to accommodate a more pluralist approach intended to foster a side-by-side 
coexistence with Lebanon’s other prominent social groups: the Sunnis, Christians, and 
Druze.394
                                               
391 Augustus R. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” The International 
Spectator 42, no. 4 (2007): 477, http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/f09/The-Role-of-
Hezbollah.pdf. 
 While the group continues to use religion as an ideological frame to align core 
supporters and their rank-and-file cognitively, Hezbollah is increasingly pragmatic with 
whom it aligns itself to further their political-military efforts. It bridges ideological 
frames to maintain and build support that ensures weapon proliferation, financial growth, 
392 Ibid., 478. 
393 Kenneth Katzman, “Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon,” Terrorism: National Security 
Policy and the Home Front (1995): 7, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/download.cfm?q=275. 
394 Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, “Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2011, 9, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf. 
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and socio-political alliances.395 The group’s ideological frame transformation and 
bridging has allowed it to assuage the risk of potential rivals, such as the Sunnis and 
Christians, and in turn, influence former opponents to align with Hezbollah under a 
nationalistic framework. One means Hezbollah employs to bridge the ideological frames 
between Hezbollah and its rivals in Lebanon is its social service programs. The group 
operates medical and dental clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals for its fighters, supporters, 
and constituents. Mobile clinics are sent into Hezbollah controlled areas and periphery 
areas, especially to areas along the Israeli border, in an effort to solidify its influence and 
growth continually.396 Hezbollah also supports more than 30 schools throughout southern 
Lebanon. Like all schools in Lebanon, the Hezbollah-run schools are not free, but are 
provided at reduced rates that the poor and financially stricken can afford, which is in 
stark contrast to the Lebanese government’s deteriorating social systems and those of 
Hezbollah’s former rivals, such as Amal, the former IDF backed South Lebanese Army, 
and even the Syrians.397 As Hezbollah increased its nationalist influence operation focus, 
the group ensured its sponsored schools adapted as well. Hezbollah limited the amount of 
religious instruction and increased the focus on math, sciences, and foreign languages, 
such as English and French.398 Hezbollah’s social service program narratives emphasize 
the group’s commitment to aiding local communities and its “resistance” against Israeli 
oppression of the Lebanese.399 This gradual shift from Hezbollah’s Khomeinist roots 
toward a more contemporary nationalist approach gained astounding momentum 
following the 2006 war with Israel.400
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c. Subverting Israel’s Domestic and International Support 
Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel is riddled with examples of its approach 
to influence operations combining grassroots influence operations along with strategic 
influence operations and strategic communications. Militarily, Hezbollah suffered 
significant losses against the Israeli military. By the time the war ended, it was “pushing 
for a cease-fire, which winners do not normally do.”401
Hezbollah fought its 2006 conflict with Israel as a “guerrilla war waged as 
a psychological operation.”
 Israeli forces had boxed in the 
bulk of Hezbollah military capabilities and the IDF was poised to destroy Hezbollah’s 
remaining forces, but Israel’s eventual tactical accomplishments were obscured and 
halted by the perceptions of local, regional, and global audiences. Hezbollah succeeded in 
subverting the perception of Israel through vilification and exploitation of the war’s 
effects, resulting in Israel’s alleged wanton destruction throughout southern Lebanon. By 
design or happenstance, the 2006 war became an influence mechanism for Hezbollah.  
402 It attacked Israeli soldiers as an end unto itself rather than 
as a means for seizing conventional objectives. By striking at the Israeli soldiers serving 
in Lebanon, publicizing their deaths, and providing accurate casualty names and other 
information, it reaped immense psychological impacts among the targeted Israeli civilian 
audience.403
Hezbollah’s second enemy audience during the war was the Israeli-backed 
Southern Lebanese Army (SLA), a historic competitor to Hezbollah hegemony 
 Hezbollah’s information became more timely and revealing than any other 
information source during the war. As a result, international and Israeli news and political 
organizations turned to Hezbollah’s media outlets for information on the war’s progress, 
which fed into Hezbollah’s intent to control the information flow and influence target 
audiences to pressure Israel to end the fighting, which in turn, furthered its lines of 
influence. 
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throughout southern Lebanon. Using local paid informants, Hezbollah gathered social 
and military intelligence on the SLA’s support base and rank-and-file fighters. The group 
then exploited vulnerabilities within the SLA to generate a false perception of rampant 
Hezbollah infiltration throughout the SLA to subvert the SLA’s trust and loyalty within 
its own ranks. Hezbollah also exploited fractures within the SLA’s social and military 
hierarchy.404 After discovering systemic SLA financial shortfalls to pay its members, 
forced drafting of recruits, and a lack of cohesiveness within the SLA, Hezbollah 
successfully expanded its SLA spies through paid recruitment and social program 
incentives for SLA converts.405 For example, in May of 2000, Hezbollah was credited by 
international news media for the defection of 46 SLA members in one day.406
Taking advantage of Israel’s public debate over its invasion of Lebanon, 
Hezbollah began a systematic coercion campaign against SLA leadership. The group kept 
extensive records on SLA soldiers and officers, cataloging them by geographic and 
family ties. Hezbollah used these records to publish names of SLA leadership 
“threatening to punish them, not if, but when it caught them.”
 Conditions 
within the SLA snowballed as Hezbollah expanded its subversive influence campaign as 
it amplified public Israeli political debate calling for Israel to quit Lebanon.  
407
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 Targeting the SLA’s 
social support base and capitalizing on poverty conditions throughout southern Lebanon, 
Hezbollah paid its soldiers substantial wages, which undercut any financial and civil 
service incentives of which the SLA was capable. Hezbollah sponsored welfare and 
education systems (as described previously) that catered to all local residents without 
ethnic or religious discrimination. The group made extensive investments in resources to 
publically take care of and rebuild any home, be it Christian or Muslim, damaged by 
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directly fed into Hezbollah’s Lebanese nationalism framework. As Lebanon’s disparate 
populations began to rally around Hezbollah, the SLA became increasingly marginalized 
and Israel could not escape the perception of an excessively hostile invader. 
d. Subverting Israeli Support Through the Press 
Hezbollah actively seeks to subvert international media and perceptions as 
a means for reinforcing its tactical and operational level influence endeavors. During its 
2006 war with Israel, the group’s propaganda achievements included its manipulation of 
foreign journalists from Arab and western nations alike. It instituted strict constraints on 
the press, ensuring journalists and their camera crews only covered what Hezbollah 
wanted them to cover or staged for them to see.408 Hezbollah herded the media to and 
from preselected sites ensuring the focus remained on select civilian casualties and 
infrastructure damage all allegedly caused by indiscriminate Israeli military strikes.409
During the war, the group treated every engagement as an 
Influence/Psychological Act (PSYACT) by deploying cameramen with every unit to 
record combat operations. After making appropriate edits—such as deleting scenes, 
merging images, or adding music and narration—the clips made their way back to 
Hezbollah’s propaganda leadership and were broadcast on al-Manar TV with revised 
versions sent to Radio Nur. The footage was selective in that it only showed scenes 
displaying Hezbollah successes and perceived Israeli failures. Even if its fighters were 
eventually defeated by the IDF in a particular operation, Hezbollah altered the perception 
through its editing process and organic media mediums.
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Hezbollah achieved Israeli resonance by targeting the families of Israeli 
soldiers serving in Lebanon.411 Hezbollah overcame skepticism and captured the 
attention of the Israeli civilian population, Israeli media, and international media by 
broadcasting its TV and radio programming with information about Israeli casualties, as 
well as containing varying levels of intelligence and information value. Israeli, Arab, and 
international media began to rebroadcast Hezbollah’s videos and stories because they 
were the only visual record of the war.412
2. Indigenous Resonance  
 Israel and Hezbollah both maintained strict 
controls on information during the 2006 war, but Hezbollah actively sought to release 
selective and manipulated information in near real time conditions in an effort to seize 
and maintain the influence initiative. Additional manipulation of foreign media is during 
Hezbollah’s mediums assessment. 
“Hezbollah is a popular national-Lebanese nonsectarian movement that conducts 
political, social, and cultural activities and is well-integrated into the fabric of Lebanese 
life.”413 To grow its grassroots influence operations, Hezbollah shies away from its strict 
Shia character and aggressively tries to alter the perception that the group is a pawn of 
Iran that continues to provide massive military and financial aid. The organization is also 
very sensitive to attempts to undermine its messages.414
Hezbollah’s social programs, financial services, Lebanese nationalism narratives, 
vilification of Israel, downplaying of Iranian ties and support, all resonate with its target 
audiences in meaningful ways through Hezbollah’s careful framing and aligning of 
personally attuned messages. Hezbollah’s approach to indigenous resonances 
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organizes its influence approach to address the relevant issues and idiosyncrasies for each 
target audience. Much of the social programs, anti-Israel propaganda, and nationalism 
influence endeavors are discussed throughout this case study.  
For the Lebanese Shia audience, Hezbollah focuses its influence message and 
deeds around its role as the defender of Lebanon and the only provider for Shia civil and 
social necessities. The group extended these services under its “Lebanonization”415
Hezbollah’s former leader (who also serves as a channel and medium) was used 
as a key artificial channel and medium to rally Palestinians to Hezbollah, using 
emotionally relevant and directed messaging. Using the Arab Al-Jazeera television 
medium, Nasrallah explained in an interview that he considered Hezbollah “as the 
'vanguard' (at-tali'a) of the Palestinian armed struggle.”
 
operations to include Christian, Sunni, Druze, and Palestinians alike, portraying no bias 
or overt favoritism in the process, which proved to be an effective strategy toward 
bridging and aligning disparate social groups to Hezbollah’s influence frame. Within the 
Shia population, Hezbollah’s social and civil sources pay dividends in continually 
generating support for Hezbollah. Among the Christian, Sunni, Druze, and Palestinians, 
the social and civil support programs (categorized as social influence programs for the 
purpose of this case study) fill a gap in services unavailable at comparable levels from the 
Lebanese government. Hezbollah’s social and civil support programs validate its 
narratives as the benevolent and omnipotent provider for the Lebanese. When combined 
with its exploitation of Israel as a scapegoat, the social influence program’s resonance 
becomes almost self-replicating. 
416
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 Hezbollah’s bridging 
technique (as discussed previously with the Palestinians) that targeted support from the 
Palestinians was later modified and applied to expand Hezbollah’s presence within 
Lebanon’s complicated political system. When Hezbollah began its overt political party 
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activities, the group instituted its Lebanonization/Nationalization narratives to publicly 
distance itself from Iran and begin targeting historical rivals for alignment. After 2006, 
Hezbollah began receiving increasing degrees of active and tacit support from Lebanese 
Sunni, Christian, and Druze populations.417
3. Synchronization and Massing of Deeds and Messages 
 
Hezbollah targets a vast array of diverse ethnic, religious, demographic, and 
geographic target audiences simultaneously. Three integrated steps characterize its 
strategy: tailoring messages for each social sector established by organizational 
penetration, penetration of Lebanese society by exploiting the lack of services provided 
by the government and synchronizing the messages across all social sectors it controls. 
By synchronizing these messages across different sectors, its operations have the effect of 
cross-validating and reinforcing Hezbollah’s overall narrative. This section focuses on 
the process of penetration and its impact on influence operations. Social services and 
organizations are addressed in depth in the following section. Each audience is targeted 
with tailored messages supported by kinetic or nonkinetic activities that resonate in 
Hezbollah’s favor. Influence rivals and competitors are undermined while potential 
audiences are simultaneously solicited for their support, which creates a massing of 
combined influence effects that enables Hezbollah to envelope and overwhelm its targets. 
Using Israel as a cognitive rally point for its narratives, Hezbollah uses Israeli politics, 
military activity, and lack thereof, as a unifying and synchronizing narrative mechanism 
requiring minimal maintenance and re-alignment. 
In coordination with its social programs, Hezbollah maintains shadow 
government civil service functions throughout its controlled territory, as well as adjacent 
areas that experience direct and indirect influence effects. Hezbollah controls and 
expands the Lebanese government’s ungoverned free space by creating administrative 
services, assuming police functions, installing a civil court system to settle disputes, and 
developing other administrative functions through mosques and religious facilities. By 
providing these services, many Lebanese, including the Christians, Druze, and Sunnis, 
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have become dependent on Hezbollah. The resulting condition creates a monopolizing 
effect that fills potential seams and prevents local rivals from challenging Hezbollah.418
Hezbollah’s social and civil services provide a synchronized massing of 
subversive, coercive, and supportive influence affects across the local tactical and 
operational levels. The group’s media operations enable it to synchronize and validate its 
attuned tactical and operational influence operations across the socio-political rugged 
landscape because its media establishment is designed to match and support its grassroots 
influence programs. When combined, its grassroots and strategic operations executed 
across its LOIs create a massed effect that establishes an influence and information 
bulwark against Hezbollah’s current and potential adversaries.  
  
Hezbollah’s social influence programs are operationalized through their 
sponsored schools, medical, and financial programs. Although the Lebanese Shia remain 
the primary support base, Hezbollah’s benevolent approach to social and civil services 
(as described above) enables the group increasingly to affect populations across social 
divides. To galvanize its grassroots interpersonal approach to influence, Hezbollah’s 
media relations directorate is responsible for reviewing and managing media coverage of 
Hezbollah, whether it includes its newspapers, television, radio broadcasts, or directly 
controlled or sponsored websites.419
We feel that the media can be effective in creating a special climate in 
public opinion on the main issues of interest . . . We are heading toward a 
new sensitive security situation (in the region) which means we need to 
follow events very closely so that we can informatively help shape 
international and Arab public opinion . . . We believe that the media has 
an important role in the conflict, as important as the military wing.
 A Hezbollah political statement in 2001 displays the 
group’s acknowledged role in using top-down managed media messaging to solidify its 
bottom up grassroots influence efforts:  
420
                                               
418 Frederic M. Wehrey, “A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaign Against Israel in 




420 Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah Steps Up Psychological Warfare: Party Believes that the Media 
Plays Critical Role in Palestinian Uprising,” Daily Star, September 8, 2001. 
 136 
Hezbollah took its view of the media a step further during the 2006 war with 
Israel when it deployed video recording and camera teams with every Hezbollah unit to 
capture its operations.421 After manipulating footage—such as deleting scenes or adding 
music and narration—the clips would then be broadcasted on Al-Manar. Video imagery 
was produced to show scenes selectively to present inflated Hezbollah achievements, 
even if its fighters were defeated by the IDF during the actual engagements.422
Hezbollah is also making inroads toward bridging ideological and religious 
frames across the globe. In the United States, due to the taboo topic of religious 
manipulation, Hezbollah exploits a critical vulnerability in U.S. politics where hate 
speech and freedom of religion overlap. The largest contributor of constituent donations 
comes from the Western Hemisphere, with the largest coming from South America and 
the United States.
 
423 In South America, Hezbollah uses cross-cultural marriages and 
religious missionaries to subvert and grow a population of Hezbollah aligned Muslims in 
the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina.424
C. CHANNELS 
 The political-military free space 
between the nations allows Hezbollah to infiltrate and subvert local population groups. 
Of the four case studies analyzed in this thesis, Hezbollah demonstrates the most 
comprehensive use of channels. The group incorporates a litany of natural and artificial 
channels across social structures, organizations, and networks. Hezbollah’s channel 
exploitation enables it to support all three of its LOIs systematically, which also enhances 
the impact of its mediums. Through channels, target audiences are continuously and 
consistently affected through information sources perceived as trusted and credible. Each 
channel serves to reinforce and validate the information and messages originating 
                                               
421 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 6. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise,” United States Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, May 25, 2005, 4–11, 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/313.pdf. 
424 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach,” Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), September 8, 2003, 4, http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/SEP08_03.PDF. 
 137 
through adjacent or otherwise networked channel. Not only does this shape conditions for 
cognitive alignment, it also creates a massing and synchronization of Hezbollah’s 
message and deeds. “Hezbollah operatives are experts at gaining entry to their target 
locations through extremely subtle infiltration,” which allows them to gain trust, recruit, 
and begin more advanced operations.425
Hezbollah develops most of its natural channels through its social influence 
operations. One method is the construction and operation of schools and education 
centers across Lebanon, such as the Imam Mehdi schools and the Education Centre of the 
Martyr Bojeji. The group’s educational centers are run by, or affiliated with, Hezbollah 
controlled companies and range from nursery age to secondary-level education programs. 
Hezbollah directly and indirectly affects well over 100,000 Lebanese children through its 
schools and education programs.
  
426 Many Lebanese consider the schools among the best 
in Lebanon and enroll their children in them rather than in Lebanese government 
sponsored schools.427
Many of us are not Hezbollah, nor are we in the least affiliated with their 
ideologies or political views, but we cannot deny them their achievements 
and we realist that theirs schools are currently better than anything else in 
the area. Not only is my son getting a better standard of educations, but at 
a young age he was practically reading English alphabet on some of the 
English adverts and billboards as we drove past one afternoon. I could not 
believe it, but they place as much emphasis on the teaching of foreign 
languages as they do Arabic, despite all their rhetoric about the West.
 The schools include indoctrination programs that incorporate 
Hezbollah ideology, so that it penetrates wider audiences and future generations alike. 
With their current nationalism focused influence operation, all Lebanese ethnicities and 
religious creeds are increasingly exposed to selected Hezbollah indoctrination and 
cognitive alignment processes. As one Lebanese father affiliated with UNIFIL and Amal 
noted: 
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Children naturally propagate Hezbollah’s influence messages and effects throughout its 
social structures and networks, such as family and friendships. Talal Atrisi, an analyst 
studying Hezbollah at Lebanese University, cited schools as a “complete system” to 
prepare the next generation to ensure they are close to Hezbollah, propagate its messages 
and deeds, and proselytize its narrative within Lebanon and internationally.429
Hezbollah exploits women as natural channels through its Husseiniyas, centers for 
observing Hussein’s martyrdom.
 
430 Hezbollah promotes Hussein’s sister, Zainab, as an 
icon for women’s behavior.431 Designed specifically for women, these centers build on 
the dynamic of women gathering separately from men. These centers are unique in that 
they specifically seek to develop women as channels who then return to their families and 
propagate Hezbollah messages. They also serve as communal gathering places to 
celebrate the martyrdom of locals, as well as provide additional education services, 
childcare, and medical services.432 Since Lebanese women often yield immense power 
within families,433
Hezbollah has dedicated operatives for creating artificial channels that penetrate 
rival and nonpermissive social networks to propagate messages. Members receive 
training in exploiting intelligence sources from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and 
Security (MOIS), as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) al-Quds 
Brigades.
 these centers facilitate the propagation of Hezbollah’s messages.  
434 In places, such as Singapore and South America, Hezbollah members marry 
local women for trusted access into local social networks.435
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the group to establish legitimate businesses for the purpose of raising money, providing 
intelligence for future operations, increasing Hezbollah’s political support globally, 
and/or serving as smuggling and laundering conduits.436 Inside Lebanon, Hezbollah 
infiltrates rival groups, such as various Christian and Sunni organizations, to manipulate 
them from within these groups. When rival religious groups begin to support Hezbollah’s 
political ideas even tacitly, greater overall social legitimacy and power is given to 
Hezbollah.437
Hezbollah is actively developing influence channels within Israel. The group uses 
foreign citizens, such as Germans, British and others, to travel to Israel to conduct 
operations.
 From these efforts, Hezbollah can reinforce the progress made via 
additional messages and deeds and through support from multiple mediums. As it has 
learned and adapted over the years, one of its most innovative uses of artificial channels 
has been in penetrating networks inside of Israel. 
438 These individuals range from naturalized citizens of Arab descent to 
natural born citizens of local ethnicity who converted to Shia Islam. Hezbollah also 
utilizes Israeli born Arabs for their access capabilities inside Israel versus that of foreign 
visitors.439 These individuals not only provide intelligence for future terrorist-related 
targeting, they also provide valuable social intelligence for use in Hezbollah’s influence 
programs. Due to their access to unique crime, youth, and other underground networks 
inside Israel, Israeli-based channels are also developed to sell illicit narcotics to Israelis, 
downplay hatred toward Hezbollah, and breed general discontent across Israel.440
Hezbollah penetrates networks of allied organizations to ensure its objectives and 
interests are properly supported. According to open-source material based on leaked 
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Israeli classified information indicates that since 2001, Hezbollah’s penetration of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) has been used to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
by attempting to prevent cease-fire agreements by directing attacks to draw Israeli 
aggression. In return, Israeli reactions feed Hezbollah’s nationalism, vilification, and 
solidarity message and deed programs.441
Regional and international news media outlets are targeted for use as strategic 
channels and mediums, which facilitates a naturally infiltration effect favorable for 
Hezbollah’s local influence operations and its strategic agenda. For example, Hezbollah 
used as Ghassan bin Jiddo (the Al Jazeera Beirut chief) and Ibrahim al-Amin (a respected 
journalist who worked for several of the leading newspapers in Lebanon) to propagate 
Hezbollah messages outside of Lebanon. The group used Hussein Nablusi
 
442 to gain the 
trust of the western media networks covering the 2006 war to manipulate press coverage 
that resulted so that reports favored Hezbollah.443 Yet another example is Octavia Nasr, 
the senior editor of Middle Eastern affairs for CNN, who was fired in July 2010 for 
posting her respect and inferred support for Hezbollah icon Sayyed Mohammad Hussein 
on Twitter.444
The organization’s political activities serve as channels to bridge its grassroots 
and top-down influence strategies. In 1992, it began actively participating in Lebanon’s 
political framework. Its political activities have transformed over time and began to 
distance itself publicly from Iranian affiliation, with the intention of improving its image 
within Lebanon and the greater Arab world.
 Hezbollah’s deliberate targeting of the media reflects the depth of the 
group’s focus on nonlocal channels to generate desired effects.  
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government.446 Capitalizing on the perception of its omnipotence in Lebanon, Hezbollah 
used its political channels to position itself quietly to seize government control. It not 
only infiltrated Lebanese political channels; it developed controlling influence over the 
entire political network.447
Hezbollah’s creativity, innovation, and mutually supporting influence operations 
have created an environment of self-replicating channels that extend beyond specifically 
targeted audiences, which enhances Hezbollah’s progressive use of mediums that directly 
supports the group’s diverse message and deeds influence operations. Hezbollah’s 
penetration of channels and adept use of mediums extends the cognitive shelf life of its 
message and deeds, and reduces maintenance requirements for its influence operations.  
 
D. MEDIUMS 
Fueling its almost viral propagation is Hezbollah’s strictly controlled media 
empire, unrivaled by most nation states and designed to directly support its tactical and 
operational political-military influence operations.448
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 Hezbollah’s mediums are broken 
down into three distinct categories: organic Hezbollah-owned mediums, nonorganic 
Hezbollah direct and indirect influence mediums, and interpersonal mediums. Each 
medium is interrelated and interoperable. Unlike the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, 
Hezbollah possesses a robust methodology for employing mediums simultaneously 
across all levels of its operations. It uses a sophisticated mix of interpersonal, local 
media, and mass media mediums to solidify its influence effects with its channeling 
techniques. Hezbollah controlled mediums include TV, radio, publication houses, 
Internet websites, blogs, and more that are used to actively manipulate, infiltrate, and or 
influence third party media organizations to adopt Hezbollah’s influence messages and 
imagery passively to further spread its influence effects. Interpersonal mediums are used 
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to generate and solidify effects at the grassroots level. These mediums include recruiting 
through civil service programs, propagating messages and accounts of deeds through 
Hezbollah owned/sponsored mosques and madrassas, ideological manipulation of local 
education programs, and its most innovative medium to date—a Hezbollah theme park 
dedicated to the group’s ‘David versus Goliath’ so-called defeat of Israel during the 2006 
war.  
1. Organic Hezbollah Owned Mediums 
a. Hezbollah TV 
Hezbollah’s multi media empire flagship is its satellite TV Station Al-
Manar.449 Established in 1991 with funding from Iran’s revolutionary guards, Al-Manar 
has become the cornerstone of Hezbollah’s strategic influence endeavors to manipulate 
influential information and perceptions of various target audiences deliberately. Al-
Manar has grown from a fledgling TV station into a global satellite broadcast company 
with an active audience of 10–15 million viewers daily.450 The significance of Al-Manar 
is not the size of the station’s viewership, its global reach, or its influence on the mass 
media market. Its true impact rests with how interwoven the station is into Hezbollah’s 
grassroots influence operations. For example, in the 2006 war with Israel, every 
Hezbollah unit included a cameraman who recorded military and civil support 
operations.451 Regardless of the type operation and results of unit actions, the footage 
was manipulated for use on Al-Manar. After selectively editing the footage, adding in 
emotionally attuned music, and professional quality narration, the footage was included 
as centerpieces for Al-Manar’s daily broadcasts,452
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 which were subsequently picked up 
and re-broadcast by other mass media companies throughout the region and the world. 
During the war, Al-Manar’s broadcasts and newsfeeds appeared so factual and persuasive 
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that they gained significant viewership in Israel and the United States.453 In a number of 
cases, information supplied by Al-Manar directly impacted Israeli civilian audiences and 
the decision-making cycles of the Israeli Armed Forces (IAF).454 “Eventually, all of 
Israel’s TV stations began to broadcast Hezbollah’s videotapes because they were the 




Hezbollah also owns an Iranian funded radio station, Radio Nur,457 which 
became active with Hezbollah’s inception in 1982. Since then, Radio Nur’s station name 
has operated under several identities, each of which is a foretelling of Hezbollah’s 
ideological frame and primary target audiences. Originally known as The Voice of Islam, 
the station changed to The Voice of Faith, The Voice of the Oppressed, and now The 
Voice of Light (Sawt al-Nur or Radio Nur).458
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format to Al-Manar TV, but with the Lebanese population as the primary target audience. 
Each radio news broadcast provides a mirror of comparable stories with manipulated or 
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then conveyed to target audiences with exaggerated drama, emotionally charged music, 
and emotionally inciting verbiage. Examples of manipulated materials are discussed in 
further detail under Hezbollah’s nonorganic influenced mediums. 
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Complimenting Hezbollah’s radio and TV stations is its elaborate 
journalism and publishing operations. The group produces weekly papers and journals 
focusing on the organization’s ideological goals and monthly publications focused on 
religious topics. It employs sponsors and supports a pool of journalists inculcated into, or 
sympathetic to Hezbollah’s cause, the majority of whom work for one of Hezbollah’s 
major news publications. In addition to news publications, Hezbollah maintains no less 
than four publishing companies that produce a myriad of books, information pamphlets, 
social service information booklets, child education material, radical religious education 
materials, ideologically aligned coloring books, posters, and many other print-based 
projects.459
c. Internet Presence 
 Together with their news media, radio and TV capabilities, the group’s 
publications provide updates to news broadcasts disseminated over Hezbollah’s TV and 
radio stations. These mediums combine to serve as a general support mechanism for 
Hezbollah’s influence operations and supporting psychological warfare endeavors. 
With funding and technical support from Iran, Hezbollah first appeared on 
the Internet in 1997.460 The group has grown its overt and covert Internet presence to 
hundreds of websites with audiences and Internet addresses in countries on every 
continent of the globe. Its Internet presence incorporates local languages and dialects for 
foreign audiences targeted by the group’s psychological influence activities.461 Erlich 
and Kahati break Hezbollah’s Internet activity down into five groups: central news, 
Hezbollah-explicit media, Hezbollah sympathetic news, local town and village sites in 
South Lebanon, and sites belonging to or dedicated to social organizations.462
                                               
459 Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 60. Two of the 
largest, most famous, and overt Hezbollah publishing companies, include the Dar al-Hadi Publishing House 
and the Imam Khomeini Cultural Center. 
 
Hezbollah’s Internet footprint not only grants Hezbollah near limitless access to a global 
460 Ibid., 53. 
461 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), 
“Terrorism and the Internet: Hezbollah's Widespread Use of the Internet,” December 3, 2006, 
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/english/eng_n/html/hezbollah_int_e.htm. 
462 Erlich and Kahati belong to an Israeli-based think tank, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center. 
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audience, it allows Hezbollah to propagate synchronized propaganda live or in near real 
time, which allows it to transmit its psychological warfare imagery and information 
throughout the world as it is developed through their grassroots influence operations. 
Footage from Al-Manar, stories from Hezbollah backed or sponsored publications, 
discussion forums, blogs, and other social media activities are incorporated into 
Hezbollah’s cyber influence and psychological warfare programming. While each format 
may not be identical, the message themes and imagery of the group’s activities provide a 
holistic set of influence effects. 
Hezbollah employs hackers who scour the Internet, exploiting vulnerable 
private and commercial Internet sites as a means of establishing temporary 
communication and broadcast hubs. Each time a hacked site or Hezbollah sponsored site 
is eliminated, another one pops up somewhere else.463 “Hezbollah then gets the word out 
through e-mail and blogs” that it can be found at the new IP address and the next hacker 
hijack is underway.464 These hijacked sites are used to run recruitment videos, re-
broadcast Al-Manar TV programming, and broadcast numbers and finance information 
for supporters to deposit donations.465 Hezbollah’s overt websites and its sponsored 
hijacked sites provide the group with nearly unlimited access to multiple target 
audiences.466 These websites, including those belonging to Al-Manar, became a primary 
source of information for Israelis, Lebanese, and the world during its 2006 war with 
Israel.467
                                               
463 Hilary Hylton, “How Hizballah Hijacks the Internet,” Time, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1224273,00.html. 
 In doing so, Hezbollah’s web and TV mediums enabled their messages and 
manipulated information to infiltrate naturally across global audiences because of third 
party media and journalist channels. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Gabriel Weimann, “Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah’s Online Campaign,” New Media and 
Innovative Technologies, 2008, 17, http://web.bgu.ac.il/NR/rdonlyres/34396BDB-6C0E-4931-A077-
697451885123/34393/Weimannedited.pdf. 
466 Secondary audiences would undoubtedly have an adverse reaction to the hacker attacks, but the 
hacking is designed to reach audiences already aligned with Hezbollah through this medium. 
467 Brennen, Hezbollah: Psychological Warfare Against Israel, 22. 
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Hezbollah’s widespread Internet activity reinforces the group’s ability to 
conduct the tactical-operational-strategic tri-spectrum for influence operations. The 
group’s overt and covert cyber influence operations enable Hezbollah to exploit political 
opportunities, facilitate ideological frame alignment, sponsor resource mobilization, and 
enhance audience consciousness through frame amplification. The Internet medium 
synergizes Hezbollah’s messages, deeds, and channels more comprehensively than nearly 
any other medium. Although face-to-face interpersonal interaction remains the dominant 
tie for its social networks, Hezbollah’s use of social media has developed into a second 
tier of interpersonal connectivity (eSocial networks) allowing the group to infiltrate 
diverse audiences and mobilize global eSocial networks.468
d. Facebook 
 Hezbollah’s activity on 
Facebook is a prime example of its contemporary influence efforts. 
More than any other violent extremist group, Hezbollah arguably exploits 
Facebook’s global reach allowing the group to access new audiences and solidify its 
relevance to current audiences.469 Beginning in 2008, Hezbollah began its Facebook 
existence and now maintains an active presence through hundreds of Facebook pages and 
accounts. Some accounts are Hezbollah sponsored; many are accounts of leaders, 
members, and sympathizers to include Hezbollah’s vast leadership hierarchy.470 
Hezbollah’s Facebook fan and friend base is far reaching with over 100,000 fans spread 
across hundreds of Facebook pages.471
                                               
468 Second-tier interpersonal connectivity, as defined by the authors’, delineates face-to-face and 
electronic interpersonal communications as parallel real time social networks. It distinguishes traditional 
social networks that exist in real time and electronic social networks through social media that originate 
within the Internet on electronic social network sites, such as Facebook, for the purpose of spreading, 
sharing, and discussing information relevant to the network’s interested nodes and actors. 
 One of the most alarming and insightful views of 
Hezbollah’s Facebook medium are the displays of ongoing indoctrination of future  
 
469 Site Intel Group, “Social Network Jihad: Hezbollah’s Capitalization of Facebook,” 
http://news.siteintelgroup.com/component/content/article/8-social-network-jihad/477-social-network-jihad-
hezbollahs-capitalization-of-facebook. 
470 Ibid., Hezbollah’s Facebook accounts exist in no less than a dozen languages to include English, 
Arabic, French, Turkish, Spanish, Hebrew, Albanian, Urdu, and Farsi.  
471 Ibid. 
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generations of Hezbollah terrorists, insurgents, activists, and supporters. Figure 9’s 




Figure 9.   Examples of Hezbollah's Facebook Impact472
2. Nonorganic Mediums 
 
Hezbollah’s nonorganic mediums include CNN, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, the 
Associated Press, and a litany of other global TV, print, and radio news agencies and 
journalists. As discussed during the message and deeds section, the group deliberately 
attempts to influence foreign media and foreign audiences to justify its actions and 
further develop Hezbollah’s image. An example of Hezbollah’s adept awareness of 
foreign media and audience susceptibility was displayed during its 2006 war with Israel; 
the group spared no effort in attempting to seize the influence advantage by staging 
                                               
472 Site Intel Group, “Social Network Jihad: Hezbollah’s Capitalization of Facebook.” 
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emotionally charged scenes for foreign media.473 Photos and videos of the conflict were 
deliberately altered to create the perception of vast civilian casualties. The material was 
aired on international television and Internet feeds for several days until the doctored 
material was exposed in the international media.474 In some cases, foreign and regional 
media, along with civilian audiences, adopted Hezbollah information feeds from Al-
Manar TV and Internet sites and then used the manipulated information as primary 
sources for the war’s progress.475
One by one, they’ve been told to turn on their sirens and zoom off so that 
all the photographers here can get shots of ambulances rushing off to treat 
civilians....These ambulances aren’t responding to any new bombings. The 
sirens are strictly for effect…. Young men on motor scooters followed our 
every movement. They only allowed us to videotape certain streets, certain 
buildings.
 Evidence of Hezbollah’s information manipulation and 
capabilities emerged during and after the 2006 war when Anderson Cooper of CNN 
identified several instances of media manipulation while attending Hezbollah sponsored 
press events. In one example, Cooper commented on Hezbollah’s deceptive use of 
ambulances to generate perceptions of mounting civilian casualties: 
476
Other examples from the Israel Project nonprofit organization include:  
  
Australian Herald Sun published smuggled photos of Hezbollah militants 
conducting military operations in densely populated areas, which is illegal 




                                               
473 Kalb and Saivetz, “The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006,” 11. 
474 Ibid., 12. 
475 Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception,” 
173. 
476 Rich Noyes, “CNN's Anderson Cooper Exposes Hezbollah's Media Manipulation,” Newsbusters, 
http://newsbusters.org/node/6574. 
477 Chris Link, “Photos that Damn Hezbollah,” Australia Herald Sun, July 30, 2006, 
http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,,19955774-5007220,00.html. 
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A New York Times photograph of a Lebanese man in Tyre being rescued 
from the rubble of a bombed building was altered. Days later, the Times 
noted a potential error in the photograph after bloggers noticed the same 
man appeared in other photographs at the same scene looking clean and 
composed.478
A Lebanese civil rescue worker identified as Saleem Daher was shown in 
German newspapers and television in late July carrying the body of a dead 
boy from one location to another in an apparent attempt to enable various 
groups of cameramen to shoot the scene. On another occasion, Daher was 
shown reloading a body into an ambulance so journalists could “get a 




3. Interpersonal Mediums 
  
Hezbollah’s education, religious, medical, youth programs, and infrastructure 
improvement efforts also provide interpersonal mediums that reinforce the resonance of 
narrative. Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, made the following 
statement referencing the power of Hezbollah’s civil and social support organizations: 
While such services do have a considerable effect on the populace, the 
essence of participation ultimately resides in belief in the overall path. 
Social work serves to enrich supporters’ confidence in the viability of the 
Party’s cause and course, as it cooperates, collaborates and joins forces to 
remain strong and tenacious in its political and resistance roles.480
These services are also duplicated throughout Hezbollah’s larger international 
enclaves. Hezbollah’s grassroots social service mediums are active in Paraguay, Africa, 
France, Canada, and even in the United States. Hezbollah-funded mosques and madrassas 
are obvious mediums, but they also serve as combined message and deeds, channels, and 
medium mechanisms. Hezbollah resourced Islamic education centers serve as mediums 
and channels that target the youth by mixing traditional sciences with its ideological and 
 
                                               
478 “Framing the Story,” The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/aug/9/20060809-090136-3068r/. 
479 Israel Insider Staff, “Media Experts Convene to Discuss how Mideast War is Waged in 
Blogosphere at Herzlyia Conference,” Israel Insider, http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=1645. 
480 Qassem and Khalil, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 165. 
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religious teachings.481
Hezbollah’s latest example of the interpersonal medium-channel-message-and-
deed phenomenon is its theme park, “Landmark for the Resistance.” Established in 2010 
south of Beirut in the Mleeta area, the park cost approximately $4 million to construct. In 
the first month of operation, more than 500,000 people visited the park.
 Similarly, Hezbollah’s micro-finance and credit services provide a 
medium for recruitment, rapport building, and ultimately, enable the group’s influence 
efforts to subvert local status quo as it draws in non-Shia supporters. 
482
 
 Figures 10 and 
11 exemplify the brilliance and alarming effects this medium has provided for Hezbollah. 
 
Figure 10.   Today Show News Report on Hezbollah's Theme Park483
The theme park’s documentary provides a glimpse of its multi-tiered influence 
effects supporting Hezbollah’s anti-Israel and Lebanese nationalism influence narratives 
 
                                               
481 See Hezbollah social service discussion in the message and deeds section. 
482 Alistair Lyon, “Devoted Crowds Throng Hezbollah's Lebanon Theme Park,” Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/11/us-lebanon-hezbollah-
idUSTRE67A2RF20100811?pageNumber=1. 
483 “Hizballah's New War Theme Park,” TIME.com, 
http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,593331362001_2013651,00.html. 
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(see link in footnote for Figure 10). It is an organic interpersonal medium for Hezbollah 
that facilitates influence messages and documented deeds to resonate at an emotional 
level with visitors, which is not unlike war memorials incorporating personalized 
documentaries in other countries. The park provides a three-dimensional medium that 
freezes an astutely cultivated perception about Hezbollah. Through elaborate and artistic 
use of music, emotionally interactive and staged personal accounts, as well as the use of 
captured Israeli war materials, such as tanks, rockets, etc., the park conveys Hezbollah as 
a champion of all Lebanese. Images of ‘resistance’ against Israel are combined with 
imagery of alleged Israeli atrocities intended to generate powerful and emotional 
influence effects to support Hezbollah. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Time Video Screen Captures Documenting Hezbollah’s Anti Israel Theme 
Park484
                                               
484 “Hizballah's New War Theme Park.” 
 
 152 
4. Assessing Hezbollah’s Mediums 
Hezbollah’s diverse use of mediums enables the group to conduct influence 
operations across diverse social landscapes, while simultaneously facilitating Hezbollah’s 
centrally controlled influence narratives and operations.485
E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES 
 The group’s vast collection of 
mediums enables the group to disseminate its influence messages and accounts of its 
influence actions in real and near real time. The array of mediums also enables them to 
synchronize messages and deeds on a global scale through various target audience 
languages. Simultaneously managing and supporting divisive, subversive, and defensive 
influence operations, Hezbollah’s tactical and operational level influence operations 
alternate in primacy, as their strategic mediums provide over arching reinforcement and 
validation. 
1. Summary of Hezbollah Influence 
Hezbollah is a calculating organization that ensures its military, influence, 
political, social, and economic operations maximize psychological impacts on the enemy, 
its constituency, future supporters and neutral audiences alike.486 Its influence operations 
intuitively use SMT principles but also displays a complimentary and supporting use of 
PIM, which provides it with an overwhelming influence effect.487
                                               
485 For a complete definition and presentation, see Steven R. Corman and Kevin J. Dooley, “Strategic 
Communication on a Rugged Landscape,” 2008, http://comops.org/article/121.pdf. 
 It essentially employs 
uniquely tailored influence operations for each target audience and its respective sub 
audiences, while maintaining a centrally controlled influence narrative from the 
organization’s leadership through its owned and controlled mediums. 
486 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 8. 
487 From a modeling perspective, Hezbollah demonstrates a hybrid of Arizona State University’s 
strategic communication on a rugged landscape model with aspects of ASU’s critical assessment of a 
simple Strategic Communication landscape methodology. For more information, see Corman and Dooley, 
“Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape.” 
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Hezbollah’s has used Israel as it framing anchor point since 1982. It has exploited 
Israel’s military interventions, settlement practices, air strikes, counter rocket fires, and 
political policies to galvanize Hezbollah’s primary and secondary audiences in line with 
the group’s Lebanonization influence campaigns. This tactic, in conjunction with its 
relaxation of strict Shia fanaticism, alleviated elements of Hezbollah’s burden toward 
continuous frame maintenance. Following the 2006 war, Israel became a cognitive 
rallying point for Hezbollah’s nationalization narrative, bringing Lebanese Sunnis, 
Christians, and Druze together (to a degree) with Hezbollah’s Shia and Palestinian 
constituencies.488
The organization spends hundreds of millions of dollars on social service 
programs that serve as its primary grassroots influence and mobilization mechanism for 
varied population groups, rival political factions, and rival religious factions.
 Israeli vilification is such a powerful influence narrative for Hezbollah 
that the group can minimize tactical influence operations previously needed to subvert or 
eliminate local competitors because its influence effects become nearly self sustainable.  
489 Its use of 
message and deeds, channels, and mediums are synchronized to such a degree that it 
affects SMT principle simultaneously.490
                                               
488 According to the Beirut Center for Research and Information’s polling during the 2006 Israel-
Lebanon conflict, 87% of Lebanese supported Hezbollah's “retaliatory attacks on northern Israel,” which 
included statistics from non-Shia communities. Reportedly, 80% of Lebanese Christians voiced support for 
Hezbollah, 80% of Druze supported, and 89% support from Lebanese Sunnis. Given Hezbollah’s history 
and embedded nature through Lebanon’s political, social, and economic sectors the statistics are 
questionable, but even if the numbers are inflated by no less than 50%, they depict a growing alignment of 
former rivals to Hezbollah. From Blanford, “Hizbullah Steps Up Psychological Warfare.” 
 Its alignment of ideological goals with other 
social groups under the premise of common grievances and expectations has enabled the 
group to marginalize competitors while also gathering support from seemingly disparate 
populations and political groups. The social and civic influence programs not only 
facilitate continued resource support from state sponsors (Syria and Iran), but also 
generate populace resource mobilization through participation in the social programs, 
financial institutions, semi-private schools, and open solicitation for constituent 
donations. Hezbollah loosened its strict Islamic governance in its controlled areas, 
489 Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 40. 
490 Hezbollah’s message and deeds also directly impact political and economical stability through its 
micro financing, credit cards, and the group’s active role in Lebanese politics.  
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specifically with clothing and limiting the amount of religious instruction in its schools 
while focusing on secular topics, such as math, sciences, and foreign languages (to 
include English).491 The social embedded nature within the Shia population, and now 
throughout southern Lebanon, has made Hezbollah an intractable body within Lebanese 
society and politics.492
2. Message and Deeds 
 
Hezbollah is successfully developing a nationalism effect among the disparate 
population groups by vilifying and exploiting Israeli military actions, in conjunction with 
the Lebanese government’s inability to compete with Hezbollah’s social and political 
mechanisms. Israel’s invasions have served as an influence catalyst for Hezbollah’s 
successes, more so than perhaps Hezbollah could have achieved without Israel’s 
invasions. Hezbollah learned from its operations and distanced itself from unpopular 
terrorist activities to only target Israeli soldiers, Lebanese Christian militiamen, and select 
Israeli civilian centers.493 Although Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel in 
tit-for-tat responses, it appeared much more successful in perception management.494 
During the 2006 war, messages targeting international and Israeli audiences, focused on 
civilian losses and Hezbollah resistance, generated influence dominance as Israeli media, 
international media, and local channels increasingly adopted the group’s messages.495
                                               
491 Shawn T. Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Non-Profits as Social 
Resistance,” Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (June 11, 2009): 126, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2009.00396.x/pdf. 
 All  
 
 
492 Simmons, Socially Embedded Insurgencies, 30. 
493 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 83–88. 
494 Ibid., 85. 
495 After the war, Hezbollah launched an extensive propaganda campaign to inculcate target audiences 
with the perception of their “divine victory.” The campaign was based on three elements: the IDF’s failure 
to stop or significantly reduce Hezbollah rocket fire throughout the war; the harsh internal criticism 
exposing IDF failures and mistakes made public for Hezbollah’s continued exploitation; and Israeli 
achievements and Hezbollah’s failures were not sufficiently emphasized, and subsequently, not carried into 
Lebanon and the Arab world preventing an undermining of Hezbollah’s victory myth. From Adam Elkus, 
“The Hezbollah Myth and Asymmetric Warfare,” Small Wars Journal (August 15, 2010): 4, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/497-elkus.pdf. 
 155 
these efforts created a massing of message and deed resonance across Hezbollah areas of 
influence and into areas of Hezbollah interest, such as the Lebanese political system and 
international opinion.  
3. Channels 
Penetrating numerous friendly, neutral, and adversarial socio-political structures 
and networks through the manipulation of organic channels produces an array of effects 
and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework.496 This 
penetration enables the development of situational awareness and flexibility to respond to 
changing or emerging social and political opportunities allowing the group to adapt to 
changing environments, which SMT theorists refer to as “tactical innovation.”497 By 
developing social and political intelligence, the group maintains an asymmetric 
advantage to exploit or affect social networks and ensure “political conditions are ripe for 
successful and sustained contention.”498 Hezbollah’s artificial channels targeting social 
networks outside of Lebanon (such as in South America and Israel) allow it to maintain 
and expand the organization’s resources.499 By penetrating numerous networks through 
channels, the group continuously manipulates collective action, movement diffusion, and 
flexibility, which fuels local and global resource mobilization.500
Hezbollah’s use of channels is a catalyst for framing. Its employment of channels 
is methodical and sophisticated. Channels provide a validation and credibility ingredient, 
enabling the organization to adapt and synchronize messages, deeds, and mediums in a 
mutually reinforcing fashion. Hezbollah’s use of channels not only increases the validity 
of its message and deeds, it integrates the organization into local communities and social 
  
                                               
496 Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception,” 
174. 
497 Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” American Sociological Review 
48, no. 6 (1983): 736, http://www.nd.edu/~rmcveigh/change/McAdam.pdf. 
498 Colin J. Beck, “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” 
Sociology Compass 2, no. 5 (September 2008): 5, 
http://pages.pomona.edu/~cjb14747/pdfs/Beck_SMTandTerrorism.pdf. 
499 Levitt, “Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach,” 4–5. 
500 Beck, “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” 14. 
 156 
structures.501 The end result is increased solidarity, improved desired effects, and 
increased alignment with Hezbollah’s stated and unstated objectives, all of which become 
a cyclical series of influence operations and effects.502
4. Mediums 
  
It all connects. Hezbollah’s mediums serve the message-deed-message-deed cycle 
by enabling a massing of effects across the operational spectrum. Hezbollah’s TV, radio 
(a local tertiary mechanism), publishing houses, journalists, Internet, and eSocial 
mediums reveal the depth of Hezbollah’s ability to spread its messages across target 
audiences and locations. Its widespread Internet activity reinforces the group’s ability to 
conduct the tactical-operational-strategic tri-spectrum for influence operations. The 
Internet medium synergizes its messages, deeds, and channels more comprehensively 
than nearly any other medium. Although face-to-face interpersonal interaction remains 
the dominant social network tie, Hezbollah’s use of social media has developed into a 
second tier of interpersonal connectivity allowing the group to infiltrate diverse audiences 
and mobilize global eSocial networks.503
5. Hezbollah Influence Vulnerabilities 
 Ultimately, mediums ensure the group’s 
primary and secondary audiences are continuously bombarded by Hezbollah’s three lines 
of influence. 
While this case study focuses on the sophistication and successes of Hezbollah’s 
influence methodology, many shortfalls and vulnerabilities do exist. Hezbollah’s current 
monopoly over its primary target audiences makes exploiting the group’s vulnerabilities 
                                               
501 Roger V. Gould, “Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871,” American 
Sociological Review 56, no. 6 (1991): 716, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2096251.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
502 Beck, “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” 9. 
503 Second tier interpersonal connectivity, as defined by the authors’, delineates face-to-face and 
electronic interpersonal communications as parallel real time social networks. It distinguishes traditional 
social networks that exist in real time and electronic social networks through social media that originate 
within the internet on electronic social network sites such as Facebook for the purpose of spreading, 
sharing, and discussing information relevant to the network’s interested nodes and actors. 
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challenging.504 Hezbollah remains rooted in a radical, or literal, Islamist movement, but 
the group has also placed itself into the world of conventional politics with its 
nationalization and Lebanonization narratives and actions.505 Any Hezbollah 
transformation away from ‘armed resistance’ is a potential challenge to its hegemony 
over the Lebanese Shia and emerging influence of the Christians, Sunni, and Druze.506
Historically, when contradictions and weaknesses in Hezbollah’s messages were 
exposed and exploited, the group responded with anger in emotion.
 In 
both instances, Hezbollah is vulnerable by its own political creation. Its Shia ties will be 
increasingly intolerable and threaten the group’s fragile influence over rival religious and 
social groups, thereby opening political and social gaps for third-party exploitation. As 
the group continues to dominate Lebanese politics, it risks becoming the ruling political 
machine for Lebanon. Doing so would place Hezbollah in the unenviable position of 
responsibility for all Lebanese, and place the group in a corner of responsibility readily 
exploitable with the correct methods and tools. 
507
                                               
504 For example, Hezbollah lost legitimacy in the mid-1980s when it attempted to enforce Islamic 
order and practice the Sharia within its controlled areas. Hezbollah banned the sale of alcohol in shops and 
restaurants and prohibited parties, dancing, and offensive music. These actions facilitated economic distress 
in southern Lebanon as tourism and commerce rapidly dwindled. Hassan Nasrallah would capitalize on 
these lesson learned by Muhammed Fadlallah to create more advanced influence efforts (both subtle and 
overt). From Judith Miller, “Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan Al-Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah,” 
Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 129–131, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20046933.pdf. 
 Although the 
group’s rivals failed to exploit these contradictions in the past, the attempts expose 
potential avenues of approach to counter and subvert Hezbollah within its own sphere of 
influence. Israel is ill positioned to exploit Hezbollah’s influence vulnerabilities due to its 
perceived antagonistic role. A credible competitor and its heterogeneous growth remain 
Hezbollah’s largest vulnerabilities. A sustained investment through a perceived 
benevolent benefactor is required to subvert Hezbollah’s influence efforts against 
Lebanese target audiences. 
505 Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception,” 
185. 
506 Ibid. 
507 Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 32. 
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Pushing Hezbollah’s nationalism narrative and political control beyond the 
group’s ability to manage and manipulate is potentially the most practical course of 
action. Forcing the group farther along the road of legitimacy, ownership, and political 
responsibility for Lebanon could stress present interpersonal, social, and religious friction 
points within the group and among its constituency. The IRA and the Muslim National 
Liberation Front in the Philippines serve as prime examples. Internal struggles, social and 
political bias, greed, corruption, and third-party sponsors, such as Iran, are critical 
vulnerabilities and influence pressure points. The situation can be cultivated to employ 
influence operations through unconventional and irregular warfare, but would require a 
comparable synchronization and investment to Hezbollah and its benefactors. Once 
Hezbollah is sufficiently embedded as an official political power holder responsible for 
the good, bad, and ugly of the nation, it can be canalized to become further benevolent or 
repressive. The latter places Hezbollah at risk for facilitation of competitive social 
movements to capitalize on the growing heterogeneity and political grievances generated 
through Hezbollah’s expansion. Through effective counter influence operations using 
resonant framing of messages/deeds, and generation of counter channels within 
Hezbollah’s influence, it may be possible to lessen Hezbollah’s influence over time. 
Specific prescriptive implications to exploit Hezbollah’s growing influence and other 




In this chapter. the strengths and weaknesses of each case are addressed and 
compared. Specifically, how message and deeds, channels, and mediums affected each 
case, as well as the common trends across the case studies. The exportable opportunities 
and vulnerabilities shared by the cases, or specific to a particular case, are discussed to 
identify replicable counter measures and preemptive influence operations. The way 
forward is then presented with associated limits and constraints inherent in U.S. 
prevailing influence methodology, followed by policy recommendations and future 
research opportunities. 
The influence strategies of the Viet Cong, Shining Path, Jemaah Islamiyah, and 
Hezbollah all exemplify successful and unsuccessful influence operations as defined in 
this thesis. Their respective successes demonstrate the application of effective influence 
operations based on the principle of bottom-up mobilization and coordinated resonance to 
achieve their desired effects. Conversely, uncoordinated top-down attempts at influence 
operations resulted in losing the influence initiative, generating counter influence 
vulnerabilities, and prevented mobilization toward the desired end state. Each case 
exemplifies the importance of deeds validating the message, viral propagation through 
channels, and the need for mediums to mass the influence effects to achieve decisive 
influence and generating the desired effects from target audiences.  
B. CASE STUDY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
1. The Viet Cong 
The Viet Cong case represents a strong case of effective influence operations 
based on their combined and coordinated use of message and deeds, channels, and 
mediums. Viet Cong strengths rested with their messages and deeds, and use of artificial 
and natural channels. Their use of mediums relied heavily on interpersonal face-to-face 
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mediums to keep messages and deeds credible, whether benevolent or threatening, which 
epitomized the carrot-stick methodology. Embedded cadre (special influence) teams 
maintained physical and omnipresence within local villages to align them through a 
systematic plan to subvert the social and political status quo. Coordinated infiltration of 
communities across provinces massed the Viet Cong’s influence and undermined 
competing initiatives. Their influence effects spread naturally through channels and 
subverted or absorbed local competition to achieve sufficient mobilization. Without 
comparable counter-influence initiatives, the Viet Cong’s influence operations were 
relatively unimpeded. 
The Viet Cong were vulnerable to variations of their own tactics and techniques, 
and susceptible through their own lines of influence being replicated and used against 
them. Counter narratives not predicated on violence were more resonate. For instance, 
Marine CAPS and similar SOF influence programs directly challenged VC influence 
efforts (message and deeds, channels, and mediums) by embedding at the village level, 
where they displayed isolated examples of success as opposed to the wider U.S. war 
effort. These successes demonstrate that the VC influence program was ultimately 
susceptible to counter-influence efforts at the grassroots level.  
2. Shining Path 
Shining Path was the weakest of the case studies; its one redeeming strength was 
its ability to achieve an effective economy of influence by infiltrating and manipulating 
rural educational systems. In doing so, Shining Path often drew in young local actors 
from rural areas, indoctrinated them, organized cadres, and then reintegrated them back 
into communities’ artificial channels. However, it should be noted that this success had 
more to do with the absence of competition than Shining Path’s doctrine of influence 
operations. 
Shining Path’s general use of influence displayed limited aspects of effective 
influence and SMT methods. The group displayed dogmatic and hierarchical adherence 
to Guzman and his ideology, but its susceptibility to losing Guzman was a critical 
vulnerability that led to its demise. Shining Path’s primary target audience was 
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indigenous, but its use of symbols and messages were not, which limited its resonance. 
Furthermore, the group was generally unconcerned about the needs of the populace it was 
trying to influence. Shining Path’s narrative illustrated its inability to use local actors and 
groups effectively as channels of influence, demonstrated by the group’s prevalence for 
violence. Additionally, its use of violence often led to a backlash from peasants. The 
leverage gained from using violence as a coercive tool was also mitigated by the 
government’s own willingness to use it. Ultimately, Shining Path obtained compliance 
through fear, but once Guzman was jailed, it became clear that compliance out of fear is 
no substitute for actual cognitive realignment.  
3. Jemaah Islamiyah  
JI demonstrates a mix of effective and ineffective influence operations. SMT 
principles were displayed through their effectiveness as a mobilization tool and their 
subsequent transformation into MMI and JAT. JI’s strengths were its doctrine and 
Pesantren education network. However, its secretive nature impaired its ability to employ 
effective influence operations. JI’s fracturing and evolution to MMI and JAT 
demonstrated a change in its influence paradigm. Previously, JI was predicated on 
violence and secrecy as an influence strategy; MMI and JAT expanded its scope to 
become more grassroots focused, displaying improved coordination of influence efforts 
using outreach and exploiting the Indonesian socio-political system. MMI and JAT 
messages exploit social grievance vulnerabilities supported with relative and responsive 
initiatives. They mask the groups’ aberrant Islamist objectives, which facilitates narrative 
adoption and propagation by natural channels. Their mediums show increased 
sophistication, synchronization, and resonance with the groups’ target audiences, but 
intergroup friction presents obvious vulnerabilities for exploitation. 
A significant vulnerability to JI-MMI-JAT is the Indonesian government’s 
inaction to counter the growing Islamist influence initiative. Meaningful efforts by the 
Indonesian government to address shortfalls, political grievances at local levels and 
confront Islamist narratives create opportunities for marginalizing the Islamist insurgents. 
One of the largest vulnerabilities is Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as a spiritual Islamist leader and 
 162 
the ideological connector for JI, MMI, and JAT. His removal could exacerbate existing 
friction between the groups and escalate their rivalries. Presently, little evidence of 
counter influence initiatives against the groups exists, especially within their growth 
industries of eSocial networks and social media. Delving into these mediums creates 
additional opportunities for ideological challenges and criticism that can entangle them in 
debates to justify their ideological framework. The increasing interconnectivity in 
Indonesian Internet service provides opportunities to subvert and exploit JI though the 
use of eSocial mediums by generating channels through social media networks.  
4. Hezbollah 
Of the analyzed case studies, Hezbollah represents the most effective example of 
influence operations. Since its inception, it has transformed from a simple terrorist 
organization and implemented a coordinated, evolving, and proactive influence model, 
enabling the group to align disparate audiences and competitors. It is the most adept at 
message and deeds with its subversion of competitors as it coordinates influence 
operations across villages and population groups through indigenously relative activities 
and narratives. Its grassroots bottom up approach to influence supported by overarching 
top down singularly controlled messaging creates a massing effect. Hezbollah’s 
indigenous resonance facilitates its artificial channel infiltration and natural channel 
adoption to create self-sustaining influence mechanisms. Its mediums are innovative, 
diverse, and interpersonal, which creates synergy when incorporated with message and 
deed and channel variables. 
However, weaknesses do exist within Hezbollah’s influence model. The larger 
and more political responsibility the group assumes, the more susceptible it becomes to 
social expectations. Essentially, the more Hezbollah assumes the burden of governing, 
the more susceptible it is to the creation of new grievances and the exploitation of those 
grievances through counter social mobilization movements. Hezbollah remains a Shia-
centric group with dependent ties to Iran. Its relationship with Iran is a concern of the 
Lebanese population and is a potential line of influence against it if implemented in an  
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indigenously resonant strategy. Forcing the group into continued political responsibility 
coupled with comparable influence competitors (who will require external support for 
long-term operations) has the potential to subvert Hezbollah’s influence model. 
5. Trends 
Pursuant to the methodology proposed in the first chapter (see Figure 12), case 
study analysis supports the efficacy of this model. In general, the case studies indicate the 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions of the three variables (and subsequent hypotheses) 
in the model. Analysis indicates message and deeds, channels, and mediums are all 
necessary to achieve effective influence. However, groups can conduct influence at the 
grassroots level without a robust use of mediums, but incorporating a multitude of 
resonant mediums serves as an accelerant to the overall influence effort. When all three 
variables are maximized to the greatest extent possible, decisive influence is achieved. Of 
the cases assessed, the Hezbollah case study most closely approximates decisive 
influence operations by maximizing the application of all three variables. 
 
  
Figure 12.   The Influence Operation Model 
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To the degree each case study demonstrated the use of influence, based on the 
principles of this model, they achieved desired effects toward their ultimate objectives. 
They show that deliberately planned and synergized actions that validate messages across 
multiple lines of influence are essential to effective influence warfare. However, they also 
demonstrated that when groups attempt to validate deeds rather than messages, they are 
significantly less successful. The combined use of physical and nonphysical actions 
selectively aimed at target audiences’ social and cognitive vulnerabilities exemplifies the 
advantages of operating at a grassroots level. States or national power holders who 
typically display a trend of neglecting or ignoring good governance and influence at local 
levels sacrifice a natural advantage to defend local populations from subversion. 
C. OPERATIONALIZING THE INFLUENCE MODEL 
The United States can adapt the techniques demonstrated in the case studies and 
proposed influence operations methodology to directly challenge and subvert the 
influence activities of insurgent and terrorist groups at a grassroots level. The influence 
operation methodology is a natural component of SOF missions, with the use of 
psychological warfare for influence operations to drive the operational environment for 
UW, FID, IW, COIN, and other mission requirements. In 2008, SOCOM reversed the 
lines of operations in CONPLAN 7500 from direct to indirect approaches as the main 
effort for future operations, recognizing the necessity of influence as the primary strategy 
in future counterterrorism efforts.508
  
 However, since 2008, SOCOM has yet to 
operationalize this change fully, demonstrating a capability and cultural gap within the 
interagency structure. Figure 13 illustrates operationalized influence operations as a 
primary effort (if given the appropriate attention and resourcing) by synergizing 
replicable attributes of the thesis within current SOF constructs, and the adaptability 
across the spectrum of operations. 
                                               




Figure 13.   Operational Implementation 
By its very nature, SOF operates within local grassroots environments. SOF 
actors are ideally situated to embed locally and generate social intelligence. Social 
intelligence is incorporated into wider coordinated influence operations across time and 
space to affect multiple target audiences and continuously shape the operating 
environment, which can include the full range of kinetic and nonkinetic actions. The 
social intelligence gathered facilitates the creation of indigenously resonate efforts where 
deeds directly support messages to generate multiple desired influence effects. 
Simultaneously, SOF coordinates with Title 10 and Title 50 intelligence coupled with 
special influence assets to develop and employ artificial channels to energize natural 
channels that then penetrate local networks and propagate influence effects. JIATF and/or 
SOTF elements, and their influence agents, ensure influence efforts are coordinated 
across the operational environment that creates the necessary massing and 
synchronization to affect multiple target audience and adversary vulnerabilities. While 
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completely replicable, which can be implemented to varying degrees of success 
throughout present operations, several constraints and limitations prevent optimal 
implementation.  
D. LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
The DoD does not possess an offensive special influence capability needed to 
fully actualize the influence prescription above. Current U.S. information actors are 
inherently defensively focused and reactive in influence application. Recent Bottom-Up 
Reviews (BUR) and Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs) identify shortfalls in 
training and integration of intelligence support within the influence career fields.509
                                               
509 U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating 
Concept (JOC) v2.0 (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2010), 7, 12–13, 
 
Influence operations are a methodology that requires more deliberate focus. To conduct 
influence operations as prescribed above, current authorities, doctrine, and organization 
design must adapt to asymmetric influence threats, as well as the need to develop an 
offensive influence capability to directly engage emerging terrorist, insurgent, and other 
nonstate actors. Although influence is frequently used in contemporary plans and policy, 
its scope and relevance is not fully encapsulated at all levels of operations. Implementing 
adequate influence through a bottom-up approach is increasingly problematic given the 
blurring of roles and responsibilities. Unconventional warfare, Special Forces’ distinctive 
core competency, cites influencing behavior, attitudes, and perceptions of targeted 
audiences as a key task. This task is the distinctive core competency of psychological 
operations whose mission is to selectively influence an audience’s behavior, disposition, 
and perceptions. However, PSYOP needs to evolve from predominantly defensive nature 
to a specially trained and selected force focused on offensive influence against an 
adversary’s influence operations. The current U.S. influence focus is traditionally 






Department of State, Strategic Communications, Psychological Operations, Public 
Affairs, and Information Operations are predominantly defensive in nature in terms of 
executing influence operations.510
E. THE WAY FORWARD 
  
A capability gap exists within the DoD and SOCOM to execute offensive 
influence operations and defeat adversaries’ endeavors to subvert U.S. support through 
malicious influence and mobilization of populations. Coupled with continued indirect 
approach requirements to maintain and expand influence initiatives, a special influence 
capability with appropriate authorities is needed to conduct influence operations 
effectively. This capability fulfills the operational requirements needed to execute the 
indirect approach by coordinating and massing full spectrum influence effects, and 
attacking adversaries within their own influence and information safe havens. Just as 
special mission units within the SOF community are inherently offensive in nature, it is 
time for the creation of a Special Influence Unit (SIU) for the express purpose of 
executing and synergizing offensive influence warfare as part of an enduring indirect 
strategy against asymmetric threats. Similar to the Hezbollah model, message and deed 
synergy is required from the tactical to strategic levels. Greater interagency coordination 
is required for a holistic focus on the importance of influence and achieving a 
synchronized whole of government approach to support bottom up/grassroots influence 
mobilization. To develop the way forward fully and identify necessary requirements to 
establish special influence capabilities and realign the U.S. approach to influence 
operations, a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF) study is needed at the DoD and SOCOM level. 
                                               
510 PSYOP’s recent name change to Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) generates 
further confusion regarding purpose and role in relation to Influence Operations, STRATCOM, Public 
Diplomacy, and the nebulous construct of IO to coordinate the information actors rather IO trying to 
become operational actor itself.   
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F. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
Several opportunities exist to expand the scope of research, which can be broken 
down into the following topics. 
• Organizational design analysis of SIU. 
• Organizational design of other influence organizations’ efficacy within the 
DoD and Interagency. 
• The use of influence methodologies by other actors, such as Iran and its 
sponsorship of social unrest throughout the Middle East, China’s approach 
to influence, Singapore’s Community Engagement Programme [sic] 
(CEP), as well as other historical case studies. 
• Study of social influence theories outside of SMT. 
• Social Network Analysis within offensive and defensive influence warfare 
to align population groups and communities. 
• Other influence methodologies incorporating social media, eSocial 
networks, mobile communications, religious narratives and counter 
narratives, and guerilla marketing techniques. 
• What does the whole of government approach to influence look like, such 
as a compare and contrast of the U.S. approach to influence between the 
Cold War and today? 
• Is there a correlation between influence operations model proposed in this 
thesis, and state successes, such as El Salvador, the Philippines (including 
JSOTF-P, the Huk rebellion, and Pershing suppression of the Moro 
rebellion), Malaysia in 1954, Singapore, and Columbia vs. Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
G. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Influence Operations are a fundamental strategic component for the United States 
to meet current and emerging threats. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the 
U.S.’s vulnerability to confront sub-national groups and nonstate actors as they 
continuously strive to subvert the United States using asymmetric influence advantages. 
The incorporation and specialized implementation of influence operations across the 
operational spectrum serves to address vulnerabilities that routinely take decades and 
billions of dollars to overcome. Based on Congressional SECDEF and interagency 
assessments, it is widely acknowledged that unity of effort and a change in methodology 
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is required to fix current shortfalls in U.S. influence and information warfare. By 
studying current and future threats, similar to those studied within this thesis, influence 
operations can be improved and tailored to meet threats at a community level, across 
geographic divides, and within inaccessible areas of operations to ultimately facilitate 
U.S. national objectives and gain influence superiority. All operations by their nature 
achieve influence, but superiority will only be achieved when influence drives operations. 
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